

**A GENETIC HISTORY OF THE PROBLEMS OF
PHILOSOPHY**



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BY

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


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FOREWORD

I wish my father were alive to-day, to write out the preface of his own book. But however much I tried to hasten up the publication of this book, the wings of death proved too swift for my abilities. Mother died by an accident, and the tragedy proved so shocking to father that his health broke down within a few weeks of it and death came soon after.

The writing out of a genetic treatment of the problems of philosophy was the one absorbing interest of father's life. As he tells in the body of his book, he conceived of this system of philosophy as early as 1890 and then devoted the greater part of his life in carrying on extensive studies of all systems of philosophy for developing and verifying his views. After he retired from service, he took up the writing out of this book. But problems of women's education and social reform proved a stronger attraction for him and the founding of women's institutions and the organisation of social reform leagues used up all his energies and there was little progress made. Things went on like this till 1930 when father's health began to break down under pressure of hard work, on the lines indicated above. His old age and weak condition of health made it risky as well as impossible for him now, to take up the work. At my suggestion, therefore, a plan was formed that I should write out the book for him on the basis of the synopsis prepared by him, after necessary modifications.

That was how I took up the work in 1931. Father had himself written the whole of the first chapter of the book and the first portion of the second chapter. The rest of the book is entirely my own writing, though based on the synopsis prepared



by father. Our method was that I would meet with father from time to time and discuss points to be dealt with in a chapter and then I would actually write it out. As my profession compelled me to live away from father, such meetings were few and far between and beyond verifying the general lines of thought taken up by me, by discussion with father, I had to depend wholly on myself for developing the details.

After working incessantly and as hastily as I could, I found in November 1933, that I had finished the work. The revision had yet to be done when news came that father was seriously ill. I raced to Calcutta and was just fortunate enough to attend him on his bedside for the last four days of his life. In course of our talks, I could only let him know that his book had been finished and he was glad to learn it. Cruel death was not slow in snatching him away from us and all hopes of my having the book corrected by father were shattered to bits. This is, in short, the history of the book. The incidents are sad and unfortunate and revive memories in the mind which are too painful to remember. I stop here therefore.

It may, therefore, be seen that the book, as it is being placed in the hand of the reader, is not what it could have been. It lacks the depth and scholarship of my dear father and in place of that, all that I could give was my utmost devotion in shaping out his thoughts and ideas. It should be made clear in this connection that I am in complete agreement with my father's views and have no different philosophy of my own. I am not only his son but his pupil as well. To none else are the shortcomings of the book more apparent than to me. I can only assure the reader that whatever merit there is in it, is my father's and for the defects the responsibility is wholly mine.

The book is not so much a history of philosophy, as the shaping out of a new system of philosophy, based on a new method of its own, which it calls the genetic method of the treatment of philosophy. Unlike ordinary histories of

philosophy, therefore, it does not take upon itself the duty of dealing in detail with the various systems of philosophy. By way of demonstrating its fundamental principle, however, that all problems of philosophy pass through the three stages of harmony, conflict and subsequent re-establishment of harmony, it compares and makes reference to all important systems, with regard to their viewpoints, about each problem. In this manner, it is also incidentally, a book on comparative philosophy. But we should not lose sight of the central fact that it holds forward a new theory of the totality of reality.

The possibilities of the genetic method have been outlined, in sufficient detail, in the first chapter of the book. The great contribution of the evolutionistic philosophers is the discovery that in biological development, the successive stages of growth in an individual animal or plant, appear in the same order as, and are analogous to, the successive stages of the life-history of the species. This repetition of the order of growth in the race, in the life-history of the individual, is known as the Law of Recapitulation. My father's viewpoint is that this law equally holds good of psychological, emotional as well as mental development of mankind. The present book applies this law to the growth of all problems of philosophy and, therefore, applies it to mental development.

As the law holds good of psychology also, it is also believed that it can be applied with advantage to the founding of a good method of teaching. My father actually applied it to this aspect of the mind, by evolving a special method of his own, for teaching the Bengali Alphabet to children. A translation of portions of the introduction to this book of his, dealing with the genetic method of teaching the Bengali Alphabet, is given at the end of the book, in form of Appendix I, for the information of the reader.

Similarly, he applied the genetic law to the development of such a complex emotion of the human mind as love, in an

introduction, which he wrote to a Bengali book of love poems, written by myself. A translation of the relevant portions of this strikingly novel introduction is also given in form of Appendix II, for the use of the reader.

Before closing I feel it my duty to acknowledge our debts of gratitude to gentlemen whose help made possible the publication of this work. Mr. Jogeschandra Chakravorti, M.A., Registrar, Calcutta University, took a keen interest in the book and my thanks are due to him. Thanks are also due to Mr. Atulchandra Ghatak, M.A., Superintendent of the Calcutta University Press, for hastening up the work of printing out the book. Last but not the least, should be mentioned the name of Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, the great educationist, who encouraged father in taking up this ambitious work and made arrangements for its publication by the Calcutta University. If father were alive to-day the book would have been, in all probability, dedicated to his sacred memory.

BARISAL, BENGAL ;

6th November, 1934.

HIRANMAY BANERJEE

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A GENETIC HISTORY OF THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Section 1. The Different Methods of treating History of Philosophy.

History of philosophy has been treated in various methods. The present writer's position is that history of philosophy should be treated in what he calls the Genetic Method. For the justification of this line of departure the question arises in what respect this is an improvement on all the other methods. This question is sought to be answered in the following pages.

We start with an account of the various methods gradually leading to the method adopted in this work.

(1) *Empirical Method.*—History of philosophy is most commonly treated in the empirical method. In it philosophy is presented as a mere record of dead opinions, a series of unconnected facts succeeding one another in time. It does not go beyond the chronological order to make an attempt to discover the relative position of the systems in the series but regards them all as mutually independent and equally true.

(2) *The Sceptical Method.*—History of philosophy may be treated also from the sceptical standpoint when all the

systems are regarded as contradicting or cancelling one another by their contradictions and consequently equally false.

(3) *The Eclectic Method*.—History of philosophy may again be treated in the eclectic method when all the systems are regarded as containing fragments of truth in what they affirm and false in what they deny and an attempt is made to form a complete system from these fragments of truth.

(4) *The Dialectic Method of Logical Development*.—The mutual contradictions of the different philosophical systems that result in scepticism cannot be completely removed by the eclectic method. An attempt was made, therefore, to remove them completely by the dialectic method of Hegel which is rationalistic and is based on the very principle of contradiction as the universal law of reason.

In the dialectic method the systems by their mutual contradictions are supposed to remove their onesidedness and to rise to the whole truth by the synthesis or reconciliation of the opposites. According to the law of dialectic development as defined by Hegel, thought starts from one side of a truth and this is Thesis; then it advances to its opposite side, this is Antithesis; and in the third stage it reconciles those two opposites in a higher Synthesis. This logical law, according to Hegel, governs all natural and mental development because reason forms the structure of nature and mind.

It should be noted that this dialectic treatment of philosophy by thesis, antithesis and synthesis is purely a logical scheme for arranging the different systems in order of their complexity purely by an analysis of their internal character without any reference to the order of their actual genesis in time. The dialectic treatment is thus purely an arrangement of the systems in their rational or logical order determined *a priori* independently of experience. Hegel, however, tried to cast historical material derived from experience into this rational form, often with violence, and made it seem as

deduction of experience from reason or an *a priori* construction of history which is absurd and impossible.

(5) *The Evolutional Method.*—While the empirical method finds no connection or law in the succession of the different systems, the dialectic method goes to the other extreme and reduces the systems of philosophy to an unfolding of impersonal reason ignoring all personal factors or the play of free individual agency in it. It thus deprives history of its unique character as a record of creative activity transcending the mechanism of nature and logical necessity. To avoid this onesidedness it was necessary that the right methods of treating history of philosophy should not be merely rationalistic like the dialectic method but should also take full notice of the empirical factor. In consequence of this attempts were made to study the history of human knowledge and culture in recent times in other methods of which an account is given below.

(i) *Mechanical Evolution.*—Darwin in 1859 tried to show in his *Origin of Species* that the various species of plants and animals now found in the globe have not been produced by distinct miraculous acts of creation by God but have arisen from certain primordial germs without the intervention of any intelligent cause through the mechanical operation of blind forces. Diderot a century earlier in 1774 and Lamarck in 1809 had shown that the species are not immutable but they are mere varieties. This they did by the application of two laws—the law of variety and the law of similarity. The law of variety assumes that the species have a tendency to show spontaneous slight variation partly explicable by the influence of the environment on the organism and partly by the change of habit and the use and disuse of parts. The law of similarity maintains that these slight variations are transmitted by heredity from the parent to the offspring producing a similarity between them. And these variations accumulating

through successive generations have gradually produced the diversity that now separates species from species. Herbert Spencer also came to an analogous conception of evolution independently even before Darwin in his *Social Statistics* published in 1851. In it he expounded the truth that all organic development is a change from a state of homogeneity to heterogeneity by progressive differentiation followed by gradual integration of the heterogeneous elements. He expanded the conception of evolution and extended it from biology to psychology and raised it to a cosmic principle universally applicable from the lowest to the highest stages of development.

The law of evolution empirically determined by the above thinkers strangely coincides with the law of dialectic development rationally deduced by Hegel from the structure of our reason. It is not difficult to see that Darwin's laws of variety and similarity and Spencer's law of development from homogeneity by differentiation and integration and Hegel's universal law of development by thesis, antithesis and synthesis are the statements of the same truth from different standpoints.

The conception of evolution as formed by Spencer and Darwin is vitiated by the logic of identity. It cannot account for any qualitative difference. It is pure mechanism. Life and consciousness can never be reduced to mere mechanical movements or unconscious nervous changes and they cannot be shown to arise from the latter except by a philosophical jugglery. The evolutionary method in trying to derive them from the lower categories reduces all qualitative differences to quantitative ones and fallaciously represents the higher as a mechanical combination of the lower. As a matter of fact, however, it combines elements of the higher to explain the higher which is only a movement in a circle and no explanation at all.

Exactly in the same way the dialectic method of Hegel is vitiated by the logic of contradiction. It recognises the

inseparableness of qualitative opposites and reduces everything to antithetic types leading to a synthesis of opposites to find the eternal. The transition from one side of the antithesis to the other is only a logical implication excluding all time process. It thus fails to account for all empirical differences arising in process of time in defiance of logical law and ascribes them to the impotence of Nature to realise reason, proving thereby the impotence of any purely rationalistic method to rationalise experience completely.

(ii) *Creative Evolution*.—To remove the onesidedness of both mechanical evolution and logical development Henri Bergson has formulated a new conception of development which he terms Creative Evolution. To distinguish it from the mechanical evolution of Spencer and the logical development of Hegel he provides the adjective 'creative' implying thereby the perpetual creation of elements qualitatively new marking the successive stages of the process. But the expression is an incongruous combination of the mechanical conception of unfolding of pre-existing elements with the idea of creation. Moreover, it is vitiated by a metaphysical theory which if consistently carried out, would result in the annihilation of all science and philosophy both of which deal with conceptional knowledge, in as much as it denies the validity of all mediate and general knowledge and asserts the validity of immediate particular intuition only.

An original creative intuition lying at the basis of experience and the reflective activity of the understanding was accepted by Kant as the presupposition of the activity of the mind in perception and thinking and was called by him "the transcendental unity of apperception." The creative Ego of Fichte and the Absolute of Schelling were represented as knowable by intellectual intuition. All these are analogous to Bergson's conception which differs from theirs only in this that while they regard intuition as the precondition of all psychic life creating the world of perception on the one

hand and the individual selves on the other, passing through various progressive stages of cognitive, ethical and religious experience and culminating in artistic creations and speculative thinking which grasps all the preceding stages, he regards all these higher stages as a degeneration, as a mechanical dissection, a distortion of the living unity of the whole and with the longing of a Romanticist falls back to a pre-existing lower stage and extols it above the higher ones.

It is difficult to see here how the creative intuition which lies at the basis of all life—organic, psychic and spiritual alike which are the successive higher stages of it and is more akin to instinct on account of its spontaneousness and immediacy—can be conceived as higher than intellectual or spiritual life. Instinct is blind while rational and spiritual life though torn by conflicts of dualisms and distinctions is richer than immediate intuition or blind instinct for the very reason that it ultimately surmounts all those contradictions and conflicts and holds them dissolved in a synthesis and comprehends all those distinctions without destroying them in the transparent unity of absolute knowledge.

If disinterestedness is a mark of higher worth as Bergson holds, instinct and immediate intuition are no more disinterested than intellectual life all of which equally serve the practical ends of life. In fact any activity without interest—without an end or ideal to be realised—is blind and irrational and if intellectual intuition is a mere motion, a ceaseless rushing forward without any end or ideal to be realised, it is no better than the fortuitous movements of atoms or blind chance of crass materialism. Disinterestedness, therefore, cannot be the mark of higher worth but interest only gives an activity stimulated by it, a higher worth. Aesthetic, spiritual and speculative interests are really higher than instinct or the creative intuition of Bergson which is regarded by him as akin to them.

The intuition of reality claimed by Bergson can only be a rare philosopher's gift and it is not at all marked by

spontaneousness or immediacy. It is evident, therefore, for beings endowed with our mental structure the attainment of this intuition is most unnatural and going against the grain. Without cancelling all the progress made by reality up to this stage and dissolving our personality we cannot have an intuition of Bergson's Reality. It is the old story of Oriental mysticism, the Vedantic absorption of individuality in the life of the Absolute, the Buddhist extinction of selfhood in Nirvāna, a *caput mortuam* of abstraction baptised with a new name. What gives a semblance of reality to this 'Real' of Bergson is its identification with duration, that particular phase of our psychic life commonly called memory. This, however, is full of images of our empirical experience which are all spatial and, therefore, as mechanical and fixed as our sense perceptions though less vivid. Bergson's duration, therefore, cannot bring us any nearer to that fluid reality without any bones or structures which is his aim to attain. Bergson's intuition is in fact an oscillation between our mechanical experience and a pure becoming, a glimpse of the bottomless gulf from the borderland of our ordinary consciousness. And this only saves his reality from becoming an empty abstraction, a pure nothing.

The only logical outcome of his theory is that the whole course of evolution following the original intuition of reality and blind instinct is a curse, a blunder, a delusion, a *Māyā*, which deserves to be cancelled by a process of retrogression, a devolution, a return to the root from which the process started. This is nothing but extreme irrationalism and pessimism. It is an apotheosis of blind impulse, the urge of the irrational will-to-live, a return to Schopenhauer. But can we by such a retrogression have an intuition of reality? Supposing that we have it, is it the life underlying our own self only or of all conscious beings and of Nature? If it be an intuition of our own innermost life lying behind our empirical consciousness then by what method are we to know the life underlying all other conscious beings and Nature? Can we know that also

by intuition? Bergson does not claim such powers for his intuition and perhaps he admits that for knowing the life underlying other beings and Nature we must have recourse to analogy and inference, in other words, to conceptual knowledge involving the very operation of the analytical, abstracting understanding which he condemns as a curse. If he denies this and claims that the intuition of life in our own self is an intuition of life underlying everything then his theory is only a subjective idealism.

From whatever standpoint, therefore, we look upon his theory by making intuition the only means of knowing reality it makes any science or any philosophy impossible, the former of which aims at a conceptual synthesis of a part and the latter of the totality of experience beyond which there can be no reality.

The Genetic Method.

To avoid the onesidedness of the mechanical evolution of Spencer and the logical development of Hegel we must not pass into the other extreme to which Bergson's philosophy takes us. We must do equal justice to the dynamical and the statical side of reality, to the changeable and the abiding factors of it, to its physiology and anatomy, to its function and morphology, to its process and product, both of which are inseparable and are different aspects of it. We can understand *making* only in the light of *what is made*. We can grasp the meaning of a process only in and through the product,—a pure making, a pure process, a pure dynamical flow is no reality.

This leads us to seek a method of treatment, which while doing full justice to the free creative activity of the spirit will not ignore the empirical and the rational forms in which it clothes itself and will thus be a true synthesis of the empirical, rationalistic and voluntaristic methods. Such a synthesis we find in the genetic method expounded below.

Dr. J. M. Baldwin in a truly scientific spirit conceives development without obliterating qualitative distinctions in the genetic method as applied to mental development. He conceives the distinct stages of development as a continuous progression in time in which each stage is marked by successive typical determinations, qualitatively distinct elements, not contained in any of the preceding stages.

In all mental development, therefore, in explaining higher stages from the lower the use of such expressions as 'potentiality' or "implicitly existing" is meaningless. What is not "actual" is "non-existent." The appearance of a new factor at any stage must be regarded as "a creation out of nothing" and not as "the unrolling" or "unfurling of something which previously existed in a contracted or germinal form" as the use of the expressions 'Evolution' and 'Development' imply. Genesis excludes the idea of 'pre-formation' suggested by evolution, on the other hand, like the theory of evolution, it excludes the idea of "special creation" but substitutes for it the idea of "perpetual creation."

Mr. Baldwin, however, though admitting the above principles as canons of genetic science does not abandon the use of the expression 'Development' and 'Evolution' suggestive of mechanical progress. His expression 'Progression' is more appropriate for genetic treatment as it is a neutral expression free from all mechanical conceptions of reality.

Need of further advance.—Dr. Baldwin has applied the genetic method not only to psychology but in his *Genetic Logic and 'Pancalism'* (1914) he has applied it to the highest form of mental activity—the growth of philosophical theories, the subject-matter of the present work. The conception of the Genetic method and its application to history of philosophy was formed by the present writer in 1890 from a study of the growth of the religious and philosophical views in his own mind. The verification of the method by its application to the history of thought not only of Europe but also of India

has taken the subsequent years. And the present writer has the consolation to find a confirmation of his general position in Dr. Baldwin's works notwithstanding differences in the conception of its limits and its application to the history of philosophy. Two points of difference may be briefly indicated below.

Though the genetic method is psychological and empirical in the sense that it starts from experience yet it may pass by a process of mediation to the presuppositions and conditions of experience, *i.e.*, to the Absolute and try to understand them by the genetic laws operating in the sphere of immediate experience, and, therefore, a philosophy of the Absolute and of Nature and not merely of Mind is brought within the scope of the genetic method. That genetic method is not purely empirical as Dr. Baldwin regards it but is a synthesis of the empirical, rational and the teleological or voluntaristic methods will be clear from the following considerations. If it had been purely an empirical method it would have been confined to a statement of the succession of 'phenomena' constituting a thing or to its 'How.' By a complete statement of the successive changes it explains also the content or the 'What' of a thing. By pointing out the special interest or motive that dominates each stage it also explains the 'Why' of a thing. It would be seen, therefore, that the genetic method is not a return to the empirical method from which knowledge starts but a reconciliation of all the methods stated above. In fact the full scope and possibilities of the genetic method cannot be understood until it is applied to spheres lying beyond experience. It is beyond the scope of this work to attempt this as it is confined only to the higher stages of the philosophy of mind, *viz.*, to a genetic history of Morality, Art, Religion and Philosophy. It is necessary, however, to indicate here how the genetic method can be applied to the Absolute and Nature. For this we must pass beyond empirical consciousness and penetrate

into the subconscious processes that underlie immediate experience. This means that instead of starting from pure experience as Dr. Baldwin does and working forward and upwards only, we must start from pure experience and work also backwards and downwards to consciousness and then the subconscious and thus prefix a 'pre-empirical' stage to the 'pre-logical' stage of experience of Baldwin. If we do this all presuppositions and conditions of reality will be genetically explained.

As the lower limit of the scope of the genetic method is to be thus extended, so the higher limit of its scope as fixed by Dr. Baldwin is also to be extended. According to Dr. Baldwin, aesthetic contemplation or intuition of beauty is the highest stage of comprehending reality. The progressive movement of world-views in his opinion culminates in 'Pancalism'—a theory of reality in which 'Beauty' is regarded as the highest form of reality—higher than 'the True' and 'the Good.' This dethrones philosophic comprehension which has for its object 'Truth' to a lower stage, the stage of mediation theories. But philosophic comprehension is richer than aesthetic intuition and religious experience, in as much as it makes them its objects and contains them as its elements. Its object is not only the True but a synthesis of the True, the Good and the Beautiful and it, therefore, represents a later stage of progress of Reality—which embraces not only the ideal elements, the voluntaristic and affectivist factors of reality manifested in the Good and the Beautiful, but also knowledge, the cognitive factor having for its object actuality, the True, which is lacking in aesthetic contemplation. The aesthetic object is only a semblance of the True and falls far short of the True in as much as it lacks reality and excludes the ugly and the aesthetically neutral which are all embraced in the True.

For a real synthesis of "the True, the Good and the Beautiful," therefore, we must rise to a standpoint above

aesthetic contemplation in which this discord between the True, the Good and the Beautiful will be healed up and the True and the Good also find their proper recognition in a higher harmony of the three. Such a synthesis we find in that philosophic comprehension* which realises the universe as the highest work of art containing the True, the Good and the Beautiful in Nature and in all the works of art in it, a drama in which the Absolute transforms itself into Nature and a realm of spirits and taking their rôle acts out the world-play—a tragi-comedy, the most thrilling romance—and then rising to the philosophic vision enjoys this performance as its audience.

This view of philosophic comprehension as the synthesis of the True, the Good and the Beautiful and as such revealing a higher synthesis of reality than aesthetic contemplation is the second point of departure from Dr. Baldwin maintained in the application of the genetic method in the present work. At the higher limit of world-views we must, therefore, place not immediate theories, but those that are a synthesis of mediation and immediacy—the theories that may be called theories of self-mediation or self-comprehension.

The genetic method has been mainly applied up to this time only to biological and psychological sciences, to study things in short that have a history and whose present content is the result of a series of changes in the past. The peculiarity of biological and psychological changes lies in this that the new elements introduced at each successive stage do not replace any of the elements that preceded it but are incorporated with the pre-existing elements.

This is organisation—a process which is at once progressive and conservative, in which the preceding elements are retained and ramify into new elements which continually increase the complexity of the whole. Out of the preceding elements the new elements rush forth and their difference is gradually sharpened till they pass into opposition and antithesis. This opposition

is held together in all its distinctness in the whole and they give rise to new qualitative distinctions and oppositions marking a new stage in the life of the organism or the conscious being. It is not difficult to see that the rise of these new qualitative distinctions and oppositions marking a new stage in the life of the organism or the conscious being may be generally represented by three stages as stated below :—

First Stage : Harmony.—In it the qualitative distinctions have not yet arisen.

Second Stage : Conflict.—It is a stage in which the qualitative distinctions first appear and gradually pass into opposition and antithesis. This may be called, therefore, the stage of Conflict.

Third Stage : Synthesis or Reconciliation.—In it the opposite elements in all their distinctness are incorporated with the pre-existing elements and in their mutual union form one organic whole. This may be called, therefore, the stage of Reconciliation or Synthesis.

These stages differ from the stages of dialectic development in this that the thesis and the antithesis—the first and the second stages of dialectic development—are contained in the second stage of the genetic law while its first stage, the stage of harmony, is absent in the law of dialectic development.

The second point of difference is that while the stages of the genetic law are successive and have a temporal order showing ascending stages of progress, the stages of dialectical development are logical and represent a timeless order in the ascending scale of different types of reality.

The genetic law governs all biological and psychological growth. According to this law all the present structure of an organism is the result of a series of progressive changes in its past history. What is strange in the successive stages of progress of an individual plant or animal, both on the physical and psychic side, is that the successive stages of these

are analogous to the various orders of plants and species of animals now inhabiting the globe arranged in an ascending scale. This can be best verified by the study of comparative embryology so far as the bodily structure is concerned. When we see an embryo in the womb rapidly passing through the various shapes of lower forms of vegetables and animals before it assumes the human form we cannot resist the inference that the transformation of the individual from the lower to the higher stages takes place exactly in the line in which the development of different orders of plants and animals arranged in an ascending scale has taken place. The modifications gone through by the various species in the long course of their origin is rapidly repeated in the short career of an individual before it attains its adult stage. The order of progress of the race is called Ontogenesis and the order of progress in the individual is known as Philogenesis; and the rapid repetition of the former order by the latter is known as the law of Recapitulation. This order of ascent of higher forms from lower is not unilineal but runs in constantly ramifying and divergent lines. Accordingly it would be wrong to suppose that man has the anthropoid ape for his ancestor or that the anthropoid ape will be developed into the human species in future. They represent separate lines of genesis which gradually converge in the past but diverge in the future.

Not only in biology but in the mental sphere also this can be verified by the history of every individual's mental development in the minutest detail. The mental progress of every individual proceeds through the same stages and in the same order in which it was slowly made by its long series of ancestors in course of millions of years. This law not only applies to the general order of growth of mental functions but to the growth of moral, religious and intellectual life and the changes that our views undergo from childhood onwards. From a record of the present writer's changes in moral and religious life and in philosophical views held at different

periods of his life it has been ascertained that they exactly reproduced the order in which those same changes have taken place in the history of the different nations.

An illustration will suffice. We see in the history of nations Animism or belief in spirits dwelling in or animating material objects and personification of physical phenomena is the most primitive form of religion. This is succeeded by demonistic religions. So, in every child's mental growth we can trace these stages. A child would kiss or fondle a doll or kick against the ground after a fall, believing them to be living. This is animism. Then he will people the earth and the sky with mischievous spirits and dreadful demons. This is devil worship. Last of all he becomes a believer in beneficent spirits, in gods or a god. This is polytheism rising by grades to monotheism. The lower strata of society may not rise to the highest stages even in their adult age for want of culture. They differ in their religious or philosophical views not because the conflicting religious beliefs or philosophical theories are equally wrong or some of them are wrong and others right. If instead of bigotedly sticking to one view, we continually try to rise higher and higher we may ultimately come to the highest religious beliefs or philosophical views that have yet been evolved in the human race which reconcile and hold in an organic unity all the preceding beliefs or views it has passed through, each representing a different grade of the whole truth.

This Genetic method of treatment of the history of spiritual life and philosophy must be distinguished from the eclectic method of its treatment which capriciously collects and puts together fragments of truth from different schools of thought.

The Beginnings of Genetic Method in India.

In India the conception of progressive development of philosophical views is found in the *Pariṇāma-vāda* of the

Sāṅkhya-Yoga school and in some sections of the Vedānta school and was applied to explain the origin of the universe by the doctrine of categories (tattvas) which represent the ascending stages of cosmic progress. This conception of Parīṇāma is purely mechanical and is based on the theory of permanence of the existent and the denial of the non-existent ever coming into existence. It was opposed by the Buddhists who denied the permanence of the existent and asserted that all existence is momentary and that the non-existent is ever coming into existence. This Buddhist conception of change is not, however, really dynamical but under the influence of the Vedantic theory of statical reality it substitutes a series of *momentary beings* succeeding one another so quickly as to produce an *illusion of becoming* without any *real becoming*. It was in fact a theory of detached units of being, a momentary psychic atomism. Thus it is evident why Buddhism though admitting the origin of new elements failed to reach a theory of true genesis.

The Parīṇāma-vāda and the theory of momentary reality of the Buddhists fail to account for the origin of qualitative distinctions; the former by making the rise of qualitative differences a manifestation of what existed as unmanifested and the latter by making them detached units of being. The Jaina school succeeded in reconciling the claims of "one and many" by denying abstract unity and conceiving it as a synthesis of distincts. In fact, their Saptabhaṅgi-Nyāya anticipates to a certain extent the Dialectic method of Hegel by placing the logic of contradiction above the logic of identity.

Some Indian philosophers of the Vedantic school applied the method of development to the treatment of history of philosophy. Madhusudan Saraswatī in his Prasthānaveda regarded the different theories of causation as stages of development of the last view which lead to the highest conception of it. The Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha surveys sixteen schools of Indian philosophy beginning with Materialism and

ending with the theistic Yoga arranging them in an ascending scale from the writer's point of view without any reference to the chronological order. Vijñānabhikṣu in his introduction to the Sāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya shows an insight into the truth that the different philosophical systems are the successive stages of development leading to the Vedantic conception of reality as established in his Pariṇāma-vāda. The three stages of the genetic law also find their analogy in the development of problems as given in the Mīmāṃsā school. The five members of an Adhikaraṇa or topic are the subject (Viśaya), doubt (Samasyā), the thesis (Purva-pakṣa), the antithesis (Uttara-pakṣa) and the conclusion or synthesis (Siddhānta). The Viśaya represents the stage of harmony; Samasyā or doubt disturbing the initial harmony initiates the second stage of the genetic law. Purva-pakṣa and Uttara-pakṣa represent the conflict of the opposites forming the second stage. Siddhānta is a synthesis of the opposites which re-establishes the harmony and forms the third stage.

Application of the Genetic Method to the History of Philosophy.

The genetic method represents the different systems of philosophy as the stages of progress in the world-view of humanity and they are spontaneously reproduced in each nation and individual in the same order. The different systems of philosophy are not mutually independent complete theories of the world but represent successive stages in the continuous progress of a world-philosophy built up by humanity of which the different individuals and nations are members. The same problems of philosophy are seen to arise in the mind of each nation and individual in the same order and they pass through the same stages of progress. It is remarkable that the same problems of philosophy arise in the same order not only in different nations by a spontaneous generation from within,



without any external borrowing, but if we keep a record of the progressive history of philosophical views of any individual mind its stages are seen to proceed, though very rapidly, just in the same order in which the problems arose in the history of different nations in course of centuries. This proves conclusively that the different philosophical problems arise both in the individual and in the race in the same order and pass through the same stages—the stages of their genesis in the individual being a rapid repetition of their slow genesis in the nation. As in organic genesis so in the genesis of the highest mental products, ontogeny repeats phylogeny and the law of recapitulation holds good in the minutest detail. Each particular system of philosophy thus represents a particular stage of genesis of the world-view in the mind of the race. The earliest systems in the history of a nation present the problems in a stage of undifferentiated harmony. The later systems represent the problems split up into conflicting, onesided views or aspects of truth; and the latest systems represent the gradual synthesis of the earlier conflicting, one-sided views and partial truths into a coherent system of truths—into a harmonious whole.

INTRODUCTION

Section 2. The Genetic Conception of Philosophy.

No account of the genetic method can be complete unless its metaphysical implications are cleared up. Every method is based on a theory to know which is its goal. The mechanical theory of evolution presupposes a mechanical conception of reality. The conception of the genetic method also is based on a theory of reality. Without some exposition of this theory the genetic method cannot be grasped in all its

bearings. It may be pointed out in this connection that the full exposition of the theory will be found in the genetic account of the theories of reality in the main body of the book. It will, however, help matters if we give here an idea of the genetic conception of reality in brief outline.

The genetic method by its very nature is inconsistent with any theory of reality which conceives it as a statical, processless something, transcending the perpetual flux of conscious life. The conception of a dark, unknowable Thing-in-itself lying at the back of our empirical consciousness is a fiction of abstraction barren and useless for explanation of experience. Likewise the conceptions of 'potential' and 'implicit' existence serve only to fill certain gaps in our experience by metaphors taken from physical phenomena which appear in the empirical stage of experience and, therefore, are incapable of explaining the genesis of experience.

The conception of unconscious ideas is equally materialistic and does not really solve the mystery how our past experience is preserved, when it is out of our immediate consciousness and is brought back to consciousness by an exercise of the functions of what is called memory. The difficulty of explaining the transmission of experience from remote ancestors to the offspring through countless generations by progressive stages according to the law of heredity, is far greater than the revival of our past experience through memory in course of a single life. The law of heredity is a term which simply serves to conceal our ignorance without explaining the underlying process by which this transmission is effected. The uniformities in the order of succession explained by causal connection and the uniformities in the order of co-existent elements explained by the conception of substance, are nothing better than names that serve only to hide our ignorance of the inner principles that produce these uniformities in the midst of change. The interaction among the ultimate elements of matter combining into the various



compounds and living organisms and the interaction of mind and matter in perception and voluntary action, are no less mysterious. The conception of chemical affinity, force and conservation and transference of energy employed by physical science to explain these phenomena are equally obscure. How mass and energy maintain their quantitative equality through all changes is not explained by the mere statement of the law. The defects of this sort of explanations are that they either assume, in the guise of an abstract term what is meant to be explained or simply rest satisfied by noting down some intermediate stages of the change that is to be accounted for. The first type commits the fallacy of *Petitio Principii* assuming what is to be explained. The idea of 'potentiality' may be taken as an example. When a man asks how did it exist, we try to silence him by the simple word 'potentially' by way of bluff. Most explanations of science are of the nature of the second type. It is simply a statement in detail of the question that is put. This to a certain extent satisfies the 'how' of a thing but can never answer the deeper question 'why.' In fact all these ideas deal with realities that transcend immediate experience and empirical knowledge. Their defect lies in trying to fill up the gaps in the continuity of our knowledge by conceptual constructions taken from the empirical world of matter and space which are not at all adequate to express the nature of the reality that lies under the world of immediate experience.

It is also necessary to point out that the conception of unconscious psychic process or ideas rising above and sinking below the threshold of consciousness employed by modern psychologists are also equally mechanical. They are worse than useless in any theory of psychogenesis.

An unconscious idea is an inconsistent combination, as what is unconscious lies outside the domain of mind and is nothing but a mechanical, physiological process which may

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be treated in biology but not in psychology proper. It conceives consciousness and ideas like physical light and material bodies respectively, two entities mutually exclusive, capable of existing separately and entering into an external relation by accident. The question where and in what form our past experiences are stored up when we are not conscious of them or how they are brought back into consciousness, is a metaphysical problem which can be solved only by determining the relation of our individual consciousness to the Absolute.

If our personality has self-consciousness for its essence, it must be dissolved when our self-consciousness ceases to exist even in course of our life as it happens when we fall asleep or fall into a trance. Then we remain living bodies no doubt, but cease to be persons. Our coming to conscious life after such periods of discontinuity or the reproduction of our past experience through memory must be regarded as a revival, a rebirth after momentary or periodical return of the individual self to the life of the Absolute, and is determined by activities in the Absolute lying beyond the immediate experience of the individual self, and knowable mediately by deduction as the presupposition of our immediate experience.

This conception of periodical dissolution of our personality in the Absolute in sleep or death may appear shocking to our habitual belief. But it finds support in the earlier Upaniṣads before the doctrine of transmigration of the individual soul took a definite shape. In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, Chapter VI, Khāṇḍas 9 and 10, all beings are represented as losing their consciousness of individuality in the Absolute in sleep or death like rivers flowing into the ocean or honey of various flowers collected in the honeycomb. In the Brhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad, Chapter IV, Brāhmaṇa 3, in the stage of dreamless sleep (suṣupti) the soul is represented as becoming one with Prajñā—the Omniscient—and losing all individual distinctions as saint or sinner, as parent or child, as god or man. This doctrine is further elaborated in the Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad

in which the four quarters of the Absolute (Pāda) represent the four stages of genesis through which the Absolute passes. From the fourth, the transcendental stage (tūrīya) it passes through the stage of dreamless sleep to the dream world and thence into the waking world when personality is fully developed with the objective world presented to it.

The stages of genesis of personality can equally be studied at the operation table, when by inducing anæsthesia by the application of chloroform a patient is made to lose the mental and physiological functions gradually in a descending order and is deprived even of the motor functions of the higher nervous centres and retains only the activity of the automatic vital centres. And by stopping the application of the anæsthetic he is made to regain the same functions in their ascending order. The genetic order here revealed, is not only applicable to the stages of genesis of life and mental functions in the individual but also in the race. Our personality consists purely in the exercise of certain functions of our conscious life unified in a centre where all the activities meet and interpenetrate. The idea of a fixed, statical self or soul as the substratum of these functions, is taken from matter and cannot explain the unity of self-consciousness in the midst of its perpetual flow. The essence of the individual self must, therefore, be sought in self-consciousness and not in any dark unconscious core surviving the extinction of consciousness in sleep or death as is commonly believed or in liberation (mokṣa) as conceived by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.

The discontinuity of our personality in moments of our unconsciousness in sleep and death may appear inconsistent with certain facts of our experience. The memory of our past experience and the consciousness of our personal identity through the whole of our past life may be regarded as a direct contradiction of any such theory of periodical lapse of self into the Absolute and discontinuity of our personality. It may be asked if our past conscious life is chequered by periodical



merging in the Absolute life, why do we not retain any recollection of these periods and why these periods are remembered by us only as blanks in our past conscious life ?

To these objections it may be replied that our personality consists of certain functions of the absolute life individualised and forming into relatively independent centres of activity. It does not lose its distinctness while it merges into the Absolute, but it loses only its limited and narrow horizon of immediate experience and self-consciousness. The limited horizon of immediate consciousness like an impenetrable wall incases the individual self and shuts out other individual selves and the Absolute from its immediate view. The impenetrable wall of immediate consciousness surrounding the central luminous point of self-consciousness, is individuality. This relative independence and isolation of individual selves, however, is only a differentiation of the Absolute consciousness by which its immediate creative intuition becomes self-mediated and forms itself into a multiplicity of centres of creative intuition or selves which surround themselves in mutually exclusive worlds of immediate consciousness, progressing forward in the same order through a series of stages and returning periodically to the Absolute, the centre of all in the reverse order. The mutually exclusive individual selves, therefore, are only specialised functions in the life of the Absolute, the all-inclusive Self or Centre of creative intuition from which they are periodically split up and divided into mutually exclusive centres of consciousness. This will explain why in our waking state we do not retain any memory of the intuition of the Absolute which we had in our sleep or trance. The stages of progress by which the individual selves are generated in the Absolute are very gradual and have infinite gradations. If we mark these gradations into certain broad stages then they may be thus characterised :—

I. First Stage : Harmony.—The universal forms of all reality, the categories rising in a genetic order which form the

common structure of the absolute intuition realised in a multiplicity of centres of activity and in the antithesis of mind and matter, the perceiving selves and the worlds of sense perception. The universal structure of thought manifested in every individual and the universal structure of things presented to each subject and the uniformity in the progressive changes of both can be explained only by supposing that this unity is due to their forming elements of an all-embracing experience lying at the back of our individualised empirical consciousness.

II. Second Stage: Conflict between self and not-self, mind and matter.—Its gradual differentiation into the conscious and the unconscious, the perceiving selves and the worlds of perception immediately presented to them.

III. Third Stage: Synthesis through reflection and self-meditation.—In this stage the perceiving selves turn upon the products of their own activities and by analysis and abstraction break up their worlds of perception into their elements and translate them into thought or mediate conceptual knowledge, which gradually reconstructs the worlds of reality in thought and rethinks the processes of creation and culminating in absolute knowledge returns to the Absolute from which it started, thus completing the circle.

The first stage lies at the background of each individual consciousness and may be called the pre-empirical stage. All individual experience and the experience of the race is organised and preserved in this stage by a continuous creative intuition behind our empirical consciousness and are reproduced as memory objects and as the uniformly recurring objective world in the empirical consciousness of each self. In this stage the centres of creative activity though preserving their distinction are not excluded from one another by walls of individualised consciousness. In mystic communion (*yoga*) clairvoyance, clairaudience, telepathy, inspiration, the prison bars of individuality and space and time are dissolved and spirit mingles with spirit in the Absolute. This explains the

possibility of gaining supersensible knowledge through trance, mystic communion, hypnotic sleep, clairvoyance and telepathy. Had there been no such means of access to the Absolute such phenomena would not have occurred.

In fact, the life of the Absolute which sustains everything, buds forth into individual selves and their worlds of perception periodically when we come to consciousness after trance, sleep or are reborn after death, if there is indeed rebirth of personality. This is possible by a process of progressive differentiation continued through ages and return to itself by a process of retrogression in the reverse order in trance, sleep or death. Creation is thus an eternal self-generation of the Absolute and dissolution—a process of self-suppression in the reverse order. This creation and dissolution is a perpetual rhythm in the life of the Absolute rising and falling like multitudinous waves in the stream of Infinity. These rhythms form the world processes which again are composed of an infinite series of smaller rhythms forming the life processes and the alternate waking and sleep of individualised selves. The function produces the structure and breaks it perpetually to recreate it in eternal freshness and bloom. Not only is our psychic life a perpetual flux but space and the material world itself—woven warp and woof in it—are a perpetual flow.

Space and the material world filling it appear as fixed, motionless and statical because the successive creations of these are so similar that they are taken as the same, as in a cinematographic show. There is in fact no absolute identity in the universe; all identity is an illusion of similars—an illusion produced by similarity of elements that differ at least in order of time and, therefore, cannot be absolutely identical. Thus the conception of absolute identity being a delusion, we must modify it by widening it so as to embrace not only the indistinguishable stages of a process that repeats itself and is mistaken for identity, but the stages that are qualitatively distinct but are continuous and inseparable. There is no

ground, therefore, to be afraid of space and matter as an obstacle to the free activity of the spirit. They are the perpetual creations of a spiritual life that sustains them from within and puts them on as a delusive mask.

In this perpetual flow of spiritual life we can distinguish elements or groups of elements (1) that reproduce themselves without any change and appear as identical and statical and (2) elements that are constantly changing and appear in contrast with the former as dynamical and evanescent.

Both these groups, however, are in a perpetual flux and the first is not in reality statical, though it appears to be so. The conception of an eternal objective space, of fixed objects filling that space and of a permanent self in the midst of its fleeting states belongs to the first group, and is thus only an illusion.

The reality with the apparently uniform and changing elements as noted above thus flowing on may be regarded as identical, if *identity* is here taken in the wider sense of *continuity*. For, the successive changes of this spiritual life which are formed by the introduction of new elements at each stage, are not mechanically separable from each other but absolutely interpenetrate like a continuous flow and, therefore, they must be regarded as a self-differentiation of one Absolute Experience.

This will show that the pre-empirical life of the Absolute is related to the empirical world of space and time and to the rational world of thought constituted by the categories or universal forms of reality as function is to structure, as physiology to anatomy, and process to product, neither of which can be conceived apart from the other and each of which realises itself in the other. It would be an error of abstraction if we reduce reality like Bergson to a pure dynamical flow divorced from the morphological structure of thought and Nature in which it clothes itself—a pure movement without any goal or ideal to be realised. This conception of the Absolute is the

true synthesis of the affectivist, the voluntaristic and the intellectualistic metaphysics of emotion, will and idea, of the dynamical and the statical factors of reality. And the genetic method thus conceived is a reconciliation of the empirical and the rationalistic and the affectivist methods.

This vision of the Absolute can only be reached mediately, by conceptual construction. No individual intuition can grasp it immediately without bursting the limitations of personality and the world of perception. That will mean the destruction of the very qualitative distinctions which the Absolute creates within itself, for its fuller and richer realisation. Hence the inadequacy of the intuitional method. As has already been pointed out, the aim of such intuitionist philosophers is to go back to the state of pre-empirical harmony where the Absolute is not manifest in all its richness and complexity. The true nature of the Absolute, therefore, can never be grasped by such a method. The rational method was evolved, as will be evident from the above statement, for the fuller realisation of the Absolute life. It is, as it were, the method of Introspection evolved by the Absolute for its own study. There is only one road leading to the fullest realisation of the Absolute just as there is only one reality to be known. And the beauty of the thing is that the Absolute itself approves of it as the only method that can comprehend it in its fullest majesty and grandeur.

CHAPTER II

THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

We have so far attempted to make out a case for the genetic method of treatment of the philosophical problems. We have now to determine the fundamental problems that clamour for solution in philosophy. After an exhaustive enumeration of all such problems, our ultimate task would be to apply the genetic method to each of these problems individually and to find out their solutions. That will be the final test of the fitness of this new method. We have for the present to confine ourselves in this Chapter to the enumeration of the problems of philosophy, their classification and the determination of their order of genesis.

Philosophical problems are generally divided into two broad classes namely, Practical and Theoretical. What is the basis for this differentiation, how do we come to make such distinction, is the problem that we shall have to answer. This question is closely mixed up with the question of freedom and necessity. We, therefore, take them up together for treatment.

Consciousness is ever moving forward. In its perpetual progression, it takes attitudes and viewpoints and looks before and behind and splits itself into past and future. The viewpoint taken is not fixed; it is also moving forward in the perpetual flux. It is the dividing point in which the prospective and retrospective, the forward and the backward views meet. These three divisions created by consciousness in its life are the present which stands between the other two, namely, the past and the future. The present is a fleeting point in the

stream of consciousness which is continuous, seamless and has no real division or split in it and is not made of a succession of states. In fact this division of past, present and future in the continuity of consciousness is an illusion produced in abstract analytical understanding. There is, however, a real distinction as the basis of this illusion. The past and the future are a peculiar functioning of consciousness taking place in an eternal present. Consciousness is creative and is eternally reproducing the past in the form of memory and is perpetually creating the future and their synthesis is the present. Future as yet unborn and a movement of consciousness towards it is volition which deals with the realm of ends.

The past which is reproduced and incorporated with the present is the actual world and the activity of consciousness directed towards this realm, is intelligence and reason which deal with the world of facts. The movements of consciousness in the realm of ends are constantly being translated into the realm of facts by the forward movement of consciousness. The realm of ends is the realm of freedom. In it consciousness is creating something new. As soon as it is converted into the realm of facts this freedom is converted into necessity. As soon as the ideal is realised it is converted into objective fact. Its relation in the chain of succession and of co-existent elements forming the world of experience which constitutes reality is unalterably fixed. The mobile reality is changed into immobility, the dynamical into the statical. But this statical and immobile present and past are not statically immobile, though they appear to be so. They are also in perpetual flux, the past being perpetually re-created and reproduced in the present. There is no statical dead-past; to talk of a dead past is a fiction of abstraction; it is always a living present reproducing the past. The present appears to be fixed and motionless on account of the illusion of identity produced by the resemblance between the successive forms of the series that seem to constitute fixed objects.

The realm of ends passing into reality is being constantly translated into the past. The intermediate steps through which the end is realised, are the means which together with it form a series which may be called teleological. The same series when realised and past is viewed in the opposite order and is known as the causal series. They are the same series viewed only from different standpoints.

The distinction of Practical and Theoretical also arises from the above difference in the functioning of consciousness. As a practical problem is a problem of end it considers what are the ends or ideals and how they are to be realised or translated into reality. A theoretical problem considers the same subject in a reverse order ; it considers what constitutes reality or the realm of facts and how the world of reality is to be translated into thought or ideas.

In the above division of the practical and theoretical problems of philosophy we have seen how will creates the world of reality and how this world of reality is again converted into an ideal world of knowledge. The contrast is so far confined only to the sphere of human activity. The realm of human activity, however, is not a realm of absolute freedom but it is limited by pre-existing and co-existing conditions and cannot be altered by our own will. This is the world of perception constituted by our organism and its environment and the laws regulating their relations. This may be called the realm of nature or of empirical necessity. Besides this realm of nature which forms the world of perception there are certain laws of mind, certain presuppositions equally unalterable by our will. These form the structure of our mind and condition the structure also of the world of perception which presupposes the mind and therefore, these laws are truly universal regulating and controlling both our thoughts and things,—the objects of perception. This may be called the realm of reason or logical necessity, while the former is the world of causal necessity.



So far as our present experience is concerned we find, therefore, against the world of freedom there stand two other realms—the realm of natural, causal or empirical necessity and the realm of logical necessity. The first binds only the connection of facts and phenomena forming the world of experience and the reversal of these connections are conceivable and they are not a necessity of thought. The second binds and connects the world of ideas or reason and their reversal is not conceivable in thought and they form a necessity of thoughts and of things as well, because the world of things is built upon the world of thought which is its pre-supposition—the mechanism of reason forming the frame-work of nature. Both are self-created chains by which the free realm of ends determines and binds itself for self-realisation. Thus it is seen, necessity is only a mask of freedom.

In the realm of our freedom we find a key to the genesis of these two worlds of necessity. In the sphere of our voluntary activity we see, what is free in the present is transformed into an unalterable fact as soon as it is past and by repetition what is a matter of choice now, becomes a matter of habit in course of months or years and at last a matter of necessity limiting or restricting our freedom. Is it not possible that the fixed and the uniform recurrence of phenomena constituting the world of our experience—both inner and outer, may also be the result of a transformation of the world of freedom of spirits into a world of necessity by repetition of their free activities through millions of births of the individuals and races now organised as nature? And is it not possible that the realm of logical necessity may also be the result of a similar conversion of the realm of freedom of spirits through a still more prolonged repetition of free activities and converted into a realm of absolute unalterable necessity known, as the *a-priori* laws of thought? It is the aim of the genetic method to show the dependence of both these realms of necessity upon the realm of freedom and the

priority of the realm of freedom to both and they are only aspects and stages of development in the life of the cosmic spirit realising itself in and through them all. The individual spirit though limited by the causal and the logical law has still a sphere of free activity and selective determination in which it chooses its ends and ideas and gives them reality by converting them into the world of nature and objective reality though in conformity with laws of matter and of reason. Thus in all purposive acts there is an adjustment of freedom and necessity—a synthesis of the practical and the theoretical. And in all theoretical activity also in which the world of perception is translated into an ideal world of reason built up by thought, there is the same fusion of the theoretical and the practical—a synthesis of the world of necessity with freedom. Absolute necessity like absolute freedom is thus a pure abstraction, though we can conceive freedom as generating necessity, the functioning of consciousness as creating the structure of nature and reason. This freedom again is determined by the realm of ends or ideals towards which consciousness is moving, impelled by interests or satisfactions peculiar to the realisation of these ends. In this realm of ends and interest, therefore, we must seek for the root of all activity of consciousness—practical or theoretical. The opposition of nature and freedom is thus seen to be a question of the degree to which we are able to trace the progressive organisation of our present experience backwards. What is natural, fixed and innate at present was formed by a gradual encroachment upon the realm of freedom and had its origin in the free activity at one or other stage of the life of the individual or the race.

In our short individual life we see, how our free activities are gradually organised into fixed unalterable habits by frequent repetition.

The uniform order of co-existence and succession of phenomena—"the Routine of Nature"—and the objective

world itself may have its origin in the free creative activity of the realm of spirits converted into a realm of necessity through repetition of intuition originally creative and free. As the difference between natural and logical necessity is only a difference of degree the latter also may have a similar origin. Thus what is unalterable law of nature or of the objective world at present may be traced back if we go sufficiently far to a stage of free activity not of course in the life of the individual spirits nor of the spirit of races but of the cosmic spirit or the totality of spirits which constitute its essential elements. The opposition between natural and logical necessity is thus found to be only a difference of degree and what appears as nature and innate at present had really its origin at an earlier stage in free activity. In this realm of end, therefore, we find the ultimate key to the origin of the realms of nature and of reason both of which are created by it as means to its realisation.

The distinction between practical and theoretical problems would now appear to be based on the distinction of the realms of freedom and necessity. The scope of practical problems is limited to the realm of freedom and the scope of theoretical problems is limited to the realm of necessity. The problem of practical philosophy is to determine the ends towards which our will impels us and how to realise these ends in our life. In other words it teaches us how to build up reality nearest to our hearts' desire subjected though we are to the limitations of the realm of nature and the realm of reason. This is concerned with the creative aspects of the human mind. Theoretical philosophy, on the other hand, reflects on the realms of necessity which as has already been pointed out are of two distinct kinds, namely, the realm of natural necessity and the realm of logical necessity. Nature and reason are fixed and determined and what remains for the mind to do here is to make a sort of survey of them and then to try to reconstruct a picture which will give a correct idea of it. It is

thus concerned with the work of making a copy of what already is. While theoretical philosophy is concerned with the simple work of taking photographs, practical philosophy engrosses itself with the higher work of creating pictures. Yet it would be wrong to say that this creation is creation out of nothing. It has its limitations under which it has to work. It cannot work under conditions of absolute freedom. Just as the painter has to work on a canvas or paper or just as the sculptor has to work on plaster of Paris, the practical philosopher has to build on the given basis of the two realms of necessity. Subject to these limitations he is free to mould his creation to any shape he likes. The analogy, therefore, holds good that while the theoretical philosopher is like an ordinary photographer, the practical philosopher is like the artist who paints or the sculptor who moulds three dimensioned bodies. The only means of creating reality is action. It is only by means of action that we can impress or modify reality. And therefore, practical philosophy is concerned with actions. Theoretical philosophy on the other hand, concerns itself with theoretical reflection, with observation and generalisations which are best calculated to give the truest picture of reality. In another way we could say that while practical philosophy deals with reality in the making theoretical philosophy deals with reality that is made. The one deals with the process and the other with the product.

It would not be out of place to make a digression here and say that in the practical sphere of activity the human mind makes the nearest approach to the creative spirit that is at the root of the whole of reality. The higher mammals can in a way be said to have the power of reflecting on nature. They can form ideas about the position of a thing or the situation of their place of habitation. They can thus form the pictures of the realms of natural necessity, the realm of logical necessity remaining, however, out of their reach. Nevertheless, they are in this respect



endowed with powers similar to human beings. In the realm of freedom, however, man alone has success like the eagle that soars to giddy heights leaving the lower regions for the activities of minor birds. Unlike other creatures man alone is the blessed being that can have taste of the drink of freedom, which is otherwise the monopoly of the Absolute Spirit directing all creation. Lower animals are all so many bundles of adaptations, their activities are a series of instinctive actions directed by no conscious will. It is in man alone that activities are conscious and are meant to realise a certain end or purpose towards which his will moves him. Well might one say that God did really make man after his own image.

We have so far tried to determine the relationship between the practical and theoretical problems of philosophy. We have now to determine the order of genesis of these classes of problems. This task has been made easier, however, by the reflections made above. We have noted above that in the life of the Absolute there might have been a stage in which it was absolutely free. But absolute freedom cannot build on itself and so in order to make reality possible it evolved out of itself the two realms of necessity. What was a habitual mode of action with the absolute at one stage, became fixed rigid laws of nature and reason at a later stage for the sake of convenience. Just as function evolves structure and reduces structure to a rigid form, so the function of creation evolved the structure of the realm of necessity. The question now becomes simplified. Is structure prior to function or function to structure? The answer logically follows that function is both logically and chronologically prior to structure. We would take an example by way of clearing up the position further. In our habitual acts we have noted that there have been several occasions when the action had to be repeated voluntarily before the habit could be formed. Habit is a structure or form in which our activities flow or

take shape. In this case certainly the free actions preceded the formation of habit. Chronologically, therefore, structure is preceded by function. We may conclude, therefore, that the realm of freedom precedes the realm of necessity and therefore, the problems of practical philosophy are prior in order of genesis to the problems of theoretical philosophy. We have to go through the stage of making before we come to the stage where the thing is made. Practical philosophy should, therefore, precede theoretical philosophy.

The problems of practical philosophy refer to the sphere of our freedom. They fall into three sub-classes according as our activities refer to (1) our dealings with other beings in which case it may be characterised as either good or bad, (2) to the realisation of the ideal of the sublime and the beautiful, or (3) to our dealings with and attitude towards the ultimate ground of the theoretical and the practical realms otherwise known as God. In the first case it is Morality, in the second case it is Art and in the third it is Religion. All the problems are concerned with our voluntary practical activities and not with our theoretical cognitive activities. They are concerned with our spiritual life and not with our intellectual life. As soon as these activities have any reference to our intellectual life they become theoretical studies which have those practical activities for their subject-matter. In this way morality is the subject-matter of the theoretical science Ethics; art is the subject-matter of the theoretical science *Æsthetics* and religion is the subject-matter of the theoretical study, Philosophy of Religion or Theology.

Practical problems are, therefore, three—morality, art and religion. We have now to decide what the order of their genesis is. Does the religious problem take its rise first or art or morality? Let us study the life of an individual. When in the cradle, the child smiles at its mother's face or moves its arms towards her with the dawning of its consciousness, that is the first relationship it enters into with another being

and that is an act of morality. After some time it can appreciate a toy or set its mind to moulding toys for itself. This is artistic activity. It is after a long time of growth and development of consciousness that the child can reach the religious stage and enter into relations with the supernatural reality. The first practical activity of the earliest man, the cave-man, must have been limited to his relationship with his mate and child. The next kind of activity was chiselling out stones for the purpose of armour or in a moment of inspiration drawing pictures on the walls of the cave. Afterwards when he grew conscious of supernatural forces such as thunder and storms he learnt to keep an attitude of awe towards them and that was the first groping towards religious consciousness. Ontogeny and phylogeny tell the same tale. They, therefore, determine once for all the order of genesis of these three fundamental problems of practical philosophy. Morality came first and then art and then religion. Thus the practical activities forming the subject-matter of morality, art and religion are found to manifest themselves in an ascending order, beginning with morality and leading to religion through art. Our treatment of the problems, therefore, will also come in that same order.

Morality deals with the problem of our conduct in respect of other persons. As man is essentially a social being, he has got to hold relationship with persons other than himself. The question of clash of interests between persons necessarily arises. That course of conduct which is beneficent to all is said to be good and that which is not is bad. Incidentally, therefore, morality also deals with the question of good and bad. But the chief concern of morality is always the search for a principle which would guide us in all our conduct in every moment of our life. That ideal is the question of morality.

Art is concerned with our creative activities. Its objective, therefore, is to find out the ideal of beauty that



we should realise,—what kind of beauty we should give expression to. Should art care more for the content or more for the form? Those are the problems that art has to deal with.

The third problem of practical philosophy is religion. With the consciousness of a supernatural being the question arises what should be the nature of relationship between that supreme being and man. Is that supreme being a person at all or a non-personal being? Should we hold personal relationship with that being or should we not? Is that supreme being beneficent or not? These form the subject-matter of religion.

In our discourses above we have made reference to two worlds of necessity, namely, the world of nature and the world of reason which have also been called the world of logical necessity and the world of natural necessity. Theoretical philosophy is concerned with the study of these two worlds of necessity as opposed to practical philosophy which has the world of freedom for its subject-matter. The interest of theoretical philosophy is, therefore, purely theoretical or disinterested. It tries to get an idea of the nature of these worlds as they are. In practical philosophy will is predominant but in theoretical philosophy it is purely deliberative. Will plays a passive part here. While in practical philosophy will is creative, in theoretical philosophy it is reconstructive.

The world of nature is commonly known as reality while its conceptual reconstruction in mind is knowledge. The world of nature is guided by the laws of nature and also the laws of reason forming its structure. The world of reality is presented to us through perception and we try to reconstruct it in our own mind with the help of ideas and their relationings and thus come to reconstruct the world of reality in our mind. Knowledge may thus be said to be a mental reproduction of the world of reality. It is analogous to the process of introspection by which we study our own thoughts and in that way we could say that knowledge is self-introspection of the Absolute.

The subject-matter of philosophy may thus be divided into two parts, namely, knowledge and reality. They are both real in the sense that they are existing, the intensity of reality of knowledge being just a degree less than that of reality itself. In as much as they are very much like each other their constituents are the same, the problem relating to one world is equally vital to the other world. The problems of theoretical philosophy for both the worlds of necessity are, therefore, one and the same. In view of these facts they shall be taken up together for discussion.

The first problem of theoretical philosophy is based on the antithesis of one and many. This applies to both the worlds of necessity. In reality it determines the question whether reality is composed of one or many—are particulars real or universals real. In the sphere of knowledge it deals with the question whether knowledge is composed of particulars of perception only or general ideas only—that is, of universals only. These are the various conflicting views both in the world of reality and of knowledge that constitute the first problem of theoretical philosophy.

The second great problem of theoretical philosophy is based on the antithesis of subject and object in both the worlds of reality and knowledge. In the world of knowledge it tries to determine whether the object is presented to the subject directly or not. In the same manner in the world of reality also the comparative importance of subject and object is sought to be determined. Whether subjects alone are real, whether objects can have existence independent of the subject—these are problems that seek for solution.

These are the principal problems that have been knocking at the door of humanity and asking for solution. They have arisen in the human mind from the very dawn of his consciousness. Humanity has never been slow in offering its best efforts towards their solution and for ages and ages man has given answers to these universal riddles. These answers

are not isolated statements to be referred to as dead specimens of human activity in the history of philosophy but they are like living tissues instinct with life which go to build the massive organism of philosophy. These solutions are not to be looked at as rigid isolated units but as moving currents of thought—coalescing and growing in volume to form the mighty stream of thought of humanity. No system of philosophy is ever useless or lost. No system is absolute or out of date. Each system is like a living cell that goes to build up the living organism. Each one of them has its usefulness and organic necessity. No system is false and therefore to be rejected. Each system has an element of truth and each system is true at a stage of the growing human perspective. There is no real clash or conflict between the various systems. They are all true in their own way and can be harmonised from the proper perspective. Just as each blind man was correct in holding that an elephant is like a trunk of a tree or a fan or a wall in the fables, in the same way each system of philosophy gives a true picture of the totality of reality in its own way and yet is in harmony with the final synthesis which leads to ultimate development of the philosophical organism. The genetic method aims at arranging them in this order of consistency and harmony placing each system at its proper place or stage of growth leading to the highest stage of growth where all conflicts are smoothed up in an all-pervading harmony. The following chapters will be an attempt at demonstrating the truth of this statement.

CHAPTER III

THE FIRST PROBLEM OF PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY —MORALITY

First stage—stage of childish• innocence ; A-morality. The Genetic law explained. Second stage—conflict, Right *vs.* Wrong, Pleasure *vs.* Happiness. Pleasure theories : Cyrenaics, Omar Khayyam, the Lokāyata system, Epicureans, Utilitarians. Happiness theories : Cynics, Stoics, Christian asceticism, Jaina asceticism, Hindu asceticism, Kant, the Upanishads. Third stage—reconciliation of right with agreeable, *sreyas* with *preyas*, Duty with pleasure. Eudaemonism, Butler, the middle path of Buddha, the ethics of the Gita.

Section 1. Introduction.

Morality as has been already indicated, is the first problem of practical philosophy. It has application to all voluntary actions of man and tries to determine how they are good or bad, right or wrong, desirable or undesirable.

These distinctions are based on two types of antagonistic principles, which need clearing up at the out set. The human being is constituted of two sets of principles, each set having a sort of antagonism between themselves. First of all, a human being is both body and mind. Curiously enough body seems to fight shy•of mind and mind wants to look down upon body. What the body advocates, the mind denounces and shows it contempt by calling it sensuous, while what the mind preaches, the body rejects as cynical. The body looks for pleasures of the senses, but the mind wisely observes that they are just the things to be avoided. The mind preaches

that man is essentially a rational being and life according to his nature should be a life of reason.

The human being again is a social being and on that basis two other antagonistic principles take shape. Should a man care for himself alone or should he concern himself about the welfare of other members of his society? There is one side of him that would preach selfishness, while the other side will be satisfied with nothing short of complete self-denial or selflessness. The theory that pleads for selfishness is egoism and the theory that upholds selflessness is altruism. These principles are also at war with each other and equally antagonistic. As a result of these conflicting views, different standards are laid down for considering what is right and what is wrong. It may be that what is right according to one principle may be wrong according to another.

If we go deep into the matter, we shall find that these two pairs of antagonistic principles may be reduced to one pair only. As immediate satisfaction of the senses and necessarily of the particular individual concerned is what is advocated by the body, these two analogical principles may be combined into one. This joint principle may be called the one that seeks for pleasures only, for satisfaction of the body is generally spoken of as pleasure in books on ethics. The mind, on the other hand, has a tendency to deprecate all that appertains to the body. It is against egoism and against sensual pleasures. It, therefore, declares that man's goal in life is to spurn all this in favour of a life devoted to spiritual pursuits. Sensuous pleasure is tied up with egoism and selfishness. The idea of altruism is, therefore, incorporated in it. What the mind seeks is tried to be differentiated from what the body seeks by calling it happiness, as opposed to pleasure. Thus the conflicting ideas of happiness and pleasure include within themselves the four kinds of antagonistic principles spoken of above.

The conflict is, therefore, between views supporting pleasure as the goal and views supporting happiness as the goal. Pleasure is what is agreeable, what is desirable, what makes a ready appeal to the senses. On the other hand, happiness is something which is more mental than physical. It is a joy derived from mental satisfaction, from the reflection that what one has done is not what the body wanted but what the mind dictated as the true course to follow. What the mind dictates is duty. There is an element of rigorism, of sternness in what the mind commands us to do. It is "stern daughter of the voice of God." That is why duty is seldom what is agreeable or desirable. Therefore, an antagonism lies between duty and agreeability. What our base sensual nature wants is agreeable and what our refined mental nature wants is duty. The conflict between views advocating pleasure or happiness as their goal may also, therefore, be expressed as a conflict between duty and desire, between what is right and what is agreeable. In Indian philosophy also we have the exact counterparts of these two terms. The Katha Upanishad distinguishes between what it calls *sreyas* and what it calls *preyas*. It is easy for us to understand that *preyas* is what is agreeable to the senses as it is more tangible and more readily perceptible than what is *sreyas*. The *sreyas* is something ephemeral, which has to be appreciated more with the help of the mind than with the help of the body; it is something refined and spiritual. *Preyas* may, therefore, be safely identified with what stands for pleasure and *sreyas* with happiness. We have to remember that these distinctions are true of a stage only in morality and not true for all times. These antagonisms hold good only in the stages of conflict. When the moral problem has got sufficiently developed, these conflicts are removed and the differences of the antagonistic views are reconciled.

A fresh reference to the inner nature of the genetic method would be found very helpful at this stage. It bears an apparent

similarity to the dialectic method of Hegel, but it has at the same time some vital differences. The dialectic method, for example, talks only of two stages so to speak. Thesis and antithesis in the dialectic method may be taken together to denote the stage of conflict, while synthesis like the third stage of the genetic method forms the stage of re-established harmony. To these two stages, the genetic method prefixes the stage of harmony, the stage which is followed by the stage of conflict. The dialectic method takes no notice whatever of this stage of initial harmony. It seems to start with the stage of conflict, which represents a problem at a developed stage of its growth. It does not trace a problem from the very beginning of its growth. The dialectic method is not so much chronological as logical, while the genetic method is essentially both logical and chronological.

In dealing with every problem we must begin, therefore, with the stage of harmony, which is the first stage, through which all problems must necessarily pass. This stage of harmony is the stage of undisturbed calm before the stage of disturbance. It may be compared to the state of nature on the eve of a storm when there is no fluttering of leaves, no whispering sound of wind. The stage of conflict may similarly be compared to the storm that follows, when there is a violent commotion leading, after some time, to the stage of re-established harmony that follows a storm.

The order of our treatment is determined by the above genetic law. The first stage of harmony will naturally correspond with the stage, in which no moral consciousness has been developed at all. This is the a-moral stage of childish innocence, when the child has not developed any sense of responsibility, nor can it consciously conduct any voluntary action. In the second stage will come all those different theories that war against one another in upholding one kind of actions against another. In this stage will be perceived the difference between right and wrong, pleasure and happiness and *sreyas*

and *preyas*, as interpreted by different schools of morality. In the last stage, a reconciliation will be attempted by finding out such a principle as will comprehend all those conflicting views in one consistent unity. It will try to effect a compromise between the claims of the body and the claims of the mind and between altruism and egoism and it will thus abolish the distinction between pleasure and happiness, duty and agreeability, *sreyas* and *preyas*.

Section 2. The First Stage: A-morality.

The first stage of morality is the stage of childish innocence. This is the non-moral or the a-moral stage, where the moral consciousness has not yet developed. We may imagine a time when primitive man had no society, no tribe. At this early stage of cave-man life he might have got his mate to share life with him, but his relationship with her was not of the personal type. It was very much like the kind of relationship that exists between the mates of higher mammals, purely guided by instinctive impulses. With the dawn of his consciousness, he came to a stage when he discovered a person, an individual in his mate, when he found that there might be acts of his which would cause pain to his mate. With the growth of this feeling, there developed a sense of responsibility in his mind and then he would begin to guide his actions in such a way that he might not cause pain to his mate. It would be at this stage that he developed the right of calling his mate beloved, in the crudest sense though. In this way man must have emerged from the state of non-morality to morality. And this stage of non-morality is the stage of harmony.

We may make a parallel study of this stage of harmony in the life of the child. And this would be proof of the above observation, for ontogeny proves phylogeny. The child in the beginning is in an a-moral stage. It has no sense of responsibility, it has no sense of right and wrong, it has no sense of good

and bad. It is guided purely by impulses; whatever idea takes possession of its mind it would do. It would thus pinch a man, give a slap on its mother's cheek, and would not hesitate to kill ants. But if its mother happens to smart under the pain of the slap, it would pause and it would think. As soon as it would feel that its action had caused pain to its mother, it would feel remorse and it would express its pious wish that it would no more strike its mother. It is in this way that the sense of moral responsibility is engendered in the child. Teach it that the ants have their capacity to feel pain even as it itself does, and it would cease from killing ants. It has now learnt to be moral. As soon as the question of pain or injury to others, leads us to modify our course of conduct we cease to be a-moral beings and step into the stage of morality.

Section 3. Second Stage: Pleasure vs. Happiness.

As soon as this sense of responsibility dawns upon us, we enter into the second stage of the development of the problem. As soon as other-regarding ideas are developed, this stage is started. In the case of the child it may be seen that as soon as it realises that its mother would feel pain if it happens to strike her even as it would feel if somebody else would strike it, it would think that its mother should not be hurt and would regulate its actions accordingly. At this stage, however, the other principles of conflict, namely, those that advocate mental pleasures and those that advocate bodily pleasures, do not strike the mind. It can only think that its impulses should be checked so that it may not hurt its mother. The perception of the antagonism between body and mind, however, presupposes a considerable mental development which the child cannot be expected to have. This distinction is, therefore, realised much later in life. The stage of conflict, however, begins as soon as any kind of antagonism comes into the field.

In telling the detailed story of this stage of conflict, therefore, we shall first deal with the first pair of principles namely egoism and altruism. After we finish with this we shall talk of the other pair of conflicting principles, namely those advocating pleasures of the body and those advocating pleasures of the mind.

Though the perception of distinction between altruistic and egoistic principles becomes manifest very early both in the life-history of man as well as the child, it is curious enough that this did not strike the mind of any philosopher until very late in the history of morality. Neither Socrates nor Aristotle, nor any other ancient European philosopher ever recognised this dualism. They talked of life according to nature which according to their interpretation is life exclusively of reason. They only limited their discussions to the claims of the body and the claims of the mind. It was Comte, who for the first time recognised the existence of other-regarding virtues. He considerably widened the outlook of morality by proposing to define good as the good of society in general and not of the individual. In fact the term altruism itself was also coined by him. This dualism, however, is bound to appear in the mind of man as early as he started to be a social being. Being a member of society, he cannot but think of the convenience of others as much as his own. In the East, however, there is a great deal of reliable evidence to show that this dualism was recognised by the earliest moral thinkers. As early as the sixth century B.C. Buddha recognised that even the lower animals do feel pain even as human beings do and so he thought that they should be protected from cruel deeds on the part of man. Prevention of cruelty to lower animals was one of the principal tenets of both Buddhism and Jainism. Even before Buddha the idea that animals and other creatures deserve good treatment from us, seems to have dawned on the Indian mind. In the Brahmanas of the Vedas it is said that man owes duty

to five kinds of beings. His duties are first, to the gods, second to the seers, third to the manes, fourth to men and last of all to the lower creation. The idea is that man has duty to animals also. A man should not touch his daily food without offering part of it to the gods, fathers and animals. This is a type of altruism which is much wider in its scope than the altruism of utilitarianism, which thinks of the happiness of human beings alone.

In Western philosophy, it is only positivism and hedonism of the utilitarian type that first came to recognise the dualism between self-regarding and other-regarding virtues. As opposed to ancient hedonism, which was wholly egoistic, modern hedonism is purely altruistic. The standpoint of ancient hedonism was that of the individual, the standpoint of modern hedonism is that of society or mankind in general. 'The greatest happiness of the greatest number' has been substituted for the greatest happiness of the individual. They came to regard that the true standpoint of morality should be, not the individual but society. To them the society is the unit, while the individual is just a member. The individual member should look to the interest of the whole organism primarily and if need be, should sacrifice itself to the general good of the whole organism. Thus according to Mill "the utilitarian standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether."

The other dualism between pleasures of the body and pleasures of the mind appears to have been more prominently emphasised by moral thinkers of all times. This is based on the apparent dualism in the nature of man. A human being is constituted both by a body and by a mind. The body has its own pleasures, while mind also has its own ways of feeling satisfied. The body would naturally be keen on securing such pleasures as are enjoyable by itself alone. On the other hand, the mind would take up an attitude of superiority and look down upon all that is bodily or bears association with the

body by calling it low and base. It is thus the conflict between the two aspects of human nature. On this basis, most of the types of ethical theories have been arrayed into two antagonistic camps. The common tie of one group would be that it pleads for bodily pleasures alone, while that of the other group is, advocating the cause of mental happiness alone. To the first group is given the general name of hedonism and to the opposing group is given the name of rationalism or intellectualism as applied to ethics.

Right from the beginning of moral consciousness a fight has been going on between these two rival camps, one pressing the claims of bodily pleasures and the other the claims of mental happiness. Before we begin narrating the story of this very interesting conflict, we shall stop to note one important point. As we arrange up the various theories under each camp, we shall discover that we have extreme forms of both types at the beginning. Afterwards the theories become modified gradually as they develop, till at last the most modified form of one type will be found to have made a near approach to the most modified form of the other type. They almost meet half way, so to speak. They begin by being farthest apart and gradually they advance towards each other, till only a few paces are left between them. The way to reconciliation is, in this way, automatically laid out and the work of the third stage is made proportionately easy. We shall presently test the correctness of these statements.

Section 4. Pleasure Theories.

We shall start with the theories that claim supremacy of the pleasures of the body over those of the mind. The earliest and the most extreme form of them is the Cyrenaic school founded by Aristippus. The greatest amount of pleasure of the senses is, according to him, the ethical ideal. Whatever is enjoyable is good and is not shameful, he would

say. To make the most of what one can, one must discriminately utilise the pleasure of each moment. All pleasures, according to him, are alike in kind; they differ only in intensity. Bodily pleasures are more intense than mental pleasure. Therefore, mental pleasures should be rejected in favour of bodily pleasures. Again, he had learnt from the Sophists that the mind has knowledge only of the immediate present. Present is certain but future is obscure. If we are wise, we should not, therefore, reject pleasures of the moment anticipating pleasures of the future, which may never come at all. In the face of this uncertainty, the best thing to do is to make the most of each moment before it passes away. We need not stop to calculate even, for, it means loss of some amount of time at least, which could better be spent in enjoyment. "We live only from moment to moment; let us live, then, in the moments, packing them full, ere yet they pass with intensest gratification. A life of feeling, pure and simple, heedless and unthinking, undisturbed by reason—such is the Cyrenaic ideal."¹

The Indian parallel of this theory of extreme hedonism is the Lokāyata or Chārvāka school attributed to Brihaspati. The description of the theory as we get it in the Sarvadarsana-sangraha of Mādhava is meagre. It is sufficient however, for our purpose to characterise it as an extreme form of hedonism. It advocates a life of continuous enjoyment of bodily pleasures like the Cyrenaics. As regards knowledge also it takes up an attitude of scepticism like Aristippus. Beyond the present life nothing is certain. Unlike other schools of Indian philosophy it does not believe in rebirth and so it assures men that they need not be afraid of retribution in a future life, for acts done in the present life. It does not recognise the existence of soul as a separate entity from the body and, therefore, feels safe to draw the conclusion that 'once the body is turned into

¹ Seth, *Ethical Principles*, p. 84.

ashes it cannot return again.' According to its analysis man is all body and what we call mind is but an epiphenomenon of matter. It stands to reason, therefore, that we should only listen to the demands of the body. The system, therefore, necessarily draws the conclusion that 'so long as one would live one should live merrily' without a care for what may betake us in the future.

This same view also finds expression in the poetic overflow of Omar Khayyam. This poet has put these ideas in such strong and convincing manner and clothed them in such beautiful language that his poems have won universal favour for all times to come. His hedonism is also based on scepticism. He finds that in life everything is uncertain, what shall overtake us in the future is absolutely unknown. It is however, certain that life flies.

Oh threats of Hell and hopes of Paradise!
One thing at least is certain—This life flies;
One thing is certain, and the rest is Lies:
The flower that once has blown for ever dies.

Under the circumstances the best thing to do is, to make the most of our time by devoting it to sensual pleasures, without a thought for the future. In the poet's own language;—

Some for the glories of This World ; and some
Sigh for the Prophet's Paradise to come ;
Ah! take the cash, and let the credit go,
Nor heed the rumble of a distant drum.

Pleasures of the moment and pleasures of the body are, therefore, his ideal. It is to be noted, however, that his hedonism is based on an attitude of pessimism. Omar Khayyam does not advise us to drink wine for its own sake, he takes it as a means for forgetting the sorrows and perplexities of our complex life. He believes that we are playthings of a blind force which is not guided by reason, nor by

any sense of equity, but shakes our destinies according to its own whims. This world is nothing like our heart's desire. God is as much indifferent to our needs, as a potter is to the requirements of each particular pot. Impelled by a sense of injustice, he would even go so far as to accuse God for his inequities. He is also strongly sceptical. By his experience he knows that nothing can be known. He had visited many a wise man and discussed and thought over the problems of life but he confesses, he had to come back by no means wiser. In this world, therefore, of sorrows and doubts, it is better to drown ourselves in the pleasures of the moment. A cup of wine would help us to forget all worries. And, therefore, his advice is

Come fill the cup and in the fire of spring
Your winter-garment of repentance fling.
The bird of life has but a little way,
To fly and lo ! the bird is on the wing.

The theory of hedonism underwent further development in the hands of Epicurus. Happiness, according to Epicurus, lies in the satisfaction of man's true nature and man's true nature is, according to him, feeling and sensation. Like the Lokāyata system, it believes in the complete annihilation of the soul after death and, therefore, one need not be afraid of death. "When we are, death is not, and when death is, we are not." All feelings are divisible into two kinds, pleasure and pain. Pleasure is the sole ultimate good and pain the sole evil. A pleasure is not to be rejected except, on ground that its ultimate consequence is pain and a pain is to be chosen only when it is a means to a greater pleasure. While, the ordinary man seeks immediate and indiscriminate pleasure of the moment, the wise man should know how to forego some kinds of pleasures which cause pain afterwards. Instead of unalloyed sensual life of the moment, therefore, we get here a theory which keeps the totality of pleasure in view. It would further want

to avoid pain. There should be discrimination in the choice of pleasures, the pleasure that gives us the greatest amount of enjoyment in total and the least amount of pain is to be given preference. Reason is thus brought to the service of hedonism. Hedonism thus makes room for an element of reason in it and thus is brought one step nearer to rationalism.

Even in epicureanism itself, there is a strong inclination towards rationalism. In a way, it fights shy of bodily pleasures. Deeper reflection led Epicureans to think that positive pleasure is seldom the lot of man. We have, therefore, to remain satisfied with the negative pleasure of keeping free from pain. We must also curtail our desires to the minimum, otherwise, there is no escape from the pain of unsatisfied desire. "The end of all our action is to be free from pain and fears," says Epicurus. The Epicurean ideal thus comes to mean complete indifference to both pleasure and pain. In epicureanism itself, therefore, there is a current of thought which feels dissatisfied with bodily pleasures.

In utilitarianism, hedonism absorbs further elements from rationalism and makes a nearer approach to it. It shows to what extent the base theory of extreme hedonism can be softened and modified. Hedonism is based essentially on sensibility and sensibility in the highest phase assumes the form of the emotion of love. It is utilitarianism which, for the first time, puts emphasis on this aspect of man's character and, attaching great importance to brotherly sympathy and fellow-feeling, introduces what is called utilitarianism in morality. Morality had so long pointed out that the pleasure or happiness sought to be the goal of man is always of the individual. It shifts the view-point from the individual to society. It preaches that pleasure is to be sought for the whole of society and not for the individual. This new conception is the special contribution of utilitarianism.

In this matter, utilitarianism seems to have been profoundly influenced by the philosophy of Auguste Comte.

According to Comte, social life owes its existence not to self-interest but to the social impulse. In the ideal state of morality, the altruistic feelings of man should gain mastery over the selfish instincts which are stronger in the beginning. He, therefore, believes that the social problem is a moral problem and, therefore, he holds that ethics is the highest science. The moral problem, according to him, is to subordinate personality to sociability. To live for others is the absolute demand. Bentham and Mill drew their inspiration from these ideas. Both of them accepted the principle that the individual lives, not for himself but for society. They accordingly developed this idea and propounded the doctrine that the *summum bonum* of morality is the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Egoistic feelings are, therefore, to be suppressed. Sacrifice your own personal interest for the interest of the community, that is their preaching. It may be noted therefore, there is an element of asceticism in this form of hedonism. Like asceticism it discards all considerations of personal comforts. This is as rigoristic as any rationalistic view that would advocate suppressing of all bodily impulses.

The other great contribution of utilitarianism is that it introduces a further element of reason in hedonism. It brings hedonism nearer to the theories of morality that preach rationalistic views and for this, the whole credit should go to Mill alone. According to Bentham the value of pleasures is to be measured by their intensity, duration, extent, etc. He makes no difference between pleasures differing in quality, for according to him, all pleasures are qualitatively the same. The pleasure derived from playing a game of cards is as good as pleasure derived from reading poetry. Mill, however, thinks that pleasures also differ in quality. Intellectual pleasures are higher and better than sensual pleasures. No intelligent person would consent to remain a fool. Persons who have experienced both intellectual and

bodily pleasures would prefer pleasures of the intellect. A person who has read poetry as well as played cards would prefer reading poetry. The feeling is, that it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied, it is better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. Mental pleasures are, therefore, to be preferred to bodily pleasure inasmuch as they are superior in quality. The cause of bodily pleasures is thus almost thrown away indirectly.

Utilitarianism thus adds two new characteristics to hedonism which it did not possess before. It lays down that all interests of the individual are to be sacrificed and thus brings in the rigorism of an ascetic's life. It also lays down that bodily pleasures are to be discarded in favour of mental pleasures, which is the central theme of rationalistic ethics. Hedonism almost admits defeat at the hands of rationalism. It makes the nearest approach possible to rationalism in the ethics of utilitarianism.

Section 5. Happiness Theories.

In studying rationalistic theories also we shall find that there are extreme forms of it, in which sensibility is not admitted at all. Gradually however, this extreme theory undergoes modification till finally it comes to assign a place for sensibility also. As hedonism makes a gradual approach to rationalism, the latter theory also in the same manner goes forward to meet the other half way, so to say.

We start with ancient cynicism. It is just the opposite of the Cyrenaic school as it gives us an extreme form of the rationalistic view. It preached self-control and absolute independence of circumstances. It says, "For each being that alone can be a good which belongs to it, and the only thing which belongs to man is mind or reason." In remaining restricted to the mind there is one great advantage. As mind is our own, we can control it but the outside world

we cannot. If we, therefore, make ourselves dependent on the outside world we cannot control its circumstances and may thus reap pain. It is better, therefore, to withdraw from the world. Let us reduce our wants to the minimum, extirpate all luxuries and conventional needs. It thus advocates complete self-denial. It also wants us to be indifferent to both pleasure and pain even as Epicurus told us, for it is thus that we can avoid pain. Avoidance of pain is the greater thing and not acquisition of positive happiness. "The cynic rule of life is one long course of self-denial.....for the reward of such self-denial is a perfect peace of mind." The man who has killed out all desire is alone impenetrable by evil.

The stoics further developed the cynic ideal of life according to reason. They also interpreted the maxim of life according to nature as meaning a life of reason. They however introduced certain changes in the cynical doctrine. They did not say that life according to reason is opposed to natural conventional laws. They gave a wider meaning to reason which they thought is present as much in mind as in nature. The established laws of society are based on reason also and we should conform to them. 'Life according to nature' thus ultimately comes to mean, 'life according to law.' For them 'the real is also rational.' The stoics also found that all things on earth are insignificant and transitory. They are irrational and lawless. Feeling is the bond that ties us to this external world of shadows. Man should extirpate feeling and withdraw from the world of shadows and illusions. Stoicism looks upon the world of senses from the same standpoint as the Indian philosophers do. Like them also it preaches emancipation from the 'shadow shapes that come and go.' This is possible by living a self-contained life of reason alone and rejecting all that is sensuous.

The asceticism as preached by cynics and stoics seems to have a special charm for mankind in general. Thinkers have

again and again come to realise that the pursuit of pleasures ultimately leads to dissatisfaction and pain. The best way to avoid pain, therefore, is to avoid all bodily pleasures. Pleasures of the body are to be looked down upon, the body is to be disciplined and controlled so that it may not crave for bodily pleasures. All such desires are to be ruthlessly curbed and man's one great duty should be to live the life of an ascetic. Christian asceticism thoroughly assimilates these ideas. "Die to live," it preaches. "He that saveth life shall lose it and he that loseth his life shall find." The spirit of Christianity is the spirit of the Cross. The natural life of sensibility may offend the spirit's life and so it should be denied. Among Mahomedan sects Sufism was also influenced by this ideal. It also advocates asceticism as preparing the mind for mystic vision.

Christian ethics seems to have been crystallised in a complete form in the views of Thomas Aquinas. We would profit, therefore, by giving a brief description of his views. The ideal for man, he said, is the attainment of the greatest possible perfection or likeness to God. The supreme good for man he called blessedness or 'beatitude,' which is the realisation of his true self. Rational beings are meant by God to realise their goal consciously. The highest form of action is contemplation and the highest form of contemplation is contemplation of God. The contemplative life, therefore, is the highest and the most blessed life. The safest and quickest way to blessedness is the total abandonment of earthly good. It advocates poverty, celibacy and obedience for the attainment of higher perfection. For Thomas, as well as for all priests of the Church, the ascetic life is the ideal life.

The Jaina view gives the most extreme form of asceticism in Indian thought. According to the Jainas the goal of man is *nirvana* or wholesale extinction, for, they take it for granted that life on earth is painful. The way to *nirvana* is the *triratna* or the three jewels. They are right knowledge,

right faith and right conduct. "Belief in real existence or *tatvas* is right faith, knowledge of real nature without doubt or error is right knowledge. An attitude of neutrality without desire or aversion towards the objects of the external world is right conduct."¹ Jainism also prescribes the fivefold conduct for acquisition of virtue: (1) Innocence or *Ahimsa* is kindness to all creation, (2) charity and truth-speaking, (3) honourable conduct, (4) chastity in thought, word and deed, (5) renunciation of all worldly interests. We should make special note of the last provision. This is meant to free the individual from all ties of worldly life. "That Jiva which through desire for outer things experiences pleasurable or painful states, loses his hold on self and gets bewildered and led by other things. He becomes determined by the others."² In its eagerness to free the human soul from the bondage of all worldly ties, it advocates the most rigorous form of life. It encourages all actions which lead to peace of mind, actions in which the mind acts disinterestedly. These are selfless acts like giving food to the hungry, water to the thirsty, clothes to the poor, shelter to the monks, etc. Lest he should destroy any life unknowingly, the orthodox Jaina would sweep the ground in front as he walks, walk veiled for fear of inhaling living organisms and thus killing them and would not take honey even. Jainism goes further than this. It would preach renunciation to such an extent that it would enjoin men to cast off the piece of cloth they wear and go naked. It would even say suicide is good and preach that after some years of ascetic preparation winning him freedom from rebirth, a man can kill himself.

This same idea of a rigoristic life pervades through all the six orthodox schools of Indian philosophy. They all hold that *mukti* or salvation from the chain of rebirths is the ideal

¹ Panchāsti Kāya Samaya Sāra, p. 163.

² *Ibid.*

goal of humanity. For, to all of them the idea is common that life on earth is painful and our duty is to avoid earthly life. On basis of such a view one would have in ordinary course advocated suicide as the quickest method of achieving this end. But the difficulty with these thinkers is that they also believe in rebirth. Therefore, suicide cannot achieve their object. They hold that knowledge of reality is the means for attaining *mukti*. All the six of them, therefore, advocate rational life as the proper life of man and discard sensibility as ephemeral and ultimately bringing sorrow and pain. Over and above preaching that man's true vocation is acquisition of knowledge, they preach a rigorous and ascetic mode of life as a preliminary measure for qualifying people for the pursuit of knowledge. It disciplines the body and prepares the mind for acquisition of knowledge. Before taking up the sacred task of quest for knowledge, they all enjoin that a man should lead a rigorous life and gain a complete mastery over the senses. The senses are the sources of all distractions. They are compared in the Upanishads to refractory horses and they would always try to run to worldly pleasures. It is necessary, therefore, that they should be completely brought under control and when this is done, the world of pleasures would cease to attract us. When this is accomplished, the mind becomes free from distractions and can properly concentrate on search for knowledge. In the beginning of his famous commentary on the Brahma-sutra, Sankara prescribes an ascetic course of life as a preparation for the noble life devoted to pursuit of knowledge. The Yoga again takes very seriously this aspect of the question and lays down special practices, which are helpful in giving the mind control over the senses. In fact, the very name Yoga stands for concentration of the mind.

Morality assumes such an important position in the Upanishads that it would be improper to overlook them in our enumeration of ethical views. We would only indicate its main characteristics.

The ethics of the Upanishads is on the whole rationalistic. It not only advocates a path of reason and search for knowledge as the true vocation of man, but also indicates that life of passion is to be curbed. Sensual pleasure is looked down upon as being of a low quality. Knowledge, it advocates, brings us nearest to the Absolute Spirit and it is in such union that the highest bliss lies. The senses and their objects are impediments and, therefore, they have to be controlled and guided according to the dictates of reason. The Katha Upanishad enjoins as follows : " Know the self or *Atman* as the lord who sits in the chariot called the body, *buddhi* or intelligence is the charioteer, mind is the reins, the senses are the horses and the objects are the roads. The self, the senses and the mind combined, the intelligent call the enjoyer. But he who has no understanding but is weak in mind, his senses run riot like the vicious horses of the charioteer." " If we do not recognise the ideal prescribed by reason and do not accept a higher moral law, our life will be one of animal existence, without end or aim where we are randomly busy, loving and hating, caressing and killing without purpose or reason." ¹

The Upanishads are permeated with a feeling that worldly pleasures are not worth anything. They are not enough to give man eternal happiness which is man's desert ; they do not give full satisfaction to the soul. This idea is brought out very beautifully in several stories narrated in the Upanishads, which are well worth mentioning here. In the Katha Upanishad, Nachiketa is stated as a guest waiting in Yama's house without food. Playing the part of a host, Yama could not stand this and entreated him to take food offering boons as a reward. Taking this opportunity Nachiketa wanted to be enlightened on the fate of departed souls. Yama would not, however, answer it and offered instead long life, girls, chariots and all sorts of tempting pleasures. But Nachiketa would

¹ Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 211.

not be tempted. He said, " Even long life is after all limited, let the horses, dancing and music remain yours for man is not to be satisfied with wealth." He, therefore, rejected them and preferred to exact the answer. This reveals the spirit of the Upanishads. The story of Maitreyi and her husband Yajnavalkya as narrated in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, equally brings into relief this spirit of detachment from and indifference to worldly pleasures. When her husband offered her wealth and riches, she replied: " What shall I do with that which cannot make me immortal ; let my husband tell all the knowledge he possesses." Knowledge then is the *summum bonum* ; knowledge of the Absolute is what we should run after rejecting gold and earthly comforts.

In Western philosophy rationalistic ethics reaches its climax in the ethics of Kant. In common with all rationalists he has intense distaste for a life of pleasures of the body. The brute, he says, is the plaything of its wants and instincts. Man's distinctive feature is reason and that is clear indication that not a bit of him is meant to be animal but he should be rational through and through. " Man is not the least elevated above mere animalism by the possession of reason, if his reason is only employed in the same fashion as that in which the animals use their instincts." ¹

Other rationalists were impelled to banish sensibility as a measure for avoiding pain or loss of peace of mind. The Upanishads wanted knowledge of the Absolute as they thought that would lead to eternal bliss. That is one of the chief characteristics of rationalism. But Kant would not stand the idea that any action should be done with a motive. An act done from sympathy or love is not moral, according to Kant. He would abolish the feeling side completely. An act is to be done from sheer respect for law. The moral law is categorical imperative ; it commands categorically and unconditionally. It

¹ Kant, Critique of Practical Reason.

would not say : Do this if you would be happy, but it says : Do this, because it is your duty to do it. We need not concern ourselves with particular acts or general principles. We need not think of the results or consequences. We should act from the fundamental principle rising from within man which says, always act so that your action is from the most universal principles or law ; act so that you can expect that every one would follow the principles of your action. This law is a universal *à priori* law common to all men. To this law Kant adds a parallel law : " Act so as to treat humanity whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal and never as a means." This amounts to saying that the interest of each person is to be held sacred. Kant's main characteristic is that he abolishes the feeling side completely in the scheme of morality. A man should scrupulously obey the dictates of the moral principles and should never think of indulging in feelings. This was the only element of hedonism which rationalism had so far retained. By throwing it off altogether Kant takes rationalism as far away from hedonism as is ever possible. In his ethics rationalistic morality has drifted furthest apart from hedonistic ethics.

Section 6. Third Stage—Reconciliation.

All these extreme forms of rationalism work under a misconception of the human nature. Because the distinctive feature of man is rationality, they jump to the conclusion that it constitutes the whole of his nature ignoring altogether his sensible side. But we cannot banish sensibility altogether. Man is both a feeling and a willing being. If he only wills to do good actions that would not alone suffice. Will must gather strength, draw inspiration from his feeling side. It is emotion that gives inspiration to the will. The more the emotion is roused the greater the strength of the will. If we



feel intensely that we are suffering a great wrong, the effort to conquer this suffering will be proportionately great. It is again the emotion or feeling side of man that saves life from being stale and without interest. If a prescribed conduct or law is the form of morality, emotion provides the flesh and blood of it. Mere form without content presents an awful spectacle and makes the moral being lose heart. There is no harm in keeping the feeling side intact, for it does not actually clash with any view of morality. If the cynic will argue that in the wake of happiness sorrow may come and, therefore, the best way to avoid sorrow is to kill feeling altogether, it is defective reasoning. This is as good as saying that your right hand may do good actions as well as bad actions and, therefore, you had better cut it off lest it should act badly. Doing positive good acts is a better thing than merely avoiding bad acts. Positive happiness is more welcome than negative absence of pain. It is moreover within one's power to control things in such a manner that pain may not come in one's way. What is wanted is not killing of all interests, but a widening of all interests. We should make our interests less selfish and more altruistic. That is the way to gaining both positive happiness and yet avoiding pain. If we abolish the feeling side altogether, as Kant would like us to do and simply carry on the dictates of the conscience even as a slave or a horse carries out clocklike the orders of his master, the picture that such a mode of life would present is gloomy indeed. Man is thereby reduced to a mere machine, all interest is lost and life would feel more like a burden than a joyful task. The feeling side is as much necessary in the scheme of morality as body is necessary for the proper expression of life. This is the feeling that urges James Seth to observe: "In their dance, reason and sensibility must be partners, even though they often quarrel; nay their true destiny is a wedded life, in which no permanent divorce is possible."

Even rationalists themselves were not slow to observe the absurdity of the position of extreme rationalism. Thus the Scottish philosopher Shaftesbury comes to hold that both social and self-regarding impulses are equally natural and it is in the balance between the two that virtuous conduct lies.

On the other hand, Sidgwick may be said to have felt from the hedonistic standpoint the need for a compromise between sensibility and reason. He admitted the priority of the claims of sensibility, but at the same time he observed that in order to vindicate its claim, sensibility must take help of reason. Sensibility cannot stand by itself; in order to maintain its position, it must be based on reason.

Hegel attempted to correct the abstractness of Kantian formalism by trying to reconcile sensibility with reason. He vindicated the rights of sensibility by proving the essential rationality of the life of sensation. But in trying to make a case for sensibility, he tried to prove the essential identity of reason and sensibility. While the two antagonistic schools tried to exaggerate the sharpness of their difference, Hegel went to the other extreme by trying to remove their differences altogether. But this is wrong; it cannot be denied that for all their similarities sensibility and reason are different and we cannot overlook this fact. The only way to effect reconciliation is by admitting the difference and then to see if any compromise is possible. Compromise and not identity is what is wanted. As a matter of fact, we have a sort of identity in the first stage of harmony when there is no consciousness of the difference. This is however going backwards. We have to go forward and try to harmonise them in a higher unity.

Among men in general we come across both ascetic and sensuous types. There is one type that preaches that sensibility is lowly, it is an impediment to higher life and, therefore, it is to be crushed and annihilated. They start with an idea that the body is an enemy to the mind and, therefore,

it should be kept in check. They, therefore, subject it to all sorts of rigorous practices, starve it and weaken it. In fact curbing the body takes up all their energies. What is after all a secondary object, namely, keeping the body under control for proper expansion of the mind, assumes primary importance to the neglect of the real object. This is the ascetic type which reduces the body to such a state of weakness that the mind also is incapable of any work. On the other hand, there is the sensuous type whose motto of life is 'eat, drink and be merry, for to-morrow we may die.' He overlooks altogether the rational side of man and would live a life of pure sensibility. His argument would be, man is all-body, while the argument of the ascetic type will be that man is all-mind. This difference can be removed if one takes up a more comprehensive view of the matter and holds that man is both mind and body, though the mind should predominate over the body. The body should not be altogether weakened but disciplined and made to serve the mind.

A reconciliation on this basis seems to have been effected in the moral theory of Butler. According to him, conscience or moral reason is the supreme principle in ethics. Conscience includes two principles, namely, self-love and benevolence. They are more than mere impulses and are reflective. The object of self-love is individual good and that of benevolence is public good. "Mankind has various instincts and principles of action, as brute creatures have, some leading most directly and immediately to the good of the community and some most directly to private good."¹ The function of conscience is to approve and disapprove of impulses and actions prompted by these two principles and to try to reconcile them. Conscience performs the function of a judge in adjudicating the claims of both.

But Butler seems to effect a compromise between egoism and altruism only by placing equal importance on both. This,

¹ Butler, Sermons, Chap. I.

therefore, completely overlooks the other principles in conflict, namely, the antagonism between body and mind and attempts no solution for this at all. Nor does he make any reference to the feeling aspect of morality.

The Bhagabat Gita, which forms a part of the Mahabharata is an important poem dealing with ethical problems of life. According to William Von Humboldt it is "the most beautiful, perhaps the only true philosophical song existing in any known tongue." On grounds of intrinsic merit also the Gita deserves a high place, as it tries to evolve an ethical system which breathes a spirit of reconciliation all through.

Moksa or release from the chain of rebirth is given as the goal of a human being. Since man is a complex of will, reason and emotion, he can accomplish this end with the help of any of these impulses. This shows that the Gita attaches equal importance to all the three elements of mind. Unlike rationalistic ethics, it does not propose to limit human work to rational thinking alone to the exclusion of feeling. In common with Hedonism it also recognises the importance of sensibility, though it is sensibility of a different order. The Gita is imbued with a spirit of broadness and catholicity. The Gita, therefore, lays down that a man can reach his goal by knowledge, by love as well as by acts of service. They are called the path of knowledge, the path of reverence and the path of work respectively. God himself has the three aspects of '*Sat, Chit and Ānanda*,' that is, reality, truth and bliss. To the intellectual type, God reveals himself as supreme knowledge, which dispels all darkness of ignorance. To the virtuous type, He appears as righteousness which gives him a strong solid ground to stand upon and to the emotional type, He appears as overflowing with love and holiness fit to be the beloved of all hearts.

The *Jñāna mārga* or the path of knowledge covers ground, which is more metaphysical than ethical. The *Bhakti mārga* or the path of reverence similarly covers ground which is

essentially religious. It is in talking of the *Karma mārga* or the path of service that the Gita deals with moral problems proper. The Gita expresses strong feelings against inaction and urges men on to work. It does not say that it should be work of the kind which the ascetic mode of life enjoins. It does not believe in the asceticism which devotes all its energy to the suppression of the body. It gives a new meaning to the term and says : *Sannyāsa* does not mean renouncing the world but renouncing interested work. It asks men to devote their energy towards positive betterment of the condition of others. It thus lays down a code of disinterested service as the ideal moral law very much like the doctrines of Positivism founded by Compté. There is no doubt that we must act. The question follows : how should we act ? We should not act in such a way that we are bound to the chain of rebirths. We should act so that the action does not bind us. It therefore interprets yoga as skill in works (*Yogaḥ karmasu kauśalam*) that is to say choosing the proper kind of work. If we act selflessly without keeping any hopes about the fruits of such act, we do the right work and such work has got no binding effects. Work desirelessly and impersonally for the sake of the world and that will lead to *Mokṣa*. We should purge our minds of all selfishness, of all desire and hope. Work indifferently so far as your interests are concerned and you will have peace of mind and salvation at the end. Selfless service is the means of salvation.

The Gita commits the mistake of preaching wholesale banishment of all interests. We should act merely for the sake of acting and without any interest whatever. If we love the whole world and do service to it with the expectation of making all happy, the Gita would not approve of such action as good. Like Kant, the Gita is for wholesale abolition of the feeling-side of morality and, therefore, all the arguments that are applied against such a one-sided view are also applicable to the Gita. What is wanted is not banishment of

interest altogether but a widening of the interest as has already been said.

Ethics of Buddha effects a better reconciliation than the above views and we, therefore, turn to it. Buddha's view breathes an air of broadness and catholicity, which is a rare thing in the field of ethics. Ethical views always tend to take extreme forms. They would either plead for Hedonism or for rationalism and would thus suffer from the defect of one-sidedness. In Buddha we come across a spirit of reconciliation, which neither revolts against mind nor against body. It would neither preach extreme asceticism nor extreme self-indulgence. It would not propose to abolish the feeling-side of man but would rather ennoble it and accept it as an instrument of morality. Having lived for six long years the life of an ascetic, he found that true moral life "cannot be attained by one who has lost his strength." "There are two extremes, which, he who has gone forth, ought not to follow—habitual devotion on the one hand, to the passions, to the pleasure of sensual things; and habitual devotion on the other hand, to self-mortification which is painful, ignoble and unprofitable. There is a middle path discovered by the Tathāgata—a path which opens the eyes and bestows understanding, which leads to peace, to insight to the higher wisdom—to *nirvāna*."¹ It effects a reconciliation between asceticism and sensuousness, between claims of the body and claims of the mind. Rightly has Buddha's path been called the Middle Path.

As in one respect Buddha is against asceticism, he is also in another respect against the scheme of abolishing the feeling-side altogether. Unlike Kant and the Gita he believes in the need for some sort of inspiration which would make moral life more than mere carrying out orders of conscience in a machine-like fashion. He describes *nirvāna* which is the goal for a Buddhist as highest *sukha* or bliss. This can be

¹ First sermon on setting in motion the Wheel of Law.

attained by acts which set us free from the clutches of rebirth. There are acts which bring retribution on their performance and there are acts which do not. As retribution necessitates rebirth, it is necessary to avoid such acts and do only acts which do not entail retribution. Acts which are free from passion, desire and ignorance and, therefore, pure, do not entail retribution. Impure acts are those which are accompanied by some reward in this life or later. Meditation on the four noble truths of Buddhism is a pure act and accomplishes *nirvāna*. Acts leading to the welfare of others are good acts also, because they are free from selfishness. Acts done from self-interest and happiness on earth are born of lust, hatred and ignorance and lead to rebirth. Evil in morality is explained as due to ignorance which results in mistaking the value and nature of things. Unselfishness is born of right knowledge. The importance of knowledge, therefore, has been greatly emphasised, so much that a charge of intellectualism has been brought against Buddhist morality. But Buddhism stressed on the importance of knowledge only to such extent as it is helpful to leading a good moral life. It does not talk of acquiring knowledge for its own sake. "Knowledge is not something to be packed away in some corner of our brain, but what enters into our being, colours our emotion, haunts our soul and is as close to us as life itself. It is the overmastering power which through the intellect moulds the whole personality, transmutes the emotions and disciplines the will."¹

Buddhism does not stop with merely retaining feeling in the region of morality but it goes further. It preaches positive fostering of the emotion of love. Buddha wants us to cultivate true love for all creatures. The stories of the Jātakas bear testimony to his intense love and compassion for all creatures. The Majjhima Nikāya lays down

¹ Radhakrishnan—Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 431.

as follows: "Our mind shall not waver, nor vile speech shall we utter, we will abide tender and compassionate loving in heart, void of secret malice; and we would be ever suffusing such a one with the rays of our loving thought and from him forthgoing we will be ever suffusing the whole world with thought of love, far reaching, grown great and beyond measure, void of ill-will and bitterness." It is for this reason that Mrs. Rhys Davids gave the following homage in appreciation of the noble spirit of Buddhism: "Nor is there any system, not excepting that of the Christian which sees in the evolution of human love, a more exalted transcendence of the lower forms of that emotion."

The correct type of moral theory should, therefore, distribute justice in an even-handed manner by recognising both claims of the body and of mind. It would not look down upon the body as the ascetic would do, but would develop it and discipline it so that it can work as an instrument of the mind, it can better serve the mind. Nor is this all. It would allow sensibility to remain in the fold of ethics. Interest and a feeling of satisfaction of our interests we should have. Only instead of making interests selfish we should widen them. When interest is limited to a narrow compass, there is conflict between self-regarding and other-regarding virtues. But when the interest is widened so as to include the interest of all men, this conflict is removed. There is a conflict as has already been indicated between duty and agreeability. This is based on narrowness of interest. So long as interest is limited to the individual self he finds it more agreeable to do acts which benefit him alone than acts which benefit others. While duty dictates that we should make sacrifice for others the mind feels that it is a disagreeable duty. When however, the interest of the whole world is encompassed within one's own interest by the magic charm of love, there is no more unpleasantness in doing an act of sacrifice, no more conflict between agreeability

and duty. A man would under such circumstances, do acts for the good of others as if he was doing his own good. He need no more be goaded on to such action, it will come to him of itself. Thus it is that duty and agreeability, egoism and altruism, claims of the mind and claims of the body, all get reconciled to each other in an all-comprehensive view which does not favour either party but gives to each its due share of recognition and importance.

CHAPTER IV

THE SECOND PROBLEM OF PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY—ART

Art: two elements—form and content. Antiquity of Art. First stage—Primitive Art, the child's art. Second stage—conflict—Form *vs.* Content. Third stage—Reconciliation of form with content. Illustrations—Fine Art—European Painting: First stage—Byzantine Art. Second stage—European Art mainly realistic. Idealistic School—Durer, Holbein, Victorian artists, Watts. Realistic School—Pre-Raphaelites. Third stage—D. G. Rossetti. European Sculpture: Realistic School—classical Greek sculpture, Michael Angelo. Idealistic type—Rodin. Indian Painting—mainly idealistic—Ajanta paintings illustrating the highest stage. Realistic Painting—Moghul School. Indian Sculpture—Asokan sculpture, the highest class. Idealistic type—the Barhut sculpture. Realistic type. Poetry—conflict of thought and language. English Poetry—Wordsworth, Milton, Shelley. Sanskrit Poetry—Kalidāsa, Bhababhuti.

Section 1. The Problem.

It is a very difficult thing to give a satisfactory definition of beauty. Some call it an inner sense of harmony, others give it other names, but by whatever manner we try to express it in language we find that it has eluded our grasp. It is by nature so very transient, so very delicate in its composition that it fights shy of expression in language. We however know for certain, the forms in which beauty inheres. The various types of forms in which beauty appears, are well marked and understood. Hegel has given us an elaborate list of them and has arranged them in order of their excellence

and superiority. We can observe one characteristic among all these forms of beauty which have been given the general name "art," that they are all products of the creative activity of man. Just as man tries to build up his character with the help of moral actions, here also man tries to give expression to his beautiful thoughts and ideas through art. The material he uses, is ordinarily matter but in higher forms he discards matter altogether and only uses certain symbolic signs which stand for words as in poetry. All the same he is actuated everywhere by the motive of giving concrete forms to the beautiful ideas and thoughts that arise in his mind.

In this connection we can make a passing note of one important thing. In the second chapter it has been shown that art took its rise in the history of human civilisation even before religion. The truth of this statement will be demonstrated by the fact that there are proofs to show that man developed a sort of pre-historic art long long ago. The three-colour paintings of animals discovered in a cave near Santander in Spain are believed to be at least fifty thousand years old. The drawing of outlines of reindeer and ibex on pieces of bone discovered in the caves of Dordogne are much older in age and are assigned to the Stone Age. It is difficult to conceive that at such a distant time when man was little short of a wild animal, he could have developed any religion. The antiquity of the origin of the art of drawing is beyond all doubt.

The problem of art as stated in simple language is this : What should be the basic principle of all works of art ? Before we take up this question for solution the further question arises : what are the different principles that usually guide artists in their artistic pursuits ?

A work of art is essentially a thing of form. In order to be successfully done, it must have a successful outward form. Sculpture takes the form of three-dimensioned stone or bronze, painting takes the form of two-dimensioned sheet

of cloth or paper, music should take the concrete form of a regular set of notes, and poetry should take the form of versified sentences. These are the various main types of forms that art assumes. This part of art is brought directly in touch with our senses. It is but natural, therefore, that this aspect of art should appear as the most important part of it to the general mind.

We should not forget, however, that there is an inner side of art also which is complementary to the outward form. That is the idea or thought underlying the form, that is the content of the form. The outward form is but the physical expression of the inner thought or idea. Just as body is the outward manifestation of the life inhabiting it, so also the idea is the very life or soul of this outward form. Just as thought expresses itself always in form of concepts or words, these artistic ideas find their expression through these outward forms. It will be enough for our purpose to realise for the present that a work of art is constituted of two parts or aspects of it—one is the outside form and the other is the inner idea contained in it. Teleologically it is the artistic idea that takes rise in the mind of the artist first and then drives him on to the work of giving it proper physical shape and is thus in a way the formal cause of the work of art.

We are now in a position to understand the nature of the problem of art. It has to deal with these two distinct aspects of an object of art, namely, the form and the content. To state it more clearly, it has to decide the relative importance of the contributions of these two aspects or elements towards the making of a successful work of art. Based on this distinction of the two aspects, two conflicting views are possible. One view would say that it is the outward form or physical manifestation alone that deserves consideration as contributing to the success of a work of art and the other aspect is unimportant and can be ignored completely. According

to this view the problem of art is essentially a problem of form. The opposing theory would say that form should always be subordinated to content which is always the more important thing in art. Form is wanted only for the purpose of proper manifestation of the idea which is ephemeral and so its utility in art is only indirect. In short the conflict is between the view which pleads for the cause of richness of content as against the view which pleads for the cause of perfection in form. More of it hereafter.

Section 2. The first stage : Primitive Art.

Let us trace the history of this problem from the beginning. In the first stage the conflict between these two antagonistic views pressing the claims of content and form as factors of successful art, did not take rise at all. No such sense of conflict presented itself to the mind of the primitive artist. He was a man who never troubled himself about these distinctions. He started painting or rather scratching outlines of animals in the walls of his cave or on the handle of his instruments simply because it pleased him to do so. After having toiled for securing his daily meal which consisted of a frugal course of meat and fruits only, he would find some leisure time to occupy himself with works of art. He would scratch the outline of deer simply because its form had pleased him and so he wanted to reproduce its pleasing form simply under pressure of impulse. His mind was too undeveloped to be capable of the faculty of analysing the conflicting elements constituting a work of art. His art was in the infant stage when it was impossible to perceive the subtle distinction between what the content is as apart from the form.

This is comparable to the stage in a child's life when it first takes interest in drawing outlines of various objects, which it sees around it. Its drawings are imperfect and its

object is simply to reproduce forms which have appealed to it. It is too much to expect from a mere boy, that he would realise what the difference is between the content and form of an object of art. This question does not rise at all in his mind. To him there is no problem at all knocking for solution at his mind's doors, so far as art is concerned.

It has been observed before that the phenomenon of ontogeny is as much true of the genetic law of growth of mental problems, as it is of the law of biological evolution of Darwin. Just as the human embryo passes through all stages through which man passed in course of his evolution, the human child passes through all stages, through which man has passed in course of his mental development. The shape that the problem of art took in the mind of the primitive man is also revised in the mind of each child in its attitude towards art. The child's first idea of art is identically the same as that of the primitive man. This is the first stage, therefore, of the problem of art marked with the absence of any feeling of discord or want of harmony. It maintains a simple harmony free of all complexities and, therefore, there is no room for discord.

Section 3. The second and the third stage : Form vs. Content.

The problem enters into its second stage as soon as there is consciousness of the antagonism between the two principles underlying a work of art, namely, the content and the form. But this presupposes a great deal of mental development. Unless man's intellect is sufficiently developed to understand and analyse the subtle difference between the two elements of art, the conflict cannot take its rise. In the history of art, therefore, we find that we cannot locate the beginning of this stage, until a very late age in the history of civilization. In its infant stage, art is pre-eminently imitative in its nature. The human mind is not capable of forming very complex ideas in its early stage. It can only think of very simple ideas or

rather concepts of animals or trees that appeal to him. When he tries to scratch their outlines on stones or on any other material, his motive simply is to give it as close a likeness with the object as found in nature, as possible. It can also think of a combat between animals and there are specimens of such drawings by primitive man; but it cannot grasp more complex ideas than this. His art was purely imitative. But the word imitative should not be taken to mean that the artist of this age was actuated by any motive of giving a realistic expression to his art. Far from it. His skill was limited by inexperience, his knowledge of the effects of light and shade on art was still more obscure. He would feel himself satisfied, if he cou'd convey a likeness by suggesting the shape as seen in nature with the help of simple outlines. This was also the case with primitive Egyptian Art. Egyptians would always draw pictures in profile as that is the most easy thing to do, as no question of light and shade crops up here. All these are examples of art in its infant stage when there was no consciousness of the two conflicting aspects of a work of art.

Not until we come to Greek sculpture, when it has undergone a great deal of development, do we come across an example, showing the beginning of the second stage. Here for the first time, we find the sculptor is not simply satisfied by an object, which only suggests likeness of an object in nature, but he would go into details and study the object in nature and try to make his work resemble the object in the minutest details. The men and women of Greek sculptors are still recognised, as the most perfect representations of the beauty of the human body. Here then, we find that the artist is clearly led by the idea, that the form should be as perfect as possible. Here is discovered first the distinctiveness of form, as a separate element in the constitution of a work of art. This, therefore, marks the beginning of the second stage of the problem of art.

We may make a parallel study in the life of the individual

artist. The child's first drawings are as primitive as the drawings of the primitive man. When he grows up and both skill and intelligence are developed, he is actuated by the motive of giving as perfect a form to his work as possible, so that it would be mistaken for a real thing. The human mind is easily drawn to this aspect of art, because this is more easily detected by the senses, as it has the special advantage of having a concrete form. It may be interesting to note here, that the idea of giving a perfect form was developed earlier in the history of sculpture than in painting. To use a technical word, realism in art appeared earlier in the field of sculpture than in the field of painting. The idea of light and shade, of contour and shape did not take its rise in the mind of the European artist, until the appearance of Botticelli or Giovanni in the beginning of the mediaeval period. But the idea of perfect shape as applied to a work of sculpture had undergone full development in the hand of the Greek artist. The reason is that sculpture has to deal with three dimensions, while painting has to deal with two dimensions. It is easier to give a more realistic likeness to a work when it is to be done in three dimensions, than when it is to be done in two dimensions. To convey the idea of a three-dimensioned object on a two-dimensioned sheet is admittedly a much more difficult task and, therefore, necessarily presupposes a considerable development of the art of painting.

As soon as an artist realises that his ideal should be to give as close a likeness with reality as possible to his work, he is said to be led by realistic principles. He then goes on developing his art on this ideal of realism or perfection of form. After constant practice, he finds that he has gone to his utmost capacity and drawn pictures that are perfect in anatomical details. He soon realises however, that this alone does not impart life and vividness to his work. There is something wanting in it which makes it an imperfect work. He realises that to paint a man, it would not do simply to make his

limbs conform to the principles of anatomy. That indispensable thing which is necessary to a perfect picture, is the idea behind it. The physical form painted must express some idea or mood, some individual characteristic, which would give it life and individuality. Thus he comes to discover the idealistic or romantic element in art. After this, he is naturally led by the tendency of giving more and more prominence to this aspect of art. Carried by enthusiasm he may come to ignore the physical form altogether and over-emphasise the importance of the idealistic element. Thus, in order to give the idea of a strong man, he would exaggerate the size and shape of his muscles and limbs transgressing even the principles of anatomy. This shows the second stage of the problem in its fully developed form. The antagonism is most acute making the idea of a compromise almost improbable.

But a way to compromise has to be found out and compromise effected. Otherwise, art will not attain its fullest development. However conflicting the two elements of art may be, it has to be realised that one cannot exist without the other. Even the most developed realistic art is imperfect if it ignores the other element and no idea can express itself without the help of a concrete physical form. Nor can they flourish in complete isolation. Each is complementary to the other. Both are necessary for the making of a perfect picture. Their relationship is not one of antagonism but of co-operation. As soon as the mutual importance of both the elements is realised, the way to compromise is made smooth and clear. The function of content is to give life to the picture and the function of form is to interpret or express the content in all its fullness. That much of emphasis on the form side of art is necessary, as is consistent with giving fullest expression to its content. When neither transgresses the grounds of each and both keep within their limits, the result is the most successful picture. When the

necessity of both the elements is thus realised, we come to the third stage of the problem which finds out its own solution. The conflict is laid at rest by admitting the claims of both as contributors to successful work in art.

Let us have some illustrations from the history of art. That will supply us with concrete materials and illustrations for the proper understanding of the principles explained above. We start with a survey of the history of fine art.

Section 4. European Painting.

We had already referred to the specimens of pre-historic art found by scholars in Europe. They represent art of the earliest times and show that man was interested in art even in the very early stages of his development. It shows art in its earliest form where man was actuated with the motive of only representing accurately the forms that were familiar and pleasing to him. It is very suggestive to notice that the crude drawings of the backward races of the modern world such as the Australians, the African Negroes and the Esquimaux bear a strange similarity with them. This is because their art has not at all progressed and has remained in its old primitive form.

The first specimens of art of the historic times are also influenced by the same spirit of simply reproducing the forms of things exactly as they are in nature. Art is still purely reproductive and does not concern itself with analysing the component elements of art. Only this imitative spirit becomes more strongly developed. Thus the artists of ancient Egypt were concerned with the proper representation of contour. Here the characteristic poses of men and beasts were represented in a very graphic manner. After that artistic activity ceased for a long time in the Western World, the glorious period of Greek sculpture excepted. During the early days of Christianity the church gave little encouragement

to art. "Cursed be all who paint pictures" is a common sentiment to them all. The art that flourished in the hands of the Byzantine artist under the patronage of the Eastern empire was stiff and formal in nature. After the new Gothic races conquered and settled down in Italy, this same Byzantine art was borrowed to decorate their churches and buildings. It was destitute of any feeling for either beauty or truth to nature. "The figures in these paintings are raised from a gold background.....The faces retain the stiff staring solemnity of the Byzantine type. The infant Jesus is a little wizened old man, the adult Christ is portrayed as an awful judge, not as a loving shepherd and there is never a trace of emotion in the countenance of the almond-eyed Madonna." ¹

It is with the advent of the modern period that European art assumed its second stage of development. In the art of Cimabue with whom modern art is said to begin, we find a perceptible change from the style of the Byzantine artists. He seems for the first time to impart a touch of life in his paintings. To quote from Sir William Orpen: "If in type his Madonna still adheres to the Byzantine tradition as regards features, a new softness has crept into her face; the infant Jesus is no longer wizened but tender and more childlike, while there is a touch of human kindness in the angles that bear them company." Here then is a dim perception of the fact that mere delineation of form does not give us a good picture, that there is content-side also of an object of art. If it lacks this important element art becomes formal and uninteresting like the Byzantine paintings.

With the passing of time European art began to grow very rapidly. Oil painting was introduced. The artists tried to evolve a technique which would give a correct idea of shapes, of forms and light-effects on them. It was clearly realised

¹ Orpen, *The Outline of Art*; Introduction.



that there are two distinct elements which go to constitute a good picture, that a work of art not only expresses a form but also encloses an idea within it. A human form to be a complete picture, should also represent a certain mood or idea in it. Van Dyke thus discovered that in portrait painting, mere reproduction of outward features does not constitute the whole work of the artist. The artist must try to give expression to the inner soul of the man he paints. His personality has got to be expressed through his outward features and if that is wanting, it is no good portrait at all. We quote an authority in the person of Sir William Orpen:

“To speak of the elegance of Van Dyke’s portraits is to repeat a commonplace, but what the casual observer is apt to overlook is that this elegance penetrates below externals to the mind and spirit of the sitter.

“Van Dyke established a style in portraiture which succeeding generations of painters have endeavoured to imitate, but none has surpassed, few have approached him, and when we look among his predecessors we have to go back to Botticelli before we find another poet-painter who with equal, though different exquisiteness mirrored not merely the bodies but the very souls of humanity.”¹

One special characteristic of European art deserves special mention. The artist has everywhere been actuated by the desire of giving a life-like graphic form to his pictures. He would try to find out means which would give the idea of roundness of the limbs of the body, which would give the perspective of many things put together in space. As a matter of fact, it would try to depict objects as they appear in the three-dimensioned space on their two-dimensioned canvass. This is done by studying the effect of light and shade in paintings. As a result we find all the paintings are usually life-like and vivid and true to nature and are soothing

¹ Orpen, *The Outline of Art*, Chap. VII.



to the common eye. It is not simply drawing lines and then filling up the space between, with colours as in Japanese art. In the art of early masters such as Leonardo da Vinci, Michael Angelo and Raphael we find this characteristic very much developed, while in the art of Rubens we find it developed to perfection.

In the long history of European art though we find that there is consciousness of both the elements of art namely form and content, artists may still be classified into two classes, according as they put more emphasis on either of these two elements. Thus one artist would care more for the outward form than the inner content, while another would put emphasis on the content, to the neglect of the form. We may call the former realistic artists and the latter idealistic artists. A few examples will suffice.

As examples of the extreme idealistic type of painting, we may name the two great German masters Durer, and Holbein. They are contemporaneous and the great characteristic of their art is that it is meant to tell truths in the most graphic and overpowering manner. They would not care for the beauty of the form nor for the realistic appearance of their paintings; they were carried by the one sole motive of presenting the idea or content in the most vivid manner possible. The famous wood engraving of Durer called 'The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse' has been acknowledged as the most wonderful work of art ever inspired by the Book of Revelation. The figures are uncouth in appearance, but the whole effect is so intense, that it has ever been the source of inspiration to many a man. This picture provided the theme for the popular novel of Ibanez and also a noted film, both bearing the same name. Holbein's representation of the 'Dance of Death' is also as famous a picture and has found a lasting place, in the popular imagination.

As a more recent example of the same class of art, we may refer to the group of artists who are broadly called,

'Victorian' To the mind of these artists, the content was of greater importance than form. In fact every picture was meant to tell a story. To quote Sir William Orpen: "Under Queen Victoria English painting became a homely, easily understandable art, appealing to the people by clear representation of simple things often founded on everyday life, and almost always tinged by a sentiment perceptible and congenial to the humblest intelligence. Subject was of paramount importance, every picture told a story, and the story was usually of a simple nature that required no erudition for its comprehension, one that all who ran could read." Of this group we may specially refer to the paintings of Watts, in whose pictures this characteristic was most pronounced. Here was an artist, who not only told stories in art but also preached. He has been most aptly described as a "preacher in paint." We may refer to his painting called "Mammon" which in a very powerful manner condemns the ruthlessness with which wealth is pursued. His other famous picture, "Hope" is pre-eminently the most magnificent of all allegorical pictures. Here he paints hope as a blind-folded woman "with lyre in hand and sitting on the globe in the dim twilight of the world striving to get all the music possible out of the last remaining string." It will be advantageous to quote the painter's own words describing the ideal: "My intention has not been so much to paint pictures that charm the eye, as to suggest great thoughts that will appeal to the imagination and the heart and kindle all that is best and noblest in humanity."

The Pre-Raphaelite school probably furnishes us with the best example of realism in art. Here we meet with an urgent craving for making the forms in the pictures conform in the minutest details to things as they are seen in nature. How this brotherhood was formed between the three renowned artists of the nineteenth century, Holman Holt, Millais and Rossetti reads like romance in the history of

European art. The name Pre-Raphaelite seems to give a correct idea of the principles of this school. These artists discovered that artists since the time of Raphael had deteriorated a great deal. The reason for this, according to them, was that these artists blindly imitated the pictures of former painters without going direct to nature. They failed, because their art was based wholly on preceding art. These young artists, therefore, thought that to paint good pictures it was necessary to look at nature for themselves as the earlier artists had done. They were called Pre-Raphaelites, because they expressed a preference for the painters before Raphael, to those succeeding him. Their aims were "to paint nature with minute fidelity and to regain the intense sincerity of the early Italian painters."

Here then is a case where perfection in form was given the most important place in painting. In fact the special method they adopted indicates the extreme realism of their ideals. In order to paint a picture they would group together persons and things in the manner wanted and then they would try to reproduce their forms in the minutest details on the canvass. The famous picture called "The Girlhood of Mary Virgin" by D. G. Rossetti and "Christ in the house of his parents" by J. E. Millais were actually painted in this manner. They did so, because they thought that it also implied intense poetic expression.

The development of the art of D. G. Rossetti is of special interest in this connection. While he began his career of a painter as an extreme realist who cares only for the perfection of forms, his later paintings betray a great modification of his principles. He seemed to have perceived that it was not enough for a picture to be correctly drawn, but it must also embody a worthy idea. Gradually he deviated away from his path and "his pictures became more and more dreamlike in their imaginative aloofness from life." His picture called "The Day Dream" clearly shows how little it has to do with

the original ideals of Pre-Raphaelitism. Rossetti has thus the unique distinction of beginning as a naturalistic painter and ending as a romanticist whose paintings were enveloped in a mist of poetic charm and imagination. Having thus realised the importance of both the elements of art, namely content and form, he happily struck upon that ideal which gives equal emphasis on both the elements. His later paintings are thus both realistic in appearance and suggestive of deep thoughts. He thus attained the third stage of artistic development where form and content are no more in conflict with each other, but work in unity for achieving the best type of art.

Section 5. European Sculpture.

Sculpture is a subject which has the special advantage of having three dimensions by its very nature. It has not to cope with the special difficulty felt by painters in conveying the idea of the third dimension only with the help of light and shade. The material it uses, itself possesses the three dimensions and the artist can, therefore, construct the three dimensions actually without remaining satisfied with giving only an illusion of the third dimension. It is easier, therefore, for the sculptor to produce figures which are naturalistic and realistic. The naturalistic element in sculpture, therefore, becomes very pronounced from the very beginning of its development.

There is no specimen of sculpture to show the earliest stage of it. These specimens were presumably of the type, which a boy would mould in trying to model the shape of a man or an animal. Like the earliest types of painting its only motive is to suggest a likeness with the thing as it appears in reality and must appear grotesque and uncouth in appearance.

In Greek sculpture, we come straight to the second stage of its development. The realistic bias is very pronounced in



it, because that is most naturally suggested to the mind of the artist. Here after all is a subject, which can be suitably made to resemble nature in the minutest detail. For the artist has to construct a three-dimensioned body out of a concrete material. Greek sculpture, therefore most readily developed in these lines. Perfection of form was its ideal, to impart to the object the closest resemblance with life, was the artist's haunting dream. The Greeks were thus able to bring sculpture to a point of perfection and physical beauty which has never since been surpassed. The famous "Venus of Milo" and other representations of the other legendary gods of Greek mythology are all ideals of grace and perfection in modelling and show the divine beauty of the human form in its various poses. There are statues also which do suggest action and tell stories. The "Discobolus" describes the athlete in action in a very graphic manner no doubt. The group showing "Laocoon" and his sons attacked by a serpent no doubt tells a pathetic story. But all the same, in these productions the perfection with which the bodies are modelled is of such absorbing importance that it carries away the emphasis from the thought side to form side. The perfection of their forms seems to occupy the mind of the connoisseur more, than the idea it is meant to convey. The beauty of the form seems to hamper the unfolding of the thought. They are comparable to a lady overburdened with ornaments whose personal charm and beauty become drowned in the amplitude of her artificial adornments. Greek sculpture is thus essentially occupied with form, it is characteristically realistic.

Greek art continued to remain the ideal of all later European schools of sculpture on account of its sheer merit. To find out as great a sculptor as could reach the skill and eminence of the Greeks, we have to travel over a long period of several centuries till we come to the times of Michael Angelo. His chief merit was that he could model as well as the old Greeks. It was, therefore, purely the story of the old

Greek ideal revived. His modelling of Cupid and David would clearly establish this. These figures are as perfect in their shape as the best Greek statues and may very well be mistaken for them.

After him France produced a number of good sculptors of repute of whom J. B. Pigalle, J. A. Houdon and Francois Rude may be worthily mentioned. But they were all inspired with the ideals of Michael Angelo and the Greek sculptors. Perfection of the form was the ideal and nobody thought of going beyond that. The influence of Greek sculpture was too overpowering in nature to allow them the opportunity of looking for different paths.

It lay with a French sculptor of comparatively recent times to find out a new path of progress for sculpture in the person of Auguste Rodin. Rodin is acclaimed unanimously to be as great a sculptor as Michael Angelo, so far as skill in reproducing perfect forms is concerned. It will be very interesting to note that Rodin began like all previous sculptors as a naturalistic artist who cared only for the perfection of form. It was by experience that he came to discover that there was another path and then he came to discard going along the beaten path.

The first works of Rodin were certainly inspired by the Greek ideal pleading for perfection in form. To quote his own words : " Everything is contained in Nature and when the artist follows Nature he gets everything." This sounds very much like an echo of the thoughts of the artists of the Pre-Raphaelite School. When his earlier work " The Age of Bronze " was exhibited everybody was struck with the masterly modelling which almost exceeded the skill of the Greek sculptors. The authorities even accused him of having taken a cast from life. His next great work " St. John, the Baptist " intentionally made bigger than life size proved beyond doubt his skill as a realistic sculptor.

But the greatness of Rodin lies elsewhere. With

experience he soon came to discover that realistic forms alone do not make good sculpture. The artist must go deeper and try to find expression for the inner soul of the object. He thus discarded the use of his skill in producing perfect forms. He would be satisfied with giving the forms a bare outline. He would even leave "rough the matrix from which his sculpture was hewn." His poetic insight and marvellous skill in modelling, together went to make a rare combination in which the beauty of the form was only utilised to give expression to thought. It thus came to produce the type of art in which both content and form are harmoniously blended, which is the indication of the highest type of sculpture. His statue of Balzac may be cited as an example of this type of sculpture. "The sublime simplicity of this figure, loosely wrapt in a dressing gown, with the upturned face, the lion-maned head of genius, soaring as it were to heaven, revealed Rodin at his highest not only as a master of impressionist modelling, but also as a psychologist who could conceive and create an unforgettable expression of the very soul of genius."¹ In Rodin, therefore, European sculpture rose to its highest stage of development which re-established the balance between form and content in art.

Section 6. Indian Painting.

A study of Indian art in the light of the above principles will prove equally advantageous. The time is past when it used to be said that "sculpture and painting are unknown as fine arts in India," as remarked by Sir George Birdwood. Nor do the remarks of Prof. Westmacott that the sculpture of India "usually consists of monstrous combinations of human and brute forms, repulsive from their ugliness and outrageous defiance of rule and even possibility" now-a-days gain publicity as correct sentiments. Thanks to the vigorous

¹ Orpen, Outline of Art, Chap. II.

writings of Mr. Havell, Dr. Coomarswamy and Sir John Marshall, public attention has been compelled to the subject and the attitude of mere contempt has been discredited.

It is gratifying to note that both the arts of painting and sculpture attained the very highest standard of perfection during the early ages of Indian history. Our discussions may, therefore, be conveniently limited to examples taken from earlier works. After the Ajanta paintings there is not much of really good Indian painting to talk about. The mediaeval Moghul school of painting or more correctly the Indo-Persian school deserves notice, but it is not certainly the best type of painting that India produced. We shall deal with them hereafter. As regards sculpture, there are indeed some good works credited to the Middle Ages. But since earlier specimens supply us with enough materials for the purpose of our study, it is no use multiplying examples.

The antiquity of the art of painting in India is established beyond all shadows of doubt. There are references to painting in early Indian literature, for example the Pali Buddhist canon, which dates from three or four centuries before Christ. The Cylonese chronicle, the *Mahāvamsa*, also tells of mural paintings at the time of King Duttahgāminī about 150 B.C.

The oldest Indian pictures that have withstood the ravages of time are not many in number. Of them, the paintings in the caves of Ajanta are the most interesting from many points. They supply us with numerous paintings painted over a long period of time ranging from A. D. 50 to 642. It is generally stated, however, that the bulk of these paintings were works executed under the patronage of Chalukya kings who reigned from 550 to 642 A. D. The subjects are so varied and numerous and are executed with such skill and perfection that they may easily be recognised as the best specimens of extant Indian painting.

In talking of Indian painting, and for the matter of that all oriental painting, we should bear in mind their basic

characteristic as opposed to Western painting. . Unlike modern European art which emphasises that bodies should be painted just as they are seen in nature, the oriental painter depends essentially for his success on his skill in the drawing of lines. Dr. Bushell's remarks about Chinese art may be quoted in this connection most fittingly. The Asiatic " attributes an extreme importance to the line in pictorial art ; bodies appear to them not as they are in reality, that is to say, round and with light playing about them but as if circumscribed by a precise line, defined visibly from the ambient air."

This difference in the ideals of the two continents led to different effects. While European paintings appear more vivid and realistic on account of the roundness of the forms and the depiction of light-effects on the bodies, the Indian art, and along with that all Asiatic paintings, suffer from a general absence of perception of depth in their pictures. It completely ignores the representation of the third dimension in painting. Indian painting at its best is after all drawing filled up with colour. This observation applies generally to all paintings of the Ajanta caves. All the same the lines have been drawn with such consummate skill and feelings have been depicted with such effect, that they have been universally recognised as the best type of art. On account of their general defect of lack of perspective, Mr. Fergusson considers the Ajanta paintings as better than anything in Europe before Orcagna in the fourteenth century, as after that European art progressed marvellously in the line of realistic painting.

As has been already observed, except for this limitation characteristic of all oriental painting, the Ajanta paintings combine in them both the elements of true art in equal terms of friendship. The painter here is equally conscious of the importance of a good figure as well as expression of thoughts. The best specimens of Ajanta paintings thus show the best types of Indian works on painting and may without hesitation

be recognised as art matured into the highest stage of growth. Without dwelling on the subject in detail it will be enough for our purpose if we close our discourse on Ajanta paintings by quoting the observations of certain noted authorities about them.

Mr. Griffith who spent as long a period as thirteen years in making sketches of all the Ajanta paintings and is, therefore, most fitted to pass any opinion on them, writes as follows :—

“ Here we have art with life in it, human faces full of expressions, limbs drawn with grace and action, flowers which bloom, birds which soar, and beasts that spring or fight or patiently carry burdens ; all are taken from Nature’s book—growing after her pattern.”

Vincent Smith, another great connoisseur of Indian art, writes as follows in his *History of Fine Arts in India and Ceylon* :

“ Yet inspite of disadvantages inherent in small-scale reproductions and criticism by judges out of touch with the spirit of the artists, the paintings stand the unfair tests wonderfully well and excite respectable admiration as the productions of painters capable of deep emotion, full of sympathy with the nature of men, women, children, animals and plants and endowed with masterly powers of execution.”

The pictures of Ajanta are not only faithful representation of life as seen in nature but also paint thoughts and ideas in the most graphic manner possible. They are suffused with thoughts and ideas. They all tell stories. They strike a happy balance between realistic and idealistic tendencies in art.

Curiously enough, we have practically nothing of Indian art after this glorious period of Ajanta paintings for about nine hundred years. After that we come to the introduction of the Persian style under the patronage of Akbar.

The art of painting was systematically encouraged by the Moghul rulers and thus a special school of painting in which the Indian and the Persian elements became fused, took its rise. There are numerous painters whose work has been carefully preserved. They are not characterised by such great merit as to deserve elaborate treatment. They may be referred to as a type of art in which the realistic element is more pronounced. While they cared too much about painting the minutest details, their paintings are formal in nature and do not express any thought or feeling. They thus represent the second stage in painting, where the importance of the form counts more than the content. The following observation of Vincent Smith may be taken as a correct estimate of their merit: "The excessive regard of the Moghul artist for meticulous fineness of execution sometimes tempted them to neglect the weightier matters of true art. No skill of hand or keenness of vision can make up for lack of ideas."

Section 7. Indian Sculpture.

The specimens of Indian sculpture are happily more numerous and thus allow of a very wide room for choice. The obvious reason is that while material on which painting was worked out was comparatively fragile, the material for sculpture being usually stone, it could better withstand the decaying effects of time.

Indian sculpture showed very remarkable achievements at very early times, namely during the period of Asoka. Afterwards there flourished the renowned Gāndhāra school which evidently took elements from Greek sculpture. Again, it showed remarkable vitality during the period of the Gupta kings. While most of the sculptures of the Middle Ages has for its subject the gods and goddesses of Puranic Hinduism and are, therefore, at times fantastic in form, cases of genuinely good art are not however rare. The figures of Natarāja Siva

in Ceylon and of King Krishnanārāyana of Vijaynagar may be cited as examples. When the materials are so numerous we shall content ourselves with taking examples from the earlier period alone, for it is no use multiplying examples.

The sculpture that flourished under the patronage of that great emperor Asoka is of such a high order, that it obviously presupposes a long period of development of the art preceding it. The sculptor usually found plenty of scope for his work on the monolythic columns raised by Asoka for the purpose of teaching the tenets of Buddhism. These columns were mounted by capitals which would be decorated by animals which bore symbolical values about them. The horse, the bull, the lion and the elephant are the principal animals. The best extant example is beyond all doubt the Sārnāth capital with four maned lions seated back to back on top of it and just below them the four kinds of animals are executed, one on each side of the column. The figures of all these animals are drawn with such accuracy that they have the appearance of real animals and at the same time they appear to beam with life. The very souls of these animals have been, as it were, infused into them. They are thus clearly examples of sculpture of the highest type where both form and content are sought to be realised with an impartial zeal. Though executed at such an early period as the third century B.C., they have never been surpassed by later artists. Critics have not been slow to realise their merits and they had most deliberately showered words of praise on these unique specimens of sculpture. We quote below two passages from Vincent Smith. Speaking about the art of this period in general he says: "Whatever the device selected, it is invariably well executed and chiselled with extraordinary precision and accuracy, which characterise the workmanship of the Maurya age and have never been surpassed in Athens or elsewhere." Speaking about the Sārnāth capital elsewhere, he says: "It would be difficult to find in any

country an example of ancient animal sculpture superior or even equal to this beautiful work of art, which successfully combines realistic modelling with ideal dignity and is finished in every detail with perfect accuracy." These words need no further comments. They are examples of the best type of sculpture.

In Gāndhāra sculpture also there are some fine specimens which may be assigned as high a place as the specimens of Asoka sculpture referred to above. This Gāndhāra sculpture used to have mainly for its subject-matter the personage of Buddha in his various attitudes. With the development of the Hinayāna school, necessity was felt for shaping out the likeness of the great master and the Gāndhāra art was principally inspired by this supreme necessity. Among the many extant images of Buddha cut out by the Gāndhāran sculptors, it would be enough for our purpose if we refer to one only. The relief pane found at Loriyan Tangai in Surat is accepted as the best image of Buddha. It represents Buddha seated in a cave, while Sakra with the whole heavenly host behind him is standing to pay him respect. Speaking of this Vincent Smith writes as follows in his usual appreciative tone : "Here the central figure has sweet, calm dignity, while the numerous subordinate figures and the scenery are rendered with much grace and beauty."

Before closing this discourse on sculpture we feel tempted to give another example, because, by virtue of its merit, it holds a unique position in the sculpture of the world. This is the statue found on the right-hand side of the Isuru Muniya Vihāra at Anurādhāpura, Ceylon. It is cut on the face of a rock and has been identified to be that of the sage Kapila by Dr. Coomarswamy. Its expression of dignified calm combined with simplicity, marks it out as the finest specimen of sculpture. Everybody would agree with Vincent Smith when he says that "this relief seems to be one of the most remarkable productions of Indian art whether on the mainland or in the island of Ceylon.

Specimens of sculpture in which the content element is more predominant than the form element, are also equally numerous in ancient Indian art. As we have a limited space we shall have to content ourselves with a few examples. The specimens of sculpture discovered by Cunningham at Barhut and sent to the Indian Museum, Calcutta, may be classed as examples of this type. Their principal motive is the desire to tell edifying stories in a manner readily intelligible to the eyes of the faithful. The modelling is not of the best kind but the idea of the sculptor has always been brought out with strong suggestiveness. The artist has thus been more awake to the necessity of telling the story graphically, than of representing the figures in perfect forms. The subject-matter is often humorous and thus affords a welcome change for the artist from the chiselling of stereotyped forms.

The statue of the emaciated Buddha excavated from the ruins of a monastery at Sikri in 1889 and now preserved in the Lahore Museum, gives us probably the best example of realistic sculpture in India. It depicts the great preacher as he sat at Bodh Gaya under a Banyan tree making vain attempts to attain true knowledge by the severest of austerities. The ribs and veins with only the bare covering of the skin, are chiselled with such extraordinary skill that the image is awfully repelling to the sight and presents, in a most graphic manner, the horror of an emaciated body.

Section 8. Poetry.

Poetry has been acclaimed by Hegel as the highest kind of art, because here the artist constructs on material which is more ephemeral than the material of any other art. It is most fitting, therefore, that we should give some illustration from poetry for understanding the genetic principles guiding the growth of art before we close the chapter. Of all types of art, poetry is probably the most widely appreciated and

an analysis of its growth in the light of the genetic law of development may help our understanding of its principles better.

Poetry is probably as old as articulate speech. As soon as man learnt the use of words he was impelled by the desire of finding expression to striking thoughts that tickled his brain, or deep feelings that stirred his heart. He wanted to give beautiful clothing to these striking thoughts and soul-stirring ideas. Such extraordinary things need to have a specially beautiful clothing to be in keeping with the inner idea and hence the need for rhyme and rhythm. Thus it was that poetry was born.

In the introduction of the famous Indian epic, the Rāmāyana, there is a story telling how poetry was born. This story is marked with such a deep insight and correct analysis of the nature of poetry, that it is well worth mentioning here. Time there was, when the celebrated author of the Rāmāyana, the sage Vālmiki, could write no verse at all. But one fine morning he found to his great astonishment that he had become endowed with the power of writing verses. This is how he came to accomplish that. As he was proceeding on that auspicious day towards the river for a bath, he noticed a pair of birds perching on a bough and making love to each other. The next moment, he found one of them pierced with the arrow of a hunter and the mate he found, bewailing pitifully as it circled round its dead body. This scene roused up such a deep feeling of indignation in his heart that he gave expression to his wrath by cursing the hunter in the form of a couplet. That is how the first great poet of India learnt to write verses. The suggestion is that a deep thought or emotion is the engendering factor of poetry.

It may be easily understood that in common with all other kinds of art, poetry is constituted of two elements. One element is the inner idea or feeling, while the other element is its outer clothing in form of rhymed words. In primitive poetry, the distinction between these two constituent elements

is not realised at all. The poet writes poetry without being conscious of these two aspects simply for the joy of writing. Such is the poetry of the great epic poets of the world. It is naïve and unreflective poetry; telling of great events of the ancient world.

As soon as poetry has attained some amount of development and the poetic mind has matured, the difference between the two elements of poetry is realised. This starts the second stage of the development of poetry. With the consciousness of these two constituents of poetry, namely the idea and its enclosing clothing in the form of rhymed words, poetry develops on two different lines. One line puts emphasis on the inner aspects of poetry and declares that it is the enclosed thought or feeling which is of paramount importance in poetry. The other school would say that since poetry is art it is with the outward clothing that poets should concern themselves without caring for the proper expression of thought. The rivalry of these two camps leads to an intense conflict and extreme forms of each type are developed.

The extreme form of idealistic type of poetry would say that all the interest and attention of the poet should be diverted to the full expression of the enclosed idea or feeling, while the words should be as free from embellishments of rhetoric and prosody as possible. Wordsworth's diction of poetry may be taken as an example of this view. His extreme attitude makes him recommend the use of rustic language in poetry. All the poets of the Romantic period are also actuated by the feeling of an exaggerated importance of the content side of poetry with the result that the language side of poetry is too much neglected. Wordsworth's poem called "Michael" is the best example of this class. The poetry of this class is marked with an impatience for all restrictions hampering with the free expression of all ideas whatsoever.

Milton is the typical example of the classical type of poetry, where beauty of expression and intricacies of allusions

and references count most. Thomas Gray may also be fittingly placed in this class on account of the verbosity of his style. Here poetry is not written on the spur of the moment just when a thought rushes into the mind of the poet with overpowering force. But it is slow and patient work where the mind takes time to think out the choicest of expressions which would give his poetry the most impressive clothing. That is how Gray took as long a time as seven years to complete his famous "Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard." Any of Shelley's small lyrics or Browning's sonnets could not have taken more than one hour's time to write them out, on the other hand.

It is not a difficult matter to multiply examples by classifying poets into either of the two principal groups, namely the classical and the romantic. Once we have grasped the underlying principles on which the differences are based, we can find out which poet gives greater importance to either of the constituent elements and he finds his own class accordingly.

The highest type of poetry, however, avoids the grasp of any poets who go in for any of these principles in preference to the others. The sense of conflict or antagonism is based on a false sense of the nature of true poetry. If one goes deeper, one would realise that these two elements of poetry, namely the content and the form, are complementary to each other. Idea cannot ignore the form or the language, for it has to depend on that for its expression. Mere beauty of language on the other hand, is not considered poetry either and is as much despised as a body which is beautiful but dead.

Their relationship is one of mutual dependence. Both are wanted, but the importance of neither should be over-emphasised. Only that much of the beauty of language is wanted as is consistent with the full expression of the idea. Where beauty of language stifles thought, such beauty is useless and is to be discarded. The poet who strikes upon

the true sense of balance between language and thought of poetry, is capable of producing the highest kind of poetry.

It may appear rather surprising that we should describe Wordsworth as belonging to the highest class of poets who want to effect a compromise between the thought-side and language-side of poetry.

He indeed advocated abolition of all traditional distinctions between high and low, refined and vulgar, in style and subject and was thus onesided in his views. We have already shown that he had emphasised on as simple a style for poetry as possible. It was however only a onesided reaction against the artificial poetic diction of the classical school of Pope clinging to the dead forms of a dead art without any genuine feeling in it. It was a temporary phase with him and it was not long before he gave up this reactionary principle of using the simple language of peasants in poetry. Thus in his best pieces like the "Tintern Abbey," "The Fountain and the Lucy" poems, his style becomes a reconciliation of the classical and the romantic, a higher harmony of both.

The best lyric poems of Shelley may also be taken as examples of this third class of poetry where there is harmonious balancing between both style and subject-matter. In lyrical intensity combined with melody of versification he has no equal. In this sense, his poems are the best examples of the third type of poetry.

We may also profit by taking some illustrations from a classical language. For this purpose Sanskrit will provide us with the most suitable material, for in the matter of merit and variety it has no second in the whole field of classical literatures of the world.

The history of Sanskrit poetry is a story of continued deterioration. The first great poet we come across is Kālidāsa and with him is linked the golden age of Sanskrit literature. A poet and dramatist of supernatural powers, he has no equal in the whole range of Sanskrit literature and very few to rival him

in the literature of the world. His fame has been well established both in the country of his birth and in foreign lands, and critics from both the East and the West have joined hands in showering praise on him. His style most aptly represents the best type of poetry. He would tolerate neither verbosity of language nor too much of rhetorics in his poetry. He would get hold of lofty thoughts and beautiful ideas and then clothe them in the proper language that would give them the fullest expression possible. He does not mind even if the language becomes simple, and where it is ornamental it is no product of hard labour, but comes spontaneously out of his pen. Any of his good verses would testify to the correctness of the above statement. And it is in this correct balancing between language and its content that his true greatness inheres.

The great Sanskrit scholar Landi has dealt with the various types of poetry in his celebrated work on poetics named the *Kāvyādarsa*. Here he talks of two principal styles. One is called the style of *Vidarbha*, characterised by greater emphasis on the content-side of poetry and use of simple language as far as possible. The other is called the *Gauḍa* style and is marked by use of verbose language and too much ornamentation. The analysis correctly represents the two principles of antagonism in views of poetry and may be very well compared to the scheme of dividing poetry into Romantic and Classical groups.

It would be doing *Kālidāsa* a grave injustice to say that he belonged to the *Vidarbha* school as is usually done by critics. That would be placing him lower than he deserves. In fact *Kālidāsa* is beyond any stage in which there is a feeling of antagonism between thought and language in poetry. He has reached a stage in which the conflict has been smoothed down under the sobering influence of a more comprehensive view, which gives both elements their proper share of importance. He finds that both language and thought

are essential for the composition of good poetry and their relationship is of an organic nature ; neither can do without the other. We may refer incidentally to his famous couplet in the beginning of the *Raghuvansam*.¹ According to him the relationship between a word and its content is very intimate like that of the body and its soul. That is how he strikes on that happy sense of balance between beauty of language and beauty of thought in which both serve to enhance the beauty of both and neither trespasses into the rights of the other. It would be wrong to say that Kālidāsa is easily beaten as regards beauty of language, by any of the later poets advocating an ornamental style. Even on their own ground, Kālidāsa beats them, for real beauty of language cannot flourish without the help of beauty of thought. In some of his passages in the *Vikramorvasiyam* he attains a rare music in the combination of words, which probably served as the model for the beautiful lyrical pieces of Jaydeva, a poet whose supremacy in the skill of combining musical words is unquestioned.

After Kālidāsa there is a marked tendency towards neglecting the content-side of poetry and developing the style. Poetry developed along these lines, came to produce a kind of style in which all the skill of the poet became used up in finding out the most gorgeous words and illustrating as many kinds of rhetoric ornaments as possible. A poet's skill was measured by the number of illustrations he could give of the various rhetorical combinations. Even in the poetry of Bhababhuti, a poet overstuffed with sentiment, we find a preference for the use of a verbose style which was hostile to the proper expression of delicate thoughts in which he excelled. As to other poets that came after Kālidāsa, their poems are so much overburdened with ornament that very little of poetry is

¹ Vāgarthābiba samprkitau vāgarthapratipattaye, Jagataḥ pitarāu vande Pārvati-Parameśvarau.

left in them. While the words sound jarring to the ear, the meaning is found too difficult to be grasped by the intellect. This is poetry with its soul stifled to death under the heavy burden of ornaments. These statements apply generally to the poetry of Bhatti, Bhārabi and Māgha. And after them there is not much of good poetry in Sanskrit literature.



CHAPTER V

THE THIRD PROBLEM OF PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

RELIGION.

Religion, basis of. First stage—Naïve Optimism, Fetishism, Nature worship, Cosmosophy—Vedic Religion, Greek religion. Second stage: Cosmosophy *vs.* Acosmism, Optimism *vs.* Pessimism, Theism *vs.* Atheism. Third stage: Conciliation—Pessimistic, Optimism Pantheism.

Section 1. Introduction.

Religion has now come to mean certain rites and ceremonies which are imposed on persons according to conventionalised ideas. All persons who claim to be within the fold of civilised beings have got to belong to one of the many current religions of the world, and according to the dictates of his religion has to accept certain beliefs as true and submit to certain long-standing customs.

Religious consciousness is the basis of all religion. It has always existed with man since the very dawn of his consciousness. Man has, therefore, from the earliest times felt the need for some thing which would satisfy the needs of such consciousness. As early he did not have a very developed intellect, and as scientific knowledge was almost absent at his time, he had to remain satisfied with ideas of the supreme principle and its relationship with man as propounded by men of outstanding merits of their times. They would tower head and shoulders above their fellow brethren so far as their intellectual capacities were concerned and, as such, whatever they realised as true and proper about this very important problem, was accepted as true. They were called seers and saints

and were believed to be prophets specially appointed by the Supreme Principle for enlightening their fellow brethren about its nature and the ideal conduct to be adopted in respect of it. Such persons in this manner started religions, each different from the others, according to the experiences of each founder and thus the religions came to be different from one another about their conception of religious conduct and of the nature of the supreme reality.

These may be taken as so many attempts at the solution of the religious problem, the most vital problem of mankind. It is concerned with the question of the nature of the Supreme Principle and the further question of ascertaining the ideal attitude for mankind towards it. The answer to the first question is essential to the proper solution of the second. As a matter of fact the solution of the first question decides the nature of the answer to the second problem. The first one is, therefore, more fundamental, but both are equally important so far as the religious problem is concerned. Each founder of religion gave his own answers and his followers readily acclaimed them as the true answers. The first followers might have some ground of accepting them as dictates of reason, having come from an authority who was qualified to find out truth. But their descendants had no chance of satisfying their conscience as to the reasonability of these theories. They had to be accepted *in toto* as objects of faith without question and without doubt. Religion thus became dogmatic. Extreme devotion and attachment to the founder personally and his theories, made them forsake the path of reason and truth and forced them to accept such views as objects of faith. In order to fortify it against the attacks of reason and logic, it was found necessary to infuse in it a dose of fanaticism. The followers of each religion were made to submit to the sayings of its founder without question. They were made to say and believe that what their founder had said, was the truth and the whole truth and whatever was

taught in contradiction to it was false, absolutely false. Thus to the great misfortune of humanity, the darkness of dogma and prejudice found place in the heart of the devotees of religion to the exclusion of the pure and bright light of reason. Blind faith engendered fanaticism and bigotry. Religion clashed with religion. Even a religion became split up on points of minor rites or rules according to the conflicting dictates of sub-prophets so to say. Fierce religious warfare was carried on all over the world with the intensest zeal ever showed by man. Blood was poured down on earth and persecution reigned supreme. People taking part in such deeds all the time believed that they were treading the path of virtue and earning the grace of God—the greatest act of self-deception ever practised by humanity. The pity of it is that these religious wars have not yet ended and people want to seek converts to their own religion at the expense of others with the same zeal as before, as if it were not time that there should be one broad-based religion for the whole of humanity, for all persons that live on this earth.

The real cause of all this misery is that man forsook the straight path of reason and logic and chose the misleading path of blind faith and dogma. If the founders were only treated as so many seekers after truth who had striven to find out truth in their own humble way, the road to truth would not have been permanently closed. If they were accepted as so many philosophers whose views could be doubted and tested and then accepted not as dictates of faith but as recommendations from reason, bigotry and fanaticism—the curses of conventionalised religion—would never have gained ground. Curiously enough they were acclaimed as prophets who pronounced the whole of the truth for all times to come. The result was that the followers thought that there was no new truth to be discovered. They shut themselves within the narrow walls of their religion in such effective manner that not a cleft or kink was left open for the

wholesome light of truth to penetrate through and the result was that they lived in eternal darkness. That is the story of the scholastic age of Christian Europe. It would even block the way to progress of sciences. Had Galileo been an orthodox Christian, he would never have developed astronomy. Had the scientists been implicit believers in all the dogmas of their religion, there would have been no scientific progress. It is a sign of the present times that the practical results of the positive sciences have weakened the fortifications of dogmatised religions. It is gratifying to note that there are men in all religions who have reached that level of culture, which can dispense with the necessity of a conventionalised religion and who believe that religion should be an exclusively personal matter for everybody. That is how we find Bertrand Russel writing a book with such a sensational title as "Why I am not a Christian." It is in the fitness of things that such a great man as he should take arms against the tyranny of convention and dogma to clear the way for free thinkers.

The above observation will make it clear that the essence of religion consists in an attitude of submission to the Supreme Principle. We deliberately call it principle because it may be that there are religions which do not attribute personality to such principle, as for example Buddhism. The ordinary extant religions of the world have also been already shown to be ideas about this principle as held by certain outstanding personalities. They have as a result of accretion been overburdened with bundles of rites and rituals which have blindly to be gone through by their respective devotees. These are inessential parts and may be overlooked. In our discourses these extant religions will not be given any special position of prominence in preference to other possible theories and it may happen, they will receive scanty attention for obvious reasons.

Religion may be a thing of the heart but nevertheless it draws its sap, its life-giving juice, from the intellect. It

has its main roots driven deep into the regions of intelligence and that is where we should go, if we are to explore its sources. It is pre-eminently the intellectual capacities of man that make him realise the insignificance of his position in a setting of mighty and awe-inspiring things. There are the mighty forces which are at work around him to his advantage or to his disadvantage. By what mysterious force they are impelled, his intellect is too weak yet to divine, but nevertheless his mind is suffused with the realisation of his minuteness as contrasted with the vast forces and consequently a feeling of submission is engendered in his heart. That is how he stepped into the threshold of religion. Before the dawning of this feeling, he was completely in a state in which there is no place for religion. He was then as much a non-religious being as a cow or a dog. But as soon as this feeling of submission to mysterious powers the presence of which is too apparent to him, develops, he grows into a religious being.

Section 2. First Stage : Nature Worship.

It is not yet religion properly so called however. It is just a groping towards religious consciousness. All the same, the history of man as a religious being has already got started. There is yet some time left for this feeling to develop itself into real and full-grown religion. After this feeling has become more crystallised, it feels an urge for some medium or outlet through which this feeling of submission can find expression. This is the first urge for offering of worship felt in the human heart. Worship is thus the outlet through which the spirit of submission finds expression.

What the human being does in satisfaction of this strong urge is, to get hold of any material object, be it a piece of stone or a mound, and does acts of veneration to it. This mode is most

naturally and easily suggested to him because, of his circumstances. His intelligence is not yet well developed to help him to arrive at clear and definite realisations about the nature of the powers at work around him. The ideas are yet hazy and indefinite but the urge is very strong. Under the circumstances he hits upon any object which chance brings to him, and selects it as the object of his veneration. This is clearly fetishism and fetishism is really the most primitive type of religion.

We stop here to answer a great authority on religion, Max Müller, who would not allow fetishism to be called a "primary form of religion."¹ According to him fetishism has always "its historical and psychological antecedents." A fetish is a sign or symbol 'of some power previously known, which power was originally distinct from the fetish, was afterwards believed to reside in it and in course of time came to be identified with it.' It is true that all developed religions have some elements of fetishism in them. As a matter of fact there is scarcely any religion in which an element of fetishism is not to be found. To quote John Caird: "Not even the spiritual purity and elevation of the Christian faith has been able to protect it from the intrusion of this unwholesome trait."² As applied to these comparatively developed religions the observation of Max Müller certainly holds good. Here fetishism exists as an appendage, as a paraphernalia of a developed religion and is really the degeneration of a better thing. But fetishism pure and simple can and does exist as the most primitive form of religion. The obvious difficulties and limitations of the primitive man obsessed for the first time with the idea of powerful forces around him, cannot evolve any form of religion other than this. A reference to what a child does

¹ Max Müller, Hibbert Lectures, p. 126.

² Caird, Philosophy of Religion, p. 315.

when placed under similar circumstances will help us in understanding the correctness of these statements. There comes a stage in the child's story of life, when it feels an urge for showing affection to some object. Dolls are conveniently put to it by well-to-do parents for the purpose and the child kisses them and hugs them and shows other marks of affection towards them. But any other object bearing the strongest dissimilarity with a doll, as for example, a piece of stone or wood would have served the purpose equally well. It has not its intellect sufficiently developed to discover which is more life-like, a doll or a piece of wood. All that it cares for is just something tangible, concrete, that can be seen and felt. Similarly the primitive man is not in a position to decide which particular thing would answer better for the purpose of a seat for these powers that be. The idea that an impressive thing would serve as a seat of his gods,—if such a concept could have developed at that age, better than an ordinary object, does not suggest itself to him. The sun or the piece of stone both serve his purpose, all that he wants is just a tangible object to which to offer worship and he readily chooses a fetish, like the child feeling satisfied with a piece of wood as his object of affection.

Fetishism is just the beginning of religion but it is not yet properly religion so called. It is simply an undeveloped capacity or possibility. It shows the human mind getting hold of any object it comes across accidentally and showing worship to it.

As the human mind progressed, as his intellectual sharpness increased, he soon came to perceive that there were certain phenomena around him which are more striking than others. They had some distinction about them which made them conspicuous among others. Thus the sun appeared to be a very striking object which sends down to the earth its mighty rays of light which would dispel darkness. The rain-giving clouds struck them as very welcome objects

which would cause the growth of trees and vegetables and help them in getting a more abundant supply of food. The devastating effect of a terrific storm blowing over them was noted and accordingly it was looked upon as an object of fear.

In this manner certain outstanding aspects of nature in her various moods were selected out as more remarkable and interesting. As they were remarkable on account of some striking quality which they displayed and as they would always exhibit the presence of power, they were looked upon as the special seats of the supreme power. Divinity was attributed to these phenomena and they came to substitute them for the fetishes of the earlier men, as their object of worship. Here there is a selective principle working behind, which does not choose an object of veneration by mere accident but by reason of special qualities. There is some display of reason in it. This is nature worship in its fully developed form and this is what the Vedic religion really came to be. The Vedic gods are simply the personification of the various striking phenomena of nature. Thus the sun is worshipped as the god Savita, fire as Agni, winds as Varuna and the rain clouds as Indra. There are many others, each of them deifying some remarkable phenomena of nature. The Greek Pantheon likewise supplies us with a striking parallel. The gods of the Greek mythology are in the like manner personifications of the various aspects of nature. There is Pluto reigning in the nether region, there is Ceres the goddess of cereals, there is Neptune the god of the seas and so on and so forth. Here the human mind in its naïve simplicity enjoys the most absolutely free play of imagination and attributes divinity most readily to any aspect of nature that appeals to it.

These are examples of religion in its earliest stage of development. Here mankind just starts to be a religious being. There is just a consciousness of the presence of some supreme power about him and there is a strong inclination to show homage to it. The mind hunts for the special seat of

this mysterious power and finds it reasonable to suppose that the striking aspects of nature answer its purpose best. Accordingly these aspects are deified and worship is offered to them. It may be observed* that these primitive gods are sought to be pleased by offering of objects as well as singing of praises in their honour. The human mind does not concern itself about questioning whether these gods are good or bad, whether they have to be appeased or merely pleased. There is an implicit belief that everything will work on all right. The primitive man has the optimism of the youthful mind, which has not the experience of old age to set a limit to its happy dreams. It has an implicit belief in the joy and beauty of life and there is an unmistakable indication of an optimistic outlook. Such an outlook is possible not on account of reasoned deliberate thinking, but this is the product of a sort of blind faith and utter inexperience. Of such nature is the joyful life of the Arcadians and the optimistic religion of the Vedic poets.

*Section 3. Second Stage : Optimism vs. Pessimism.
Theism vs. Atheism.*

This primitive type of religion has soon to be replaced by more complex types. The harmony and optimism of the first stage has to be disturbed to push religion forward into its second stage of development. Here storm gathers force and a conflict begins which for the time being is to end in utter turmoil. The old belief receives a rude shock, there are doubts and misgivings which oppress the religious heart and there is an atmosphere of uncertainty and scepticism about him. Here religious views develop themselves in conflicting lines and show little inclination towards effecting any compromise. An all-round sense of insecurity and doubt appears to be the most outstanding feature.



The primitive views, for example, had an implicit belief in the order of the universe. They were dimly conscious that there was order and harmony in the working of the forces that play around him. 'The idea did not come out clearly before the human mind of course. It was a sort of vague awareness which remained satisfied with the belief that there was system and order around him. At any rate he was never shaken with any doubts that there might not be any system in the universe and it might be the product of conflicting forces working discordantly at one and the same time. The real state of things was that his mind was not definitely aware of either of these possibilities. Nevertheless there was a sense of security in him undisturbed by any sceptic ideas, there was a belief that there was some sort of order in it.

But at this stage, this implicit sense of orderliness receives a rude shock which destroys it altogether and fills the mind of man with doubts. He begins to question whether there is any system at all in the universe, whether there is any directive principle which regulates the working of the various factors towards the achievement of a fixed goal or ideal. The spirit of conflict gains the upper hand. As a result of this, two mutually discordant views take rise. One view would proclaim that there are proofs to clearly show that the universe is the product of a deliberate planning, there is some regulative principle working behind it, it is not simply an accretion or conglomeration but an orderly system. This is cosmosophy. The religion of the Vedas does believe in cosmosophy, that is, in the universe being a system instead of an accidental combination of many factors. All religions by necessity have to believe in cosmosophy. Even atheistic religions like Buddhism are not necessarily against it. Buddhism may not believe in the existence of God but it does believe in some inexorable supreme principles which regulate the destiny of man, namely the Law of Karma and

the Law of Rebirth. These two principles work harmoniously together to produce the universe of being and, therefore, the claims of cosmosophy are definitely acknowledged. A religion is by its very nature bound to be a believer in cosmosophy, that is, in the universe being a well ordered system. In order to be called a religion it has to acclaim some supreme principle, personal or impersonal, which works behind the world of being. In order to make the existence of such a supreme principle possible, the universe has to be interpreted as a well ordered system. If there is no order or system, then it necessarily follows that there is no supreme principle to organise it and, therefore, religion falls through.

In direct conflict with the above view the other group of thinkers would say that the world is not an orderly system, not the handiwork of a directive principle, but it is at best a fortuitous combination of atoms. There are many factors in this universe working in conflict with one another and if there is any semblance of order in the universe at all, it was the result of mere accident. Instead of system, there is discord, instead of some regulative principle being there, it is wholly given up to the unregulated play of blind forces. This view is acosmism. This is extremely unfavourable to religion and is only consistent with extremely sceptical attitudes. The Charvaka School, which is the Indian counterpart of materialism, may be given as an example of this view. This school is characterised by its extremely heterodox views which are in greatest conflict with the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy. In this sense it is even more heterodox than Buddhism or Jainism. For it does not recognise, unlike them, that there is transmigration of soul and that man is bound by the inexorable Law of Karma—the twin principles which, curiously enough, no other school of Indian philosophy ever dispensed with. The school sticks to the principle of extreme scepticism which believes only in the working of the principle of chance.

Scientific materialism is also a supporter of acosmism. It is pluralistic and atheistic. It believes in one principle only, namely, in existence of a multitude of atoms, which go about according to fixed principles. The seeming order in the universe is absolutely the product of chance and accident. The world is a fortuitous combination of atoms, as they would say. Acosmism is, very often, the result of extreme pluralism, as we find in the case of materialism.

As a notable example of acosmism in literature, we may refer to the celebrated poems of Omar Khayyam. He thinks that men, and for the matter of that the whole universe, are subject to the whims of a blind force, which works "weal or woe" according to no fixed principles whatsoever. To quote his own words :

Then to the rolling Heaven itself I cried
Asking ' What Lamp had Destiny to guide
Her little children stumbling in the Dark ? '
And—' A blind understanding ! ' Heaven replied.

It may be noted that such a view is often the result of extreme pessimism. A rude shock or systematic disappointment may engender pessimism in the heart of a man and with such a prejudiced mind, he finds it difficult to believe that there is any regulative principle working behind the universe. If that were true how could he be so unjustly disappointed ? He finds it, therefore, more easy for him to accept a theory which believes only in chance. Such is undoubtedly the case with poet Omar Khayyam. He refused to believe in an orderly consistent God, because of his long list of disappointments. Thus—

'Tis all a chequer-board of Nights and Days
Where Destiny with men for pieces plays :
Hither and thither moves, and mates and slays,
And one by one back in the closet lays.

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The Moving finger writes, and, having writ,
 Moves on : nor all thy Pity nor Wit
 Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
 Nor all thy tears wash out a Word of it.

If Timon of Athens were asked, after he turned to the jungles for shelter in bitter hatred of mankind, to choose between the two views of cosmosophy and acosmism, he would surely have chosen the latter. The reason is that acosmism is more consistent with his bitter experience.

This does not, however, mean that acosmism is invariably born of pessimism. It may also be the outcome of cool, deliberate, logical reasoning. There may be thinkers who would start with unprejudiced minds in finding out if the world is reducible to a consistent system. Their labours may lead them to the conclusion that such is not the case and thus they may turn out acosmists. This statement holds good of the materialistic views as already mentioned above. In their case, acosmism is the result of deliberate logical reasoning.

In the same manner as above, the idea about the general outlook on life undergoes changes and develops in two conflicting lines. The mind becomes either optimistic or pessimistic. The primitive religions were optimistic in outlook, not that this outlook was definitely pronounced in them so as to make them understand it in contrast with pessimism. This was the result of simplicity and inexperience. This stage of naïve optimism soon gave place to the two conflicting views of optimism and pessimism. Man's wider experience soon brought him in contact with shocks of disappointment. His greater powers of intellect made him foresee miseries in store for him and made him aware that the planning of the world is not best to his advantage and sorrows are as inevitable as moments of joy. He consequently became more and more pessimistic and came ultimately to hold that life has no charm in it and if there was any, it was

not worth the trouble on account of the accompanying miseries. Buddhism, Jainism and all the orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy are in this sense pessimistic. They all take for granted the proposition that life on earth is miserable and, therefore, they come to the conclusion that man's goal should be to extinguish all possibilities of coming back to this world. In the West also Schopenhauer was profoundly impressed with this same idea. He too was equally dissatisfied with the life on earth and thought that the best thing for a man to do is to extinguish the will to live which is the root of all evil. This is usually the result of putting an exaggerated importance on the misadventures of life.

The other view would however boldly refuse to think too much of the dark side of life and would only make note of the joyful aspects. Thus it managed to retain its former optimism. That is what probably made it possible for Leibnitz to utter the famous words: "This world is the best possible world." Such optimism is often the result of an implicit faith in the goodness of God.

It should be noted however that both the views are only partially correct. Miseries there are in this world, which no amount of indifference can manage to overlook. It may not be the worst possible world but it is not at the same time true that it is the best possible world. Sorrow comes in the trails of happiness, and happiness comes in the wake of sorrow. They are intertwined in such a manner that a person cannot avoid one and have the other. Such conflicting views are, therefore, only possible by overlooking one aspect of life in preference to the other. Thus, the optimist would not attach much importance to the bad points of life and would believe that the good points so far outweigh them, that they may be left out of consideration. In the opposite manner, the pessimist would take no notice at all of the attractions of life and would exaggerate the pains of disappointments that fall to the lot of man.



Based closely on similar principles, another group of conflicting views takes shape in the form of theism and atheism. A well ordered universe adhering to a system, necessarily implies the existence of an intelligent God and, therefore, such a conception is favourable to the development of theistic views. On the other hand believers in acosmism attribute the working of the world to mere chance and accident and, therefore, do not find any need for implanting a God in their conception of the universe. They are, therefore, inclined to be atheistic.

Atheism appears to have undergone a certain amount of limitation with regard to its connotation. It is not necessarily antagonistic to religion. It does not necessarily mean the denial of any supreme principle whatever directing the destiny of the universe. It only means the denial of a God of the personal type which is essential for the theistic form of religion. Buddhism, for example, is called atheistic, because it does not believe in the existence of a personal God. It does however believe in the omnipotence of the joint Law of Rebirth and Karma.

In the stricter sense, however, atheism should stand for the denial of the absolute supremacy of any principle whatever, be it of the personal type or not. It is against this type of atheism that philosophers combine and level all their efforts in proving the existence of God. This kind of atheism may often be the result of extreme misfortune shaking the foundation of faith in man. It is the idea of a predominance of evil over good and of a consequent pessimistic conception that leads to the belief that there is no God to dispense justice, that the world is wholly given to evil ways.

From earliest times philosophers have tried their best to fight down this kind of atheism. The cosmological argument was apparently the oldest argument applied. To this Anselm and Descartes added the Ontological argument. In later times the progress of scientific observation led to the discovery of

many facts which indicated the working of a purpose behind the phenomena in nature. This gave another formidable weapon in the hand of theistic thinkers to fight down atheism. But all to no purpose. Before long, Kant came and demonstrated to the world the hollowness of all these arguments in favour of the existence of God, so long considered formidable. But he was an intensely God-loving man himself and so, could ill afford to do without a God. He found morality at stake and in order to make it safe, he propounded the principle of the Primacy of the Practical Reason. Whether theoretical reason gave us a God or not, it does not matter but since for practical purposes of morality a God is wanted, He, therefore, must exist. This is, however, poor consolation and against the principle of true logic. To say that whatever is practically necessary should exist, is to commit the same fallacy which the philosophers employing the ontological argument are blamed for committing. Whatever may be necessary for the needs of man may not be necessary for the sustenance of the whole universe. Unless it is proved that morality is more than a mere convention and that it has an absolute position in the universe the above argument would not carry any weight.

The great importance attached to this endeavour of proving the existence of God, is an indication of the keenness of the struggle between the two contending lines of thought, namely, theism and atheism. The absence of a satisfactory proof of the existence of God does not necessarily imply the positive denial of His existence altogether. All that it means is that there is no positive proof available. Atheism in the same manner cannot bring positive proofs to demonstrate that there is no God. It may deny the existence of a personal type of God or any particular type but it would not go so far as to say that there is no supreme principle whatsoever. Even the most radical scientific thinker would admit the existence of the great Laws of Nature and would readily swear allegiance to them. The scientist who explains away the universe as a

fortuitous conglomeration of atoms does at least believe in the laws of atoms, which, to him, occupy the same supreme position, as the joint Law of Karma and Re-birth holds to the Buddhist. Atheism strictly speaking, can seldom exist as the result of logical reasoning. Atheism does exist, in a more limited sense of the term, as an attitude of mind which does not believe in the existence of a God dispensing justice, on account of bitter experiences in life or some other cause. It is the atheism of Omar Khayyam who discovers the activities of blind fate alone in shaping the destinies of man.

*Section 4. Third Stage : Reconciliation—Optimistic
Pessimism.*

The above stage of conflict is a necessary stage of growth which the religious mind should undergo to attain the fullness of a mature stage. In the first stage, there is just the dawning of religious consciousness which believes in the existence of a powerful agency or agencies, to which it feels inclined to pay homage in its own simple ways. To grow is to become more complex. To add to the complexity the second stage of conflict comes in. It is marked with the attainment of greater intellectual powers leading to a more thorough exploration of all aspects of religion. The beliefs of the earlier stage are accordingly subjected to logical test and analysis. The mind had implicitly believed that there was God or gods ; it did not strike it, that there might be no God at all. It had believed, in its simple way, that it should offer allegiance and worship to the powers above ; it did not question whether such worship was necessary at all. It had thought and believed in the manner of a young child that the world is full of joy and bliss and there is little of sorrow in it. It had not seen enough of the darker side of life to be horrified and to be made to question whether life on earth is a continuous smooth sailing. These are new avenues of thought opened out to the mind. It explores

them and goes both ways. Sometimes it thinks that it should be an athiest; at others, it would think that there are good reasons to stick to theism. Some facts would suggest to him that there is order and system in this universe, others will seem to say that there is not. His mind will be tossed by doubts and suspicions; misgivings will prick him. All this is like looking at the two sides of the shield. Man looks on one side and thinks it to be one thing and then looks on the other and finds that it is different. Unless he rises to a higher perspective, from where it is possible for him to have a view of both sides together, or to realise the possibility of their co-existence, he cannot get rid of the mental upheaval. In the same manner, the opposing lines of thought as described above, are the result of coming across only one aspect of the universe. Not until man rises to the next higher stage of religious development, can he get a better perspective of both aspects and come to make the discovery that both lines of thinking were correct or, to be more accurate, partially correct, while the synthesis of the conflicting aspects would give the completely correct view. There are elements of truth in both, but the full truth is to be found in the view that binds the contending lines of thoughts together, in a bond of harmony. There is conflict, because we do not see the whole of the plan, but as soon as we can rise to a vision which unfolds the whole plan to our eyes, we find the conflict has been smoothed down and there is harmony once again.

With the dawning of this idea, we step into the third stage of the religious problem. We are soon made to feel that life is not an unmixed series of joyful activities; there are sorrowful experiences in between. This does not necessarily mean that the world is wholly given to evil ways. A deeper penetration into their relationship leads to the discovery that both have a place in the planning of the universe, both are necessary to each other. They are not antagonistic but complementary. Sorrow enhances the depth and intensity of the

happiness following, and the keener the sorrow, the greater the appetite for enjoyment of happiness. Sorrow is like salt, which added to food sweetens the taste. It is this realisation that made Berkeley write that sorrow is like the dark background which makes the picture shine better.

The solution of the problem of evil may be effected in another way. Man occupies a comparatively unimportant position in the planning of the universe. The greater concern of the universe is to look to the welfare of the whole, rather than that of an infinitesimally small portion of it constituted by man. It is not expected to look to the detailed comforts of man. What is considered pain, is the result of unconcern of the Supreme Principle about its removal. The leaves of the tree are necessary for collecting food for it. The tree is the greater concern and so the leaves are shed. The leaves consider themselves unfortunate beings, because they have to go away. But that is justified for making the growth of the tree possible. It is an exaggerated sense of our own importance that makes us blame the universal mind, that it did not pay attention to our comforts, to the extent that is desirable to us.

All the researches of man are making head towards the discovery of a principle, under which all others are subordinated. There are facts which indicate that the world is not only a well ordered system but that the whole universe is the working of a single principle. Monism is the confirmed belief of all reasonable thinkers, and, therefore, there can be no talk of the existence of disorder. All things in nature develop and grow according to fixed principles. There is adaptation going on everywhere. There is linking between one creature and another, one animal depends on another and so on. The whole nature may be reduced to a well ordered complex system.

In this manner we rise to a complete view of god-head. In such a view, all the conflicts of the second stage are absorbed together in a new setting. It is neither pessimistic, nor optimistic. It believes that life is beset with sorrows, but it

does not on that account give way to despondency. It finds that everything on earth is not made nearest to heart's desire, because the world is not meant wholly and solely for man. The universal mind planned it out, in the manner it thought best; it did not care to consult man. The world is not what we would like it to be, because God is not an anthropomorphic God, a figment of man's imagination, but a real God.

Such a conception of godhead is bound to be pantheistic in form, for the sole reason that it is the fullest conception of divinity. The defect of anthropomorphism cannot be applied to immanent teleology-as that is the manner in which nature works. If God is at all to work in the universe, He must work immanently. In order to make His working possible, He must be viewed as immanent in us, as present in everything that there is. Theism must of necessity give way to pantheism by virtue of the reason that it is a less complete idea. If God stays apart from the world, then he is nothing better than an arch-mason, a God whom man made after his own image. Such an idea is unacceptable, as it is against reason and against scientific knowledge.

Another great advantage of this conception is that it does away with the need for proving the existence of God. All that there is, exists demonstrably and undeniably. If all that is God, He manifests himself to our senses and He is perceptible to the least endowed of all human beings. He comes within the scope of direct knowledge. It is because we drove away God from our midst, and tried to make Him bodyless and mysterious that there was this difficulty of finding Him out. If God is all that exists, this world must surely be a part of Him. We were under the influence of the obsession that because God is great, He could not be found out easily. It is the instinctive perversion of the human intellect which would make simple things appear complex, that worked the harm.



CHAPTER VI

THE PROBLEMS OF THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Theoretical Philosophy—Scope—World of Reality and World of Knowledge, their inter-relationship. Reality prior to Knowledge; Ontology prior to Epistemology. Two problems of theoretical philosophy. The first problem—turns on the antithesis of universal and particular, one and many. The second problem—turns on the antithesis of subject and object.

Section I. Theoretical Philosophy—Its scope.

In a former chapter we have laid down the principles on which the division of philosophical problems into practical and theoretical is based. In that connection, it has been suggested that what appears to be the world of nature, governed by immutable laws, and what is the domain of reason, governed by still more rigid laws of thought, are in reality a disguise for freedom. There was a time when the Absolute was not subject to any such binding laws, either of thought or of nature. In its free activities, it happened to strike on a course of conduct, which by virtue of constant repetition, became a matter of habit with it. Ultimately this took the form of immutable laws binding the course of activity of nature and thought. They have become necessary laws now, but there was a stage, when the Absolute was free to choose any other course of conduct. It was by deliberate choice that these particular courses of conduct were selected and were thus, once, modes of true activity. This is what happens in the life of every man. What is a matter of habit, is binding on him at present, but it is a habit which was formed by deliberately planned free activities of his. The first few repetitions must have been

selective and conscious and in that sense the necessary law of habit is a mode of free activity of the person who has formed it. Numerous examples of such phenomenon may be taken from natural history. The formation of a new structure in the organism of an animal to suit an emergency, also takes place in a very similar manner. The animal organism always experimenting on new organs and senses, so as to adapt itself better to its environment and thus secure a stronger hold on the chances of life of its species, hits on a new organ. It finds that the new organ suits it well and accordingly adopts it. It is, therefore, included in the characteristics that are to be made hereditary for its posterity. What was only a device, taken recourse to by way of experiment, is found to be successful and is at once transformed into an immutable trait. The laws of thought and the laws of nature are, in the same manner, forms or structures woven by the Absolute, for its own free activity. They are made fixed and necessary, in order that thought and being may find better expression through them. They are self-imposed bonds meant for the better manifestation of the life of the Absolute.

What has been talked of as the world of natural necessity before, is constituted by all kinds of beings, both material and living beings. It not only comprehends the whole of nature, but also all kinds of spiritual beings as well, including the human mind. In short, it includes within its folds all kinds of beings, both mental and material. In a former chapter it has been stated that this is constituted by the living organisms and their environment together with the laws regulating their relations. As the laws governing the relation of things and living organisms are fixed and unalterable, this world has been called the world of empirical necessity, which is the same as the realm of nature. This realm of nature alone however, does not exhaust the whole of reality. Besides this realm of nature, there is also another realm constituted

by another set of laws, which are also equally necessary and unalterable. They are the laws of thought which are presupposed in the reasoning activities of mind and which also form the structure of the realm of nature. They are the laws of logic or reason which regulate all reasoning processes of the mind. They may also be seen in concrete form in nature, as forming the general structure or plan of the world of things. All unity and purpose and activities towards the realisation of certain ends as seen in nature, presuppose the activities of these immutable laws of thought. The existence of this realm of reason was perceived by such philosophers as Lotze and Schelling, when they said that there is play of reason in nature also. This realm of reason is presupposed both in nature and in thought and controls not only the activities of nature, but also the activities of the thinking mind. There are thus two worlds of necessity. First, there is nature with its necessary and unalterable laws binding the connection of facts and phenomena forming the world of experience. There is also the realm of reason and its laws binding the connection of ideas both in nature and in the thinking mind. The first has been called the world of empirical necessity and the second the world of logical necessity. These two, together, form the totality of reality and will be referred to as the realm of reality in future. They form the subject-matter of theoretical philosophy.

In the empirical world, we find that thought is opposed to thing, mind is opposed to matter. This opposition is only true of a stage, of the stage of conflict in the evolution of the life of the Absolute. If we work backwards and behind it, we shall come to the stage of harmony in the life of the Absolute. The structure of thought, that is to say, the universal forms or laws which guide the flow of logical thought is, really speaking, true of both the thinking mind as well as the evolving nature. This is the common basis or structure, on which both thought and

thing developed. The universal laws of nature, which guide and connect the many-sided activities of nature are also based on it. This world of nature gives thought a concrete, tangible shape and also builds up centres of thinking activities in the form of minds. This universal structure of thought manifested in every individual thinking mind, as well as in the work of nature and also the universal structure of things presented to each perceiving mind, together form the stage of harmony in the life of the Absolute. It lies at the background of each individual consciousness and may, therefore, be called the pre-empirical stage. This explains for the uniformly recurring objective world in the empirical consciousness of each self.

This pre-empirical stage of harmony is continued so long as nature works on unconsciously. As soon as it reaches the stage of consciousness, as for example in the higher mammals and in man, the harmony is broken and we step into the stage of conflict in the life-history of the Absolute. Here, nature divides itself into perceiving selves and perceived objects, into self and not-self, into mind and matter. This may be called the empirical stage in the life of the Absolute and is constituted by the ordinary everyday life of all individuals. Nature is the concretely realised thought of the Absolute, but because thought does not appear here in a naked form, but becomes clothed in things so to speak, the thinking mind is misled and considers it as opposed to thought proper.

But the mind thinks and meditates and tries to reconstruct a complete picture of the whole of reality through philosophy. This is yearning for re-establishing the harmony that has been lost in the bewildering conflict of the empirical stage. The perceiving selves turn upon the objects of nature and by analysis and abstraction break them up into their elements and translate them into mediate conceptual knowledge. The philosophic mind thus reconstructs the world of

reality in mind and rethinking the process, arrives at Absolute knowledge. In Absolute knowledge, the distinction between thought and thing, mind and matter, would appear to be more apparent than real. It would appear only true of a stage and not a fundamental difference. The Absolute evolved itself in the form of nature and mind so that mind can turn again on both of them and realise their ultimate unity or oneness.

It is in and through philosophical knowledge, therefore, that we arrive at the third stage of re-established harmony. We may say, reality thought itself out in the form of nature, or we may say that nature is concrete thought. If reason is the stuff of reality thought and thing are both of the nature of reason. The special value of philosophical knowledge should be realised here. It is mediately thinking out the world process. It lifts us from the commonplace empirical stages to the highest stage of the Absolute life, where conflict of mind and matter is harmonised in a broader vision.

The uniform laws of thought, presupposed both in activities of mind and nature and the laws of nature together evolve the world of reality, which reaches its culminating point of development in self-conscious thinking minds. All this together comes within the scope of reality. The conceptual picture of this reality as drawn by such thinking minds is knowledge. Knowledge is thus the thinking out of the world process. It is a conceptual mediate picture of reality. Since it is a picture of reality drawn by itself, it is also a part of reality. We may, therefore, conveniently divide reality into two broad parts, namely, reality proper, and knowledge or its self-drawn picture. The first part is treated as ontology in philosophy and the second as epistemology.

Having thus divided the whole universe, in its totality, into the two broad divisions of reality and knowledge, we have naturally to occupy ourselves with the question of relationship between these two aspects of the universe. In other words,

we have to justify this division, and in that connection, unfold the principles on which their differences are based.

Knowledge is a peculiar feature of the human mind. It is the product of the understanding, in its efforts to know reality. The mind works on experiences and by reducing them into ideas, in relationship to one another, it tries to build up a complete picture of reality in terms of experience. It does not see the whole of reality all at once. It experiences reality piecemeal. Mind stores up these isolated experiences in forms of images and concepts in its store-house called memory and then tries to connect them up, so as to convey the most harmonious and correct picture of reality, consistent with the variety of divergent experiences it had, at different times. It is like trying to build up a complete picture of reality, mentally, after taking snaps of various parts of it, at different times.

Knowledge is thus more or less an attempt at making a survey of reality, done by man, to satisfy the demands of his inborn will to know. Knowledge, therefore, holds the same relationship to reality as a map holds to the country mapped out. Reality is the subject-matter of knowledge.

If knowledge depends for its subject-matter on reality, then reality is prior to knowledge. This is so, both logically and chronologically. Unless there is reality, there is no knowledge possible. We may conceive of reality existing before knowledge of it developed, at least in human history. We cannot conceive of a picture without an original.

This is why in the history of philosophy, the first interest of philosophers of all countries has been reality as opposed to knowledge. They were more interested to know what reality is than to know what is the nature of knowledge. It was only after the ontological problems had received a considerable amount of thought and attention, that philosophical thinkers turned their attention to the study of knowledge itself. We find that all the Greek philosophers were more engrossed with

ontological problems than with epistemology. Indeed most of them deal with ontology exclusively. It was Locke who for the first time took seriously for enquiry the problems of knowledge. As Paulsen rightly remarks, ontology shall always remain the central portion of philosophy. He goes to show that Kant made a great mistake in identifying philosophy exclusively with epistemology alone. He explains that the disfavour in which philosophy fell in the latter part of the nineteenth century, was mainly due to the banishment of ontology from the scope of philosophy. There is a great deal of truth in these statements.

Ontological problems thus, naturally, come to occupy our attention first and, after them, epistemological problems. The genetic method therefore, would be justified in giving the problems of reality priority to the problems of knowledge with regard to the order of treatment. In the following chapters, problems of reality would, on this ground, be dealt with first and then the problems of knowledge will follow.

Though knowledge has been sought to be differentiated from reality in the above statements, the fact remains that knowledge is derived from reality. Knowledge is, so to say, sought to be built after the image of reality. The relationship between the two is, therefore, bound to be very close and intimate. Besides, we have already noted above that the same universal laws of thought form the structure of both the realm of nature and the development of logical thinking in the mind. Since the same reason is working behind the concrete world of being forming reality and the reconstructive thinking process of man leading to formation of knowledge, there is bound to be similarity between the world of reality and the world of knowledge, on this basis also. That is why the problems of the theory of knowledge also form the problems of the theory of reality. The problems of both epistemology and ontology are based, as we shall before long see, on the same common principles.

Section 2. The Problems of Theoretical Philosophy.

We shall now enumerate the problems of theoretical philosophy. There are two main problems of theoretical philosophy. The first is based on the antithesis of one and the many, of the universal and the particular. The second problem is based on the antithesis of the subject and the object. As applied to theory of reality and theory of knowledge, they become, each of them, divided into two sets, and thus we get ultimately four main problems of theoretical philosophy.

The first great problem of theoretical philosophy turns on the antithesis between the universal and the particular, the one and the many. In reality, we find a bewildering mass of separate entities, which are difficult to be unified into a system. The idea is, therefore, suggested to us, that reality may be composed of many. In the reverse manner, inspite of the isolated condition of all particular beings, there are similarities of purpose or appearances which allow us to conceive them as parts of a well-ordered system. This would lead us to conclude that reality is essentially monistic. Since both the aspects of plurality and unity are equally applicable to being as a whole, the two conflicting views are apt to be suggested, according as the philosophers put greater emphasis on either of these aspects. Philosophy has to find out the solution of this problem.

Again it may be seen, that while there are particular individuals, it is possible to form ideas or concepts in which many individuals of the same type become included. Such concepts or universal ideas are true of all individuals of the same species. It is naturally suggested to the mind that the particular individuals are probably copies made from the universal idea, which is probably more primitive and eternal, as contrasted with the flitting particulars. A theory is accordingly developed in the lines of Platonic idealism, that universals alone are true, while particulars are false, inasmuch as the

former are eternal, while the latter are passing. As opposed to this, a new line of thought may equally strike our mind, that the universals are nowhere felt or experienced, they are only thought of in the mind, while the particulars are experienced as existing tangible beings. The conclusion may, therefore, be drawn that the individuals alone are real, while what is called a universal is only a product of abstraction and is no better than a figment of imagination. These two conflicting lines of thought are thus possible, one pleading for the reality of the universals and the other for the reality of the particulars. Philosophy has, therefore, to settle this problem of antagonism between what are called universalism and particularism.

These problems, it may be seen, are equally applicable to both theory of reality and theory of knowledge. They are common problems of both epistemology and ontology.

In theory of reality it may be held that universals alone are real while particulars are only transitory flitting shadows. The problem, therefore, arises whether reality is constituted of universals alone or of particulars. In theory of knowledge again it is observed that all judgments are constituted by predicating a concept of either a percept or a concept. A concept or a universal is an indispensable necessity for the formation of knowledge. If on basis of this, a philosopher holds that universals alone are the source of knowledge we get universalism in theory of knowledge. It may again be noted that concepts are originated by percepts and percepts from sensations. On this view it may be held that the particulars of percept are the source of knowledge. When such a view is propounded, we get particularism in theory of knowledge.

Again there is antagonism between one and many, which is applicable equally to theory of reality and theory of knowledge. Reality may be viewed as constituted of only one principle and reality may be viewed as constituted of many

separate principles. If reality is taken to be made of one principle, we get monism. If on the other hand, reality is taken as constituted by many independent principles, we get pluralism. Monism may be posited against pluralism in the field of theory of knowledge as well. The question whether knowledge is the product of one factor or many factors may be answered in two ways. Knowledge is produced in the mind, on the basis of sensations received by the mind. This is the basic fact. But two views may be developed on this one basic fact. It may be held that since knowledge is engendered in the mind, mind is the only factor of knowledge. In opposition to this, it may be held that knowledge is ultimately based on sensations and, therefore, it is quite sound and reasonable to argue that knowledge is the product of sensations. Sensations are the many factors of knowledge. The question ultimately stands thus: Is knowledge the product of mind alone or is it the product of the multitude of sensations? The antagonism between one and many is thus equally manifest in the theory of knowledge as well as in the theory of reality.

The second great problem of theoretical philosophy turns on the antithesis between the subject and the object. In every act of perception or knowledge, there are two elements present, namely, the subject and the object. In order to make a perception possible, there is to be an object to be perceived and a subject to perceive. Both are necessary elements. In every act of knowledge, there is always an object which forms the subject-matter of knowledge and a subject which by active efforts derives the knowledge. These two elements suggest two different lines on which epistemological theories with regard to the nature of knowledge develop. The question sought to be answered is: How is an object presented to the subject in an act of perception.

Opinions divide themselves in two lines according as philosophers believe that the subject-object contact is direct or indirect. The object, as some would say, is never presented

direct to the subject in an act of perception. The object can only be mediately presented to the subject, through the medium of perception. This is representationism. It may be held, in opposition to this, that objects are presented directly to the subject in an act of perception. This is the view of all intuitionist thinkers, who claim, that reality in its unalloyed, living form, can be known only in an act of immediate experience.

In ontology also, antagonistic views take shape on basis of the antithesis between subject and object. The subject is identified with mind and the object is identified with the outside world. Again mind is essentially spiritual, while the world of nature is essentially material. On basis of this difference, some philosophers would find it convenient to interpret reality wholly in terms of mind or wholly in terms of matter. Some will hold that all reality is mental and spiritual and what is called the object is also a product of the mind, and, therefore, spiritual in composition. The opposing view would in its turn deny reality altogether to mind and try to explain the whole of reality in terms of matter. They will hold that reality is essentially material in composition and what appears as mind is nothing but transformation of matter. Extreme realism, in form of materialism, would thus find itself opposed to extreme idealism. Philosophy has to find out a solution for this conflict as well.

The fundamental problems of both epistemology and ontology are thus based on essentially the same principles. The problems of the theory of reality are also problems of the theory of knowledge. It has, however, been already stated above that problems of reality are genetically earlier than problems of knowledge. In the following chapters, therefore, we shall follow the same order. The problems of ontology will be taken up first and after them the problems of epistemology. That will be the order of our treatment.

CHAPTER VII

THE FIRST PROBLEM OF THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY—UNIVERSAL vs. PARTICULAR, ONE vs. MANY IN THEORY OF REALITY.

First stage: Harmony—Naive pluralism—Primitive man, child, early Vedic Philosophy. Second stage: conflict—Universal vs. Particular. Abstract Universalism—Plato, Neoplatonism, Anselm, the Veda. Abstract Particularism—Stoics, Epicureans, Nominalists, Duns Scotus. Monism vs. Pluralism. Monistic theories—Early Greek philosophy, Spinoza, Sankara. Pluralistic theories—Atomism, Leibnitz, Descartes, James, Lokayatas, Jainism, Buddhism, the Sankhya, the Nyaya. Third stage: Synthesis—concrete universalism—Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Paulsen, Lotze, Fechner. Monistic pluralism—Schelling, Hegel, Paulsen, the Upanishads.

Section 1. The First Stage.

The first problem of theoretical philosophy, as we have already known, depends on the antithesis of the one and the many, of the universal and the particular. As applied to the theory of reality, it resolves itself into two main problems, namely, whether reality is composed of universals or of particulars and whether reality is one or many. They substantially deal with the same question and may be viewed as two different expressions which the same problem assumes.

These antagonistic questions represent the stage of conflict of this problem. They represent the acute stage of the problem when two diametrically opposed views take shape at one and the same time, and put forward their claims as the most correct solution of the matter. Both views are equally vehement in opposing the claims of the other's solution and pleading for the acceptance of its own solution. The mind is, as a consequence, perplexed. It sits bewildered

as a judge, who cannot come to any definite conclusion as to the rightful claims of the contending parties. It is, thus, the stage where the spirit of antagonism enjoys full play and there is an intense conflict going on.

This is, therefore, a statement of the problem at a stage of maturity, according to the genetic view of the problem. Unlike the dialectic method of Hegel, the genetic method does not take a start from the stage of conflict. It presupposes a stage of harmony preceding it, when there did not take shape this conflict of antagonistic lines of thought. We have tried more than once to show, that previous to this stage of conflict, there is a stage where there is no conflict at all. In this primary stage, the problem has just taken its birth. The mind, in this stage, is satisfied with a very simple answer to the problem. At this stage, the mind has not had sufficient experience to look deeply into the matter and to be aware of the complexities of the problem, suggesting solution on two conflicting lines of thought. It is a state of harmony made possible by the simple nature of the mind grasping the problem.

The first stage may be very well illustrated by naive pluralism. Here the mind does not stop to think that there may be one principle underlying all beings, as opposed to many principles underlying them. It does not care to think whether the universal type of a species alone is real or its particular members. These conflicting questions do not suggest themselves to the mind at this stage simply because the mind is not yet mature enough to grasp these possibilities. We have to imagine the most simple of minds faced with a mass of realities here and there and everywhere around it. The mind is not yet sufficiently developed to attempt the task of searching for a common principle to bind them together. It takes them just as they are, on the face of it, represented to be. It thus readily and spontaneously comes to the conclusion that the world is composed of as many beings as are seen to exist.

This naïve pluralism differs from well reasoned and well thought out systems, where pluralism is given preference to monistic views, such as scientific pluralism or the monadism of Leibnitz. In the case of these pluralistic views, there is the awareness of the conflicting view of monism and certain reasons are thought out, which make a good case for the acceptance of this view in preference to a monistic view. It presupposes a considerable amount of mental development, which cannot be expected from a primitive mind. In the case of naïve pluralism, however, the consciousness of the conflict is absolutely absent. Here there is no pleading for the case of one conflicting view as against another. No idea of conflict is present at all. The mind makes a rough and ready solution and says, that the world is composed of many unconnected principles.

Naïve pluralism is thus essentially the view of the primitive mind. By its very nature, it is bound to be so. The primitive mind is simple and inexperienced. It cannot probe deeply into a problem, and so, it cannot but produce a simple solution for this complex problem of philosophy. If we ask a child whether the world is composed of one principle or many, he would answer that it is composed of many principles because, the different forms, in which reality manifests itself, suggest such an answer most readily. He is not aware, certainly, of the possibility of there being one principle only. This possibility is not suggested to him at all. He makes his answer in his own simple child-like way, without implicating himself in any complexities. His view is naïve pluralism.

In the early stages of the Vedic philosophy, we have indications of such a naïve pluralistic view. In this connection, we should not concern ourselves with those portions of the Rig-Veda, which indulge in highly speculative philosophy as in the Purushasukta, for philosophy is comparatively mature there. Nor should we concern ourselves in passages, where each god in his turn is held, as the supreme god, culminating

in the developmmment of a theory, where Varuna is upheld as the god, maintaining the domain of order and discipline (*Ritasya goptā*). For, here clearly, there is a tendency towards shaping a monistic philosophy. There are more primitive speculations, where each phenomenon is taken up in nature and named as god, and this god-making business goes on endlessly. Here, there is no consciousness of the possibility of these gods being connected by any supreme principle, nor is there any tendency of recognising any god as the supreme one. There are gods and gods, each independent in his own way and they between themselves, guide the activities of the whole reality.

Radhakrishnan rightly observes that three strata of thought can be discovered in the hymns of the Rig-Veda, namely, naturalistic polytheism, monotheism and monism. Naturalistic polytheism is the earliest stage and that is identical with what we have called here naïve pluralism. "The earliest seers of the Vedic hymns delighted in sights of nature, in their own simple unconscious way..... They knew what it was to love nature and be lost in the wonders of dawn and sunrise, those mysterious processes, which effect a meeting of the soul and nature.....Some glorious aspects of nature became the windows of heaven, through which the divine looked down upon the godless earth. The moon and the stars, the sea and the sky, the dawn and the nightfall were regarded as divine. This worship of nature as such, is the earliest form of Vedic religion."¹ The Vedic seer thus came to attribute divinity to any striking phenomena of nature. Thus, heaven was named Dyaus and earth, Prithivi and they were always named together as Dyava-Prithivi, the parents of all creation. Agni becomes a god, so Indra and so Varuna and many others. Yet in the very early stages no inter-connection is found between any of these gods; they are

1 Radhakrishnan, Indian Phil., Vol. I, 73.

supposed to be independent of one another, and taken up collectively together, they account for all the multitude of creations.

Section 2. The Second Stage.

Soon after, the mind discovers that it cannot remain satisfied with naïve pluralism. With the growth of its powers and experience, it comes to detect inter-connections between principles, which it had considered so long separate. The inter-connections become more and more developed, till ultimately, the possibility is suggested, that the whole of reality may be reduced to one single principle. Moreover, the mind has a natural hankering for unity and system. That is because that helps it better in understanding things and so a monistic principle is more attractive. Impelled by these tendencies, the mind feverishly searches for one sweeping principle, which would secure the possibility of a monistic theory.

This is found possible in two ways. All particular things allow themselves to be classed into different groups and are recognizable by the application of those group names against them. These group names convey the idea of the common qualities of all the particular things, that can be put under the particular group, and are known as abstract ideas or universals. Each universal idea thus represents a multitude of particulars. Here then, is a way for avoiding the recognition of plurality and making out a case for unity. In its eagerness to get hold of some monistic view, the mind thus finds it convenient to come and say that the universals alone are real while particulars are not. This is the manner in which abstract universalism is developed.

Then again, it is possible to construct a monistic philosophy by taking hold of only one kind of being and then trying to explain all other kinds of beings, as having been



derived from this primary substance. Working on this line, philosophers have come to develop abstract monistic theories.

Section 3. Monistic Theories.

Let us start with monistic theories. Monism, as has been already said, is developed in two ways. It is first developed by reducing the plurality of the universe to a unity by deducing them all from one principle. This is monism, as opposed to pluralism. It is again evolved by refusing to recognise particulars as real and holding universals alone as real. This is abstract universalism as opposed to abstract particularism. Let us start with the first type of monism.

The early Greek philosophers provide us with excellent examples of abstract monism. They are concerned with the question of cosmogony in general. They tried to account for all the variety of particular realities, by explaining them as modifications of a single kind of substance. There is one primal stuff of which others are transformations. Thales declared water to be the original stuff, out of which every thing else came. Anaximander found that the original stuff was not water but the "infinite" out of which all other things are made. "By this he most likely meant a boundless, space-filling animate mass, the nature of which he did not define specifically, because he regarded all qualities as derived from it."¹ By an intricate process of reasoning, he derives all things from this great mass of undifferentiated matter. Anaximenes, his pupil, specified the underlying substance of all universe as air, vapour or mist. "From air all things arise, by the process of rarefaction and condensation; when it is rarefied air becomes fire, when condensed, it becomes in turn wind, cloud, water, earth and stone. All other things are composed of these."²

¹ Thilly, History of Philosophy (17).

² Thilly, History of Philosophy (17).

These are attempts at maintaining unity at the cost of plurality. It is trying to explain away plurality, by depicting it as nothing but a modification of one single substance. Here monism is secured by ignoring the fact of plurality and hence, it is abstract monism.

As an example of abstract monism in modern philosophy, we may take the case of Spinoza. In his deterministic philosophy, there is but only one substance, which he calls God, having many attributes. Of His many attributes, man can perceive only two, namely, thought and extension and this explains the plurality of the universe. The attribute of extension manifests itself in particular figured bodies, while thought expresses itself in particular ideas and acts of will. The infinite substance, in this manner, expresses itself, in an eternal and necessary system of physical and mental forms and as a result, we get the particular finite objects and minds. "It is not however essential to the universal substance that this or that particular one should have been; neither one follows of necessity from the nature of God. Yet not a single thought or body could exist, were it not for the permanent underlying reality to which all things belong, of which all are states."¹ "To the senses and the imagination, nature appears in the form of isolated separate phenomena, but that is a purely abstract and superficial way of viewing it. To the understanding, nature is one universal substance and the particular phenomenon but a limited form of it, a negation of all the other forms in which substance expresses itself."² According to his view then the substance alone is real, while the particulars are unnecessary and contingent. The particular mode is not permanent, but a temporary expression of the substance. The particulars are simply explained away, their importance is never recognised. This is out and out abstract monism.

¹ Thilly, History of Philosophy (299).

² Thilly, History of Philosophy (299).

A prominent example from Indian philosophy is the abstract pantheism of Sankara. Sankara looks upon the Absolute or the Brahman as the basis and foundation of all that is. Brahman has no genus, no qualities, no activities, for "every word employed to denote a thing, denotes that thing as associated with a certain genus, or act or quality or mode of relation."¹ It can best be described as the negative of all, that can be positively known and it is, therefore, called *nirguna*, in the sense, that the Brahman is a mere blank. Sankara anticipated that it might be so conceived, and so he says, "Brahman free from space, attributes, motion, fruition and differences, being in the highest sense and without a second, seems to the slow of mind no more than non-being."² According to him, this Absolute cannot be an object of philosophical speculation, for by thinking of it, we make it part of our experience.

Yet in our perceptual process, we come across a world of multiplicity of beings which are differentiated from one another by time and space, name and form. Sankara holds that these are unreal, for the world of space, time and cause, is not self-explanatory, nor is it present at all times. He does not look upon this world of plurality as '*parināna*' or transformation of the Brahman; but he looks upon it, as a '*vivarta*' or a perversion, which makes the Brahman falsely appear, as a relative world of space and time. We have '*parināma*' when the milk is changed into curd and '*vivarta*' when the rope appears as a snake. This is possible by '*māyā*' which has the two functions of concealing the real and projecting the unreal. '*Māyā*' is thus '*avidyā*' as obscuring the knowledge of reality. This does not necessarily mean that the phenomenal world is absolutely an illusion and something completely different from Brahman. For, Sankara holds that

¹ Sankara-Bhāṣya, Gītā, XIII. 12.

² Sankara-Bhāṣya, Chāndogya Upanishad, VIII, 1.1.

Brahman is the basis of the universe. If the world is regarded as baseless and not rooted in reality, as having its origin in non-being then we shall have to repudiate Sankar's theory itself. The illusory snake is not based on nothing, when we realise the illusion. It is simply correcting the wrong notion or misconception. The rope has the appearance of a snake, and this appearance again is based on the rope. In the same manner, the pluralistic universe is the outcome of '*avidyā*' and '*māyā*' and yet it is only an error of judgment. When we get the true knowledge, the world of appearance merges itself into Brahman, becomes transfigured in the intuition of Brahman. This is why the world of plurality is characterised by Sankara as both real and unreal (*sadasat*) at the same time. It is unreal, because it is only appearance, and yet it is real, because it is an appearance based on the real.

Sankara thus tries to explain away the world of experience, presenting a multiplicity of beings, as a mere appearance. It is unreal and no essential part of the Absolute, on which it has to depend for its basis. The plurality is explained away, as a something which is only apparent, and is the result of *avidyā* or absence of clear knowledge. As soon as we intuit the Absolute in its true form, we cease to see the world of plurality. This is clearly abstract monism.

It has been mentioned before, that monistic theories of reality may be developed in another manner. That will be made by ascribing reality to the universal idea alone and denying reality altogether, to the particulars.

Plato was the founder of this theory of abstract universalism in Western philosophy. Plato found that the world of sense perception is a changing, fleeting something. It cannot, therefore, be the true world, which is something permanent, unchangeable and eternal. In order to get at genuine knowledge, we have to go behind this fleeting world of things, as perceived by our senses and reach the unchangeable and permanent essence of things. He finds that in

the universal idea or concept are comprehended, all the necessary qualities that are common to many particulars. This necessary form, therefore, contains within itself the essence of things of that class. These concepts again, are universal, changeless and eternal. True knowledge therefore, consists of these eternal, unchangeable, universal concepts.

The ordinary common-sense point of view would hold that these universal concepts are certain mental products only, as contrasted with the particulars, which exist outside and independent of the mind. But according to Plato, these universal ideas were not merely so many concepts within the mind, but they are real substances, they exist in and for themselves. In the words of Thilly, "they are the original, eternal transcendent archetypes of things, existing prior to things and apart from them, independent of them, uninfluenced by the changes to which they are subject. The particular objects, which we perceive are imperfect copies or reflections of these eternal patterns; particulars may come and particulars may go, but the man type, the human race, goes on forever. There are many objects or copies, but there is always only one idea of a class of things." These ideas again are not disconnected with each other, but they all form a well-ordered system. These ideas are arranged in a hierarchy, the higher idea containing lower ones within its folds and working in this order, we come to the highest idea of all, which is the idea of good which is again identical with God. The universe is thus a logical system of ideas, governed by a universal purpose, the idea of the good. The world of sense perception is changing and unabiding and is, therefore, imperfect and unreal.

Monism is thus reached, after reducing the particulars to absolute nonentities. The particulars are proved to be unreal in order to justify the claims of abstract universalism. There is psychology behind this. The human mind has a natural craving for order and system. This order and system

it finds difficult to impose on the bewildering mass of particular things, that constitute reality. It does not know what to get hold of. They are all fleeting and changing. To find a sure basis of knowledge, the mind is naturally, therefore, drawn away from this changing, fleeting world of sense perception and looks for something, which would prove changeless and abiding. It is thus, that the static conception of truth arises. The mind comes to conclude, in a rather dogmatic manner, that truth does not lie in anything that changes. In the universal concept, it comes to find out some such abiding element. For here it is found that the universal idea may continue to exist, apart from the world of particulars, for ever. Here then, is the real basis of knowledge and these universals are recognised as the really real things, while the particulars are looked upon as fleeting shadows, unreal and unsubstantial. It is no wonder, therefore, that such a conception of reality would rise again and again in the mind of philosophers of various races at different ages. It is ingrained in the nature of humanity.

It will prove interesting to note, therefore, that the Vedic philosophy also is no exception to this rule. The interest will be all the more great, because the Veda is the embodiment of the earliest speculative attempts of mankind.

With the conception of god Varuna, a complete change comes upon the character of the gods in the Vedic pantheon. So long the seers had conceived of gods and gods, but they never had thought of inter-connecting them through any agency. They are all separate and independent, each in his own way, which is polytheism, pure and simple. But Varuna is not simply conceived as just a god among many others. His position is an exalted one. He is called the *Dhritabrata*, one who is of firm resolve. He is also *Ritasya Gopā*, the upholder of the moral order. The sun is his eye, the

sky is his garment and the storm is his breath.¹ Rivers flow by his command.² The sun shines, the stars and the moon are in their courses for fear of him.³ His pre-eminence is in many ways emphasised. He is looked upon as the supreme god, who upholds the orders of the universe and punishes sin. "He is the supreme god, the god of gods, harsh to the guilty and gracious to the penitent."⁴ Yet he has a soft heart and is ever ready to forgive the sinful. "He is merciful even to him who has committed sin."⁵ This is distinctly a development towards perfect and complete monotheism and, therefore, Macdonell's statement is fully justified that "Varuna's character resembles that of the divine ruler, in a monotheistic belief of an exalted type."⁶

Varuna has been called *Ritasya Gopā*; *Rita* originally meant, "the established route of the world, of the sun, moon and stars, morning and evening, day and night." "The dawn follows the path of the *Rita*, the right path, as if she knew them from before. She never oversteps the regions. The sun follows the path of *Rita*."⁷ It thus came to stand for law in general, the law that guides the heavenly bodies, as well as men. The gods even cannot transgress it. It thus became the unchanging law of the universe, which is prior to and the basis of the changing world of experience. It is thus, the abiding element and exists before the world of sense perception came to be. It alone, like the universal of Plato, is real, while the phenomenal world of things is a passing show. "Everything that is ordered in the universe, has *Rita* for its principle. It corresponds to the universals of Plato. The world of experience is

¹ Rig-Veda, VII, 87, 2.

² Do., I, 24, 8; II, 28, 4.

³ Do., I, 24, 10; II, 28, 8; VIII, 25, 2.

⁴ Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, 77

⁵ Rig-Veda, VII, 87, 7.

⁶ Macdonell, Vedic Mythology, 3.

⁷ Rig-Veda, I, 24, 8.

a shadow or reflection of the *Rita*, the permanent reality, which remains unchanged in all the welter of mutation. The universal is prior to the particular, and so the Vedic seer thinks that *Rita* exists before the manifestation of all phenomena. The shifting series of the world are the varying expressions of the constant *Rita*.”¹

We find a repetition of the doctrines of Plato in the Neo-Platonism founded by Plotinus. This theory looks upon God as the source of all existence, the universe being an inevitable overflow of His infinite power, an emanation from Him. In this process of emanation, Plotinus distinguishes three stages. In the first stage there is pure thought, in the second, soul and in the last stage comes matter. In the first stage God divides himself into thought and ideas “that is, God thinks thoughts, he contemplates the pure ideal cosmos.” In this thinking the thinker and the thought are one; nor is it discursive but intuitive and static, the system of ideas coming into the mind of God all at once and as a whole. For each particular class of object in the world of experience, there is an idea in the mind of God and all these ideas are unified into a system. This system of ideas is the model on which the phenomenal world is built up.

The problem of the universals again assumed a considerable degree of prominence during the Middle ages in Europe. Whether the universals are real substances or exist only in the mind, appears to be the most engrossing question of the scholastic philosophers. There were all possible answers available. Some philosophers declared themselves in favour of Platonic universalism, holding that universals are realities prior to things. Others were for nominalism, admitting no existence to the universals but holding that universals are mere names for particular things; not prior to them, nor in them, but after them. There was a third group which upheld

¹ Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, 79.

the views of Aristotelean realism holding that universals are real but only in things, not outside of them. John Scotus Erignia was a realist of the first type, conceiving universals as existing prior to particular objects. But Anselm is the leading representative of this group. John Duns Scotus and William of Occum were opposed to this view and were staunch upholders of nominalism. They would regard universals, not as essences of things, but as mere concepts in the mind. The third view was more comprehensive and tried to effect a reconciliation between these opposite lines of thought. This reconciliation, as will be shown hereafter, was effected by adopting Aristotle's view of the universals. Universals are conceived by them as real, but not as prior to things, but in them. The leaders of this line of thought are Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas.

Section 4 . Abstract Particularism leading to Concrete Universalism.

We have already mentioned before that abstract universalism finds itself opposed to a line of thought, which would not admit the existence of universals at all and would hold that the particulars alone exist. By way of example, we have given the names of John Duns Scotus and William of Occum who would regard universals as mere names, for which reason, they were known as nominalists. A more appropriate name for this type of views would be abstract particularism, as the expression is naturally wider in its application. It would include all views that plead for the cause of particulars, to the exclusion of the universals.

In Greek philosophy, elements of this type of particularism are analysable from the philosophy of Epicurus and the Stoic philosophy founded by Zeno. Both these systems are more concerned with ethics than metaphysics. But there is no denying the fact that they concerned themselves, in the

problems of epistemology and ontology as well and gave answers, which entitle them to respectable positions in the domain of philosophy as well. Both philosophers start with the assumption that the study of the nature of knowledge, as well as metaphysics, is an essential preliminary to the understanding of ethics. Metaphysical knowledge is useful, says Epicurus, in order to understand the natural cause of things, in order to learn what to desire and what to avoid. And a knowledge of logic is necessary to furnish us with a criterion of knowledge. Zeno in the same manner holds that in order to understand the meaning of good, we need to have a criterion of truth and a theory of the universe. Both philosophers thus conclude that logic and metaphysics are essential preliminaries to a study of ethics.

As a consequence, a study of the nature of knowledge follows and in this connection, comes the question of the relationship between the universal and the particular. Both philosophers agree in holding that sensations are the only sources of knowledge. Epicurus holds that without sensations we can have no knowledge at all. According to Zeno, the mind of man at birth is a *tabula rasa*, which receives impressions only through sensations. Epicurus admits that there may be general ideas, but would not believe in their existence, as independent essences, as Plato did. The only reals according to him are the particular concrete objects of a species and the general idea is only a mark for them. In the same manner, Zeno believes in the capacity of the mind to follow general ideas or concepts, which comprehend a large number of particulars within their compass. But he along with other Stoics, would not admit them in the sense Plato did. The universals according to them, are only subjective abstractions, it is only the particular objects that have real existence.

It may be noted that the antagonism between abstract universalism and abstract particularism, is based on a spirit of intolerance, discernible in the mind of philosophers of both

groups. Each group is bent on proving the claims of its own theory, to the total exclusion of the other. Abstract universalism refuses to take absolutely any notice of the particulars and abstract particularism would brush aside all claims of universalism without taking into consideration the reasonableness of its claim. Both groups are marked with a spirit of exclusiveness, born of inexperience and short sight. There is scope, therefore, for these two contradictory lines of thought being reconciled with each other in a broader vision, which would smooth down the points of discord and bring out the complex harmony in which the two antagonistic views are capable of fitting. The futility of these struggles can be brought out, only after there has been some amount of experience, which makes clear the idea, that there are elements of truth in both views and that one view cannot be given preference to the exclusion of the other. The stage of conflict is, therefore, a necessary, natural stage, which enriches the mind of the philosopher with experience and prepares him for stepping into the higher stage of reconciliation, after the necessary amount of maturity is obtained. As soon as it is realised, that the claims of each line of thought are in a way irresistible and yet they are opposed to each other, the idea dawns upon the mind, that the opposition is bound in that case, to be more apparent than real and that there is scope for reconciliation of the opposite pairs of thought. The mind thus directs its energies, towards a reconciliation between the opposed groups of thoughts and before long, its efforts are rewarded.

To Aristotle should go the credit of effecting this reconciliation, long long ages ago. He did his task in an able manner, which only bespeaks of his greatness as a philosopher.

Plato had reduced the universe to an interrelated system of eternal ideas or forms. But Aristotle finds it difficult to subscribe to this view. The idea cannot be a self-existent

essence, independent of matter. In order to exist, a quality must appertain to some object. Democritus had reduced the universe to innumerable material particles, called atoms. But Aristotle found that mere purposeless matter, could not explain for the changing reality perceived by the mind. In order to explain change, which a particular object undergoes, one has to assume something which persists in the change. The thing which persists, according to him is matter. But we cannot experience matter without qualities or form. And so, it follows that matter and form co-exist together. Change is brought about by matter assuming different forms at different times. The different forms have always existed along with matter. They are both eternal principles of things.

He admits with Plato that forms are eternal, but that does not mean that they exist apart from matter. According to him, form exists only in matter. Form realises itself in a thing. It is the form that works itself out, inside each individual of a species and makes it resemble the common type. Viewed in this manner, the form is the inner moving force or cause that working within a particular thing, makes it manifest itself in a particular form. It is a kind of cause, the formal cause, which is the end or purpose realised by the thing. Aristotle thus comes to formulate the idea of four kinds of causes, namely, the formal cause or the idea or form, the material cause or matter, the efficient cause which is the same as the ordinary scientific cause and the final cause which is the purpose realised in a particular thing.

The nominalist would make us believe that universals exist only in name. But has the universal no other function than only expressing in a compendious form all the members of a particular class? Has it nothing to do in shaping individuals in the form of the class, to which they belong? Nominalism would hold that it has nothing to do with that. If that is so, we have to accept the atomistic

view of the universe. Materialistic atomism would explain the origin of species as due to a spontaneous concurrence of atoms, moving according to general laws. In the infinite succession of blind movements, all possible arrangements of elements are thinkable and among them incidentally, the existing plant and animal forms.

How such a theory would explain the problem of origin of species is expressed in most beautiful language, as follows, by Paulsen: "So then at some point of time, at some place or other in this naked earth, or in the slime, or in the water, or in the air, all the elements met which make an eagle or a shark or a lion! There stands your lion, a happy conflation of atoms, provided with skin and hair, with eyes and ears, with teeth and claws, with heart and arteries full of circulating blood. Let the boldest fancy attempt to picture the process. And consider at the same lucky moment, the same accident had to make a lioness, and that too in the same place, for, otherwise the happy chance would still have been in vain. And of course, it had to make also a beast to prey upon, a gazelle, or better a pair of gazelles, or rather a number of such pairs, enough for food until a fresh supply was produced."¹ The author's own comment on this is "we shall have to confess, if that is not incredible, then nothing in this world is incredible."

It is with a view to overcome this apparent absurdity, that philosophers came to think, that some mental principle was wanted to give unity to the world of plurality. From mind alone could order come. That is why Plato took up the idea of the priority of the universals. It is the universals which act as the regulative force of the universe. Plato however, made a mistake in supposing that matter as an irrational factor existed to receive the impress of these thoughts on them. Plato thus creates difficulties for himself.

¹ Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*, 153.

Since universals exist before matter and matter casts itself in the form supplied by them, the problem arises, how is this impressing of the form effected? An external agency is found to be a necessity and the philosopher has to commit himself to transcendental teleology as a matter of compulsion. But the procedure of nature in the production of living beings, cannot be said to resemble human purposive action.

The modern biological conception of Darwin, seems to provide for an escape from the above difficulty. Unlike the transcendental theory, it does not assume that all the various species owe their origin to an intelligence acting from without. It regards them as the result of a constant process of evolution.

Darwin explains the origin of species in the following manner: Life is a constant strife between different species for continuity and preservation. The number of creatures that desire to preserve themselves is always greater than the number of seats available in nature. Individual members of each species again are not equipped all alike. Some of them show minor variations and in case any of them are found useful in the struggle for existence, they are tried to be made permanent in the organism of the species. The individuals that are thus best adapted to the conditions of life, are selected to be the future type of the species and, therefore, indirectly determine the species forms. This is natural selection.

Many Darwinians however, make a mistake in supposing this natural selection to take place in a passive mechanical manner. They would hold that variations in the individuals come on merely accidentally and when found useful are incorporated in the form, in a mechanical manner. Darwin thus explains the fact of Madeira beetles losing their wings as follows; "For during many successive generations, each individual beetle which flew least, either from the wings having been ever so little less perfectly developed or from

indolent habit, will have had the best chances of surviving from not being blown out to sea; and on the other hand, those beetles which most readily took to flight would oftenest have been blown to sea and thus destroyed."¹

But Fechner and Paulsen think that if all the teleological equipments of animals were to be explained as being the result of accidental variation, our brain would simply reel to think of it. The presupposition of all evolution is a will to live. It is not likely that variations were struck upon blindly. It is more likely that they tended to be useful. There is a sort of purposive impulse which tends to develop certain individuals along definite lines. "They do not suffer the development passively, they are not like the pebbles in a brook pushed in a new form by mechanical causes acting from without..... The struggle for existence is not imposed on individuals from without; it is their own will to fight the battle; and without this will, the will to preserve and exercise individual life and produce and preserve offspring, there could be no such struggle for existence at all."² In the same connection, Paulsen further observes that the will manifesting itself in the impulsive feelings and activities in all individuals of the species is the creator of the form. The organic form of a species is thus, the product of a will striving continuously towards the realisation of this form.

Wundt happens to agree with the above view of Fechner and Paulsen. All organic activities according to him are originally acts of will. Even the protozoon appears as a being acting in all its parts according to will impulses. Each such impulsive activity leaves behind a disposition, which after repetition becomes habit, entailing structural changes, which can be transmitted by heredity. An organism is thus "a congealed voluntary action" so to speak. The final form may

¹ Darwin, *Origin of Species*, 151.

² Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*, 186.

not have existed in the mind of the organism, as a conscious ideal, but it was there in the form of an unconscious groping. Though the will is given to isolated acts at given moments of time, the effects transcend the immediate aim.

Here then is a theory which solves the difficulty of anthropomorphic teleology, by making the form work within the particular individuals of a species, in form of a will. This is evidently what Aristotle's view that universals exist only in the individual, may be logically constructed to mean. He steers clear of the extreme views of both Platonic universalism, as well as narrow minded nominalism. His breadth of vision led him to choose the proper view, which admits the importance of both universal ideas and particulars, of both concepts and percepts and yet held them together, in a harmonised system. We may, therefore, call this view concrete universalism, as it admits the existence of universals in form of concrete wills, directing the activities of all individuals of a species.

Section 5. Pluralism.

We have talked of monistic theories before. In these theories, there is an impatience for reducing the multiplicity of the universe to a simplified unity, in the quickest manner possible. This is not done by the more sensible method of taking into consideration the fact of the multiplicity apparent in reality, and unifying them into a system, but by the narrower and easier method of ignoring this aspect of the universe. This is possible by explaining the multiplicity, as being apparent and not real, as being an illusion altogether. This is exactly what is done by such great thinkers as Sankara and Spinoza. According to Sankara, the phenomenal world showing a multiplicity of things is only a seeming world, an illusion, akin to a dream world. This is not what reality is, which is Brahman, which is one and not many. Spinoza explains the world of time and space,

as the modes of the one infinite substance viewed under the form of time. But at the same time he affirms, that it is a purely abstract and superficial way of viewing it. They are not permanent, but a temporal expression of the substance, a transitory unreal thing.

But this is not really cutting at the roots of pluralism. Pluralism has its own valid arguments, on which it can stand. It will not simply do, to ignore it, for it would stand there all the same, solid and firm. In order to defeat pluralism, its elements have to be assimilated and harmonised with monism in a broader plane of vision. Unless that is done, monism and pluralism would fight on to the end of ages, without dislodging either from its own strongholds.

Pluralism was first founded by Democritus who propounded the atomic theory. He held that the universe is made up of a plurality of things, separated from one another by empty spaces. Each of them is indivisible, impenetrable and simple and, therefore, called an atom. They are undivided, indestructible and unchangeable. All bodies are mechanical combinations of atoms.

This original theory was reconstructed and improved upon by modern physicists, beginning with Dalton. They have come to the conclusion that these atoms, which are of the structure of a solar system in miniature, are the ultimate units out of which the world is made. All things in the universe are the result of a fortuitous combination of atoms. There is no original inner connection between atoms and atoms. But the atoms move in empty space and in course of their journey, meet with one another and the result is the transitory combinations, which we call objects and connections of objects. Since an infinite number of elements move about promiscuously, for an infinite length of time, all kinds of combinations are possible.

This is pluralism founded on materialistic basis. Leibnitz gave us a pluralism based on spiritualism or idealism. He



came to the conclusion that the universe is made up of simple substances or forces, which he called monads. Unlike the atomists, however, he holds that these are not physical points, nor mathematical points, but spiritual points. They are indestructible and eternal. The soul is such a substance. Plants, animals and inanimate objects are all made of these primary, spiritual units of force called monads.

The universe is composed of an infinite number of monads arranged in graduated progressive series. The lowest monads go to compose such things as plants and inanimate objects, while higher monads become conscious animals. The highest monad of all is God, the Monad of monads. To justify the claims of pluralism, these monads are, however, imagined as isolated and separated from each other. They are looked upon as windowless, so that there is no possibility of their being influenced from outside.

Among latest philosophers, we find William James a devoted votary at the altar of pluralism. He holds that experience does not show us a harmonised system in the universe, as monists would make us believe. On the other hand, experience shows multiplicity, diversity and opposition. This is justified on pragmatic grounds as well. Pluralism is anti-deterministic and, therefore, leaves scope for exercise of freedom of will. "There is room for change, for novelty, for the unconditioned in the world. And pluralism is melioristic: the world may be saved on condition that its parts shall do their best. The melioristic universe is conceived after a social analogy, as a pluralism of independent powers. It will succeed just in proportion as more of these work for its success. If none work, it will fail, if each does his best, it will not fail. And in such a world, man is free to risk realising his ideal."¹

¹ Thilly, *History of Philosophy*, 570.

It is a curious phenomenon in Indian philosophy, that while there is a continued effort towards founding a monistic view of the universe in the Veda, followed by the development of absolutely monistic theories in the Upanishads, most of the classical systems of Indian philosophy have a preference for pluralism, rather than monism. All the so-called anti-Vedic schools, namely, Buddhism, Jainism and the Lokāyata school are pluralistic. And among the six orthodox systems, with the notable exception of the Vedānta philosophy all others are pluralistic. Let us state their views in a brief outline.

The Sāṅkhya-Yoga system of philosophy explains the diversity of creation by positing two eternal substances. On the one hand, there is matter or *Prakṛiti* and on the other hand, there is an infinite number of souls called *Purushas*. The *Purusha* has the function of being a passive agent by inducing the *Prakṛiti* to undergo all possible changes necessary for the evolution of the phenomenal world of plurality. *Prakṛiti* undergoes these changes, under the influence of the three primary *gunas*, namely *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*.

In the same manner, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system is a believer in pluralism. The very name of the founder of the Vaiśeṣika system suggests it, for Kanāda means literally the atom-eater. The system sets up six categories, namely, substance, quality, motion, generality, particularity and inherence to which a seventh category was afterwards added, namely, the category of non-existence or *abhāva*. From the category of substance, it develops the theory of the origin of universe from innumerable independent atoms, similar to the conception of Democritus. Since the Purva-Mīmāṃsā maintains the ultimate supremacy of the Vedas, it necessarily posits a number of deities, which are necessary for the observance of Vedic *Dharma*. It does not feel even the necessity of postulating a supreme God, since the Vedic *Dharma* does not require it. There is a positive attempt also to disprove the

existence of God, in order to secure the eternal and self-existent nature of the Vedas. It is, therefore, admittedly polytheistic and pluralistic in conception of the universe.

The Lokāyata system again is pluralistic and materialistic. The name Lakāyata signifies that it is worldly minded. The authority on the subject, called the *Sutras* of Brihaspati, has altogether perished. Our only source of information is the Sarva Darsana Samgraha of Sadānanda Yogin.

The Lokāyata system believes in the possibility of perceptual knowledge alone and, therefore, matter which alone is perceptible to sense, is considered the only reality. It distinguishes four elements in matter, namely, earth, water, fire and air, which are eternal. These four can, by their combinations, account for all the reality. Mind is not admitted as a separate entity. It is also deduced from these four elements and is looked upon merely as a function of matter. The other aspects of this system we need not dwell upon in the present context.

The Jainas propounded a theory of pluralistic dualism. They traced the whole universe of being to two everlasting, uncreated, co-existing categories, called the *jiva* and the *ajiva*. That which has consciousness, is *jiva* and that which has no consciousness but can be touched, tasted, seen and smelt is *ajiva*. *Ajiva* can be both with form (*sarupa*) and without form (*arupa*), *e.g.*, space, time, *dharma*. *Ajiva* with form is *pudgala* or matter and constitutes all material forms of the universe ; it is the physical basis of the universe. A homogeneous mass of *pudgalas* can break up into several kinds of atoms (*anu*) which are infinitesimal, eternal and ultimate. Two atoms may again form a compound under laws of *dharma* and *adharma*. *Pudgala* can thus exist, both in the form of atoms as well as aggregates of them (*skanda*). The physical universe is made of *skandas*. *Karma* is our essential factor in regulating the structure of the universe. It is a sort of subtle matter with which the soul becomes

interpenetrated and becomes subject to the laws of *Karma*. The *jivas* are infinite in number and after being joined with *Karma* become subject to the laws of merit and demerit. These are the principles of which the whole universe is constituted. On the one hand, there are infinite particles of matter and on the other, an infinite number of *jivas* or souls. The activity of these numerous objects in space and time as regulated by *Dharma*, *Adharma* and *Karma*, fill the whole universe.¹

Early Buddhism, as founded by Buddha himself, is admittedly a philosophy of dynamism. Buddha reduces substance and souls to moments and processes. According to him, change is the very stuff of reality. Life is a series of becomings and their extinctions. Reality then is a becoming without beginning or end. "There is no static moment, when the becoming attains to beinghood. No sooner we conceive it by attributes of name and form, than it has changed to something else."² The appearance of the world as divided into separate things, which are more or less permanent, is explained away as a mere appearance and not reality. Reality is a continuous stream or flux; it is by an arbitrary activity of the mind that this is artificially divided up and called separate things. Identity is only seeming and not real. In this process, the mind applies certain relations or categories to the stream and by this means, builds up a comparatively stable but unreal universe. But these relations are not necessary but contingent.

Buddhism would not thus admit breaking up of reality into a plurality of beings. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that it is thereby hostile to a pluralistic view. Rather by implication it favours pluralism. Instead of admitting a plurality of beings, it introduces a plurality of becomings,

¹ Panchāsti Kāyā Samayasāra.

² Radhakrishnan, Indian Phi., I, 369.

a series of becomings, which are co-existent and parallel. As according to Buddhism, it is these becomings, that constitute the whole of reality, they take up the same position, as a plurality of objects occupies in a static conception of reality. It holds that reality is not made up of one simple principle but many. It is, therefore, pluralistic like Jainism or materialism or any other pluralistic theories. This is confirmed by the fact that the attitude of Buddhism is hostile to the admission of the existence of any god in the planning of the universe.

Section 6. Monistic Pluralism.

Pluralism takes its stand on ordinary common sense and, therefore, it is difficult to shake it off. In ordinary perception, a plurality of objects, apparently different and distinct from each other, is presented to the mind and so the idea takes root that reality is a plurality.

This view finds great favour in the eyes of the empirical scientists, because of the fact that it conforms to their theories of the universe. The physicist divides and sub-divides matter till ultimately he comes to a stage where, it is not worth his while to sub-divide it further. It is the ultimate point in the analytic reflection of the chemist. As a matter of fact, present-day physics finds that each atom again is composed of a central point called the ion and bodies revolving round it called electrons. It is the disruption of these electrons from atomic bodies that explains such phenomena as radio-activity and X-rays. If that is so, atom can no more be called a simple unit. It is as much a complex combination of several things as the solar system itself. If that is so, why should the physicist arbitrarily hold, that the atom is the ultimate unit of the universe? If a complex combination or a unity in plurality is admitted with regard to the structure of the atom why should one dogmatically hold, that the universe cannot be

regarded as a complex unity in which parts react on each other, in the same manner as the electrons and the ions do, in the case of the atom? If it is, over and above this, possible to show that there are indications that all the various parts of the universe work systematically, as if they are parts of a complex unit, atomism cannot absolutely refuse the claims of such a hypothesis. Such a hypothesis should go by the name of monistic pluralism or pluralistic monism. We have to bear in mind that we have here passed the stage of conflict, where the claims of one extreme view are pressed against the claims of another. Pluralism has an element of truth in it, in the fact that reality is not a simple unit. On the other hand, monism has also an element of truth in it, in the fact that there is order and system, in the activity of the many parts of the universe, pointing to the fact that they are all parts of one whole. Extreme monism or pluralism takes its rise, according as a philosopher accepts the claim of one of them after rejecting wholesale the claim of the other. Pure monism thus tries to establish itself, by completely ignoring or explaining away the multiplicity of the universe. Again, extreme pluralism would dogmatically refuse to believe that there is inter-action between parts of the universe and divide it into separate water-tight compartments as it were. The present view refuses the claims of neither. On the other hand, it tries to harmonise these conflicting views by admitting the essential elements of both and combining them in the proper manner. It admits that there is plurality, but this plurality is within a unity. There are many, but these many are included within an all-embracing one.

Let us come back to the claims of atomism. It admits of only a plurality of absolutely independent entities. If that is so, if every element of reality is wholly independent in its existence, how is it that there is uniformity of action in nature, how is it that change in one element coincides

with change in another? Atomism cannot satisfactorily solve the phenomenon of reciprocity of action, between different parts of the universe and the uniform laws of nature.

In the same manner, Leibnitz rather arbitrarily divides the universe into an infinite number of spiritual atoms, which he calls monads. These monads are absolutely independent of each other so much that they are thought to be windowless, so that no influencing from outside is possible. This makes it difficult for him to explain reciprocity and interaction. He tries to explain it away by inventing the theory of pre-established harmony, somehow brought about by the mysterious powers of God. This is no satisfactory explanation at all and amounts to pleading ignorance.

If we look at the universe, we become aware of certain important facts. We find that things act and react constantly and universally. If there is disturbance in one part of the universe, there are corresponding disturbances in the other parts. Secondly, there is the reign of law in nature. "So great is the homogeneity of elements, that the behaviour of all of them may, at least in certain respects, be expressed by simple formulæ. The laws of mechanics, or the law of gravity are, so at least physics and astronomy assume, the exact expression of the behaviour of every mass particle that exists anywhere in infinite space or acts at any time in infinite time."¹

Reality appears before us in form of organised system. The most comprehensive system that we can conceive of is the solar system, which is a composite whole. This again is a partial system and may be included in more comprehensive systems composed of the astral bodies. Within each part again of the solar system, there is relative unity and organisation. Every aspect of the world is a relatively complete unity. Even in the mental world, there is unity and organi-

¹ Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, 147.

sation. Reality thus appears to be a unitary organised system governed throughout by laws. This is a fact. Pluralism, either in its material form, or in its spiritual form, cannot give any satisfactory account of it. Extreme pluralism, rather is positively inconsistent with these observed facts.

We can safely conclude, therefore, that unity and organisation all round us, indicate that the elements of the world are not unrelated to each other as pluralism supposes. We can understand universal interaction between elements only by assuming that they are all parts of one unitary being. The world is rather a unitary system, in which there can be no isolated processes. The plurality of the universe is held together in an all-embracing unity. There is unity in plurality and plurality in unity. The claims of both pluralism and monism are allowed to the extent, which is consistent with co-existence. Plurality is not absolutely swept off its feet and so the misgivings of philosophers like James against monism need not arise.

Our duty has become now very much simplified. We shall close this chapter after giving some prominent examples from the history of philosophy of systems, which acclaim and accept the above theory of monistic pluralism.

In European philosophy we come across such a view in the philosophy of Schelling for the first time. We shall not here touch on the whole of his elaborate system as that will only serve the purpose of increasing matter. We shall deal with only that part of his system which deals with the structure of reality, that is with the problem, whether reality is one or many.

Schelling founded a philosophy of objective idealism and realism. He broadens the conception of spirit by making it include the unconscious purposive force, working in nature as well as in the highest self-consciousness of a philosopher, within its meaning. According to him, the creative energy that manifests itself in self-conscious mind, operates also in sense



perception, in animal life, in chemical changes, in electrical phenomenon and in gravity. The same universal mind is working behind both nature and individual mind. In his eyes, the universe is the creative purposive evolution of one single universal life, which starts with unconscious life and ultimately develops into the self-conscious reason of man. "In its developed state Schelling's philosophy is a form of pantheism, in which the universe is conceived as a living, evolving system ; as an organism in which every part has its place, and subserves the whole. In this sense, subject and object, form and matter, the ideal and the real are one together and inseparable, the one is the many and the many are one, just as in an organism, we cannot tear the part from the whole, nor understand it apart from the whole, nor understand the whole without its parts. The same unity in plurality, or identity in diversity we find in mental life ; in the act of knowledge, the knower and the thing known are one." ¹

In Hegel we find a stronger affirmation of the views of Schelling stated above. For him, nature and reason are one, the same process that is at work in reason is present everywhere. According to him, therefore, whatever is real, is rational and whatever rational, real. To him the categories of subjective thought are also categories of the universe. Reality is a living moving dynamic process, which grows and develops. Abstract concepts tell us only of parts and, therefore, cannot faithfully represent reality. Considered by themselves, such abstract thoughts give us only the contradictory aspects of things, which are meaningless. These contradictory aspects can only be understood, as parts of an organic system. One Idea according to Hegel pervades the whole and all parts of the whole and all particulars have their reality in this unity. The universe is thus an organic unity of differences, a totality of parts, a unified and yet differentiated whole. Everything is comprehended

¹ Thilly, *History of Philosophy*, 455.

within the Idea, which is to him the same as God. This Idea contains within itself implicitly, the entire logical process, which unfolds itself in the universe. The Divine mind evolves itself through unconscious nature into mind or spirit where it realises itself. "The divine Idea is enriched by its self-expression in nature and in history and rises through them to self-consciousness, becoming for itself what it was in itself. In the rhythmical process of self alienation and self deliverance, the universal mind realises its destiny; it thinks itself in its object and so comes to know its own essence."¹ In all cases of revelation of reason or the Idea, reason appears in an infinite variety of temporal and transitory forms both bodily and mental. This plurality is not a thing to be ignored or discarded and looked upon as mere appearances. They all form parts of the one unifying Idea which seeks to realise itself in these multitudinous shapes and forms.

In the philosophy of Lotze again, there has been such an attempt at reconciling monism and pluralism. The mechanical view of the world as given by science, he rejects as untenable, as he finds that there is organisation and system in all that there is. According to him, even the lowest forms of matter are not dead, but finely organised systems. He thus finds the universe to be a system of spiritual realities, in reciprocal relation to one another. He also finds, that the acceptance of such a theory is necessary for making ethics possible. Cold material mechanism is not a suitable atmosphere where morality can flourish.

Fechner's Panpsychism can also be looked upon as a form of monistic pluralism. He argues that there is parallel psychic life to all combinations of matter. This psychic life appears in a descending degree of clearness. In man, psychic life is very highly developed, in animals, it is less developed and in plants still less. In inorganic matter and in atoms also

¹ Thilly, History of Philosophy, 455.

there is psychic life in form of organisation and system. There are also higher forms of psychic life than man, for the earth and the other planets are all endowed with souls and ultimately, there is the World Soul or God for whom the whole universe is the physical counterpart. Paulsen agrees with Fechner and accepts his panpsychism as the most acceptable theory. His pantheism as developed elaborately in his Introduction to Philosophy is based on a dualistic plane accepting the principles of panpsychism.

No account of views accepting monistic pluralism as the correct solution of the problem of one and many, will be complete without a reference to the philosophy of the Upanishads. Composed at a time when philosophy had not taken its rise at all, in any part of the world, they impress us not only by their age, but by the height and depth of their philosophical wisdom.

The Upanishads are permeated through and through with the idea that all the plurality of the universe is inhabited by and embraced in the all-pervading Absolute to which they give the name *Brahman*. The parts of the universe are as much real as the *Brahman* itself. Contrary to the views of the Vedānta as propounded by Sankara, they are not actuated by any feeling that the particular is to be discarded as unimportant and, therefore, unreal. The necessity of the part is felt as strongly as the necessity of the all-embracing unity of the *Brahman*. The Isa Upanishad begins with the declaration that "all that there is in this world, is the garment of God."¹ There is nothing that is outside *Brahman*; all that there is, is like his body. All that is seen about us varying in shapes and forms is but the manifestation of one and the same *Brahman*. *Brahman* is the underlying principle of all beings, which "divides the one form into many."² In giving a description of what the *Brahman* is like, the Taittiriya Upanishad says :

¹ Isa, I.

² Katha, II, 12.

“From which all these beings are born, by which having been born they live, where they return—that is to be asked, that is *Brahman*.”¹ The *Chândogya Upanishad* reiterates these same views by saying that all that there is is *Brahman*. Everything arises from it, is sustained by it and ultimately reabsorbed in it.² In another place it most definitely propounds the theory that the *Brahman* inhabits the particular phenomenon of nature. Thus it says: “He is below, he above, he behind, he in front, he is to the south, he is to the north; he is everything that here is.”³ The *Brihadāranyaka Upanishad* also in similar manner lays great emphasis on the essential oneness of the all-embracing *Brahman* on the one hand, and the bewildering mass of particulars. The world of phenomenon is but only the manifestation of the one all-unifying *Brahman*. *Brahman* is not to be sought outside of the world of phenomenon but is manifest in and through them. “Just as the spider spins out its webs and as sparks come out of fire, even so from this *Ātman*, all living beings, all worlds, all gods, all creatures come out.”⁴ These same views are reiterated in the *Svetāsvatara Upanishad*, also which is a comparatively later Upanishad which is proof, therefore, that monistic pluralism continued to be the representative view of the Upanishads over ages together. It thus performs obeisance in one place to the God “that is in the fire, in water, that entered into all the worlds, that is in the plants as well as big trees.”⁵ Like the other Upanishads it is also actuated with the feeling that the ultimate oneness between the one and the many, between Absolute and the world of phenomenon, should be clearly established beyond all shadows of doubts. It therefore, characterises *Brahman* as “the one God, lying hidden in all creatures, all-pervading and the inner soul of all creatures.”⁶

¹ Taithienyn, III. 1.
² *Chândogya*, III. 14, 1.

³ *Chândogya*, VII. 25, 1.
⁴ *Brihadāranyaka*, II, 1.

⁵ *Svetāsvatara*, II. 18.
⁶ *Svetāsvatara*, VI. 11.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FIRST PROBLEM—UNIVERSAL *vs.* PARTICULAR, ONE *vs.* MANY.

In Theory of Knowledge.

The sources of Knowledge. First stage: Intuitionism—Upanishads, Yoga philosophy, Neo-Platonism, Mysticism, Scotus Erigena, the Schoolmen Intuitionism of Bergson; Commonsense Rationalism—ordinary commonsense view, Scottish School. Second stage: Empiricism—Lokāyata School, Jaina School, Nyāya, Bacon, Locke, Hume; Rationalism—Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Plato, Yogāchāra School of Buddhism. Third stage: Rational empiricism—Nyāya-Vaisesika, Sāṅkhya-yoga, Aristotle, Kant.

Section 1. First Stage. Intuitionism, Commonsense, Rationalism.

The first problem of philosophy, as we have already known, deals with the antithesis of the universal and the particular, of the one and the many. When applied to the theory of knowledge it necessarily resolves itself to the problem of the origin or factors of knowledge, which is a fundamental problem of epistemology. The antithesis with regard to this problem, as will be presently shown, is between the respective contributions of sensation and reason towards the building up of knowledge. On the one hand, there is sensationism which claims that sensations alone build up knowledge. Opposed to this, extreme rationalism holds that reason alone contributes to knowledge. This is in fact the central idea of the problem. If we analyse them, we shall find that sensationism resolves itself into saying that it is particular sensations alone that contribute to knowledge and not the unifying

mental ideas. Sensationalism, therefore, is the champion of the many against one or of the particulars against universals, as contributing factors of knowledge. In the same manner rationalism pleads for reason, that is for concepts or universals as factors of knowledge. Rationalism may take two forms. It may hold that sensations do not give us knowledge at all for, at best they are a bewildering mass of unconnected sensations and, therefore, meaningless. Unless mind alone works and gives us the relations, we cannot connect them up in form of knowledge. It would thus hold that mind alone is the source of knowledge. In other words, it says that knowledge is built *a priori* as against sensationalism, which would say that knowledge is wholly *a posteriori*. Again knowledge is built up either exclusively of concepts or of percepts and concepts. In case of judgment about particular, the subject is a particular, as for example, the Himalayas are mountains. In case of a perceptual judgment also the subject is a particular of percept. When for example, we rise from the stage of sensation to that of perception, we form such perceptual judgments by connecting the percept with a universal concept, previously formed in the mind. When we say this is an ink-pot, the predicate here is a concept and the 'this' is a particular of percept. Except these cases, in all other judgments both subject and object are universals. In all cases at least the predicate is always a universal. On this basis, the rationalist philosopher may claim that without concepts no judgment is possible. This amounts to saying that universals alone are the source of knowledge and not the particulars of sensation. Rationalism thus, pleads for the cause of the universal or the one, as against the many particulars, as sole factors of knowledge. The antithesis of the universal and the particular, of one and many, as applied to theory of knowledge, thus, assumes the new form of the problem of factors of knowledge. The antithesis is between sensations, on the one hand and mind on the other. Whether

sensations are the original source of knowledge or mind, is the problem before us.

In the above statements, we represent the problem in its second stage of development where the conflict is manifest. In order to get to the stage of harmony, which precedes it, we have to work backwards to a state where the conflict has not manifested itself at all. Here we shall find the problem just taking shape and making head towards growth and maturity. The problem here is tackled by an undeveloped mind and the answer sought to be given, betrays a complete ignorance of the possibilities of any rival explanations, which might give rise to conflict.

In intuitionism and in ordinary common-sense rationalism we come across such a stage. Intuitionism tries to build up knowledge on immediate experience alone. Immediate experience is direct and vivid and is, therefore, the most impressive of all proofs of validity. This is therefore, unhesitatingly accepted as the only source of knowledge. Not that the mind at this stage analysed and examined the claims of all the rival theories of origin of knowledge, and then finding intuitionism to be the most satisfactory of all theories, accepted it to the exclusion of other theories. As a matter of fact, the mind was then too immature to accomplish such a feat. The real thing was, that intuition was the only source that suggested itself to the mind and the mind in its simplicity accepted it as the sole factor of knowledge.

At this stage, it appears necessary to clear up certain points for avoiding misunderstanding. Intuitionism as we talked of above is, but the embryonic form of what later developed into empiricism. This intuitionism is concerned only with the problem of the sources of knowledge or factors of knowledge and its suggested solution of the problem is that immediate experience is alone the source of knowledge. The term intuitionism is also applied to such views as the mysticism of the Neo-Platonists or of the Schoolmen in scholastic

philosophy. The method of knowledge followed by the Upanishads in Indian philosophy is also characterised as intuitional. The philosophical method of Bergson is also usually called intuitionism. We should observe that the sense in which the term intuitionism is used in all these cases, is different from the sense in which we mean to use it in our present discussion. Intuitionism in all the above cases, is referred as a method of acquiring knowledge. They do not come in connection at all with any discussion on origin of knowledge. What is meant there is that intuitionism is a method of acquiring knowledge along with the ordinary rational method. These intuitionist philosophers also claim that as contrasted with the rational method, the intuitional method is superior as a means for acquisition of knowledge. They plead that the rational method has certain inherent defects which prevent it from giving us a true and correct idea of reality. Bergson for example, pleads that the rational method has the vicious habit of analysing and dissecting reality and thus presenting a shadow reality to the mind. Rationalism is, therefore, competent only to deal with dead reality. Living present reality is a flux, it is a dynamic flow, of which no rational method can give us a correct picture. At best it presents reality to us mediately, it gives us only a translation of reality, it cannot bring us directly in contact with the very heart throbs of reality. On these grounds he rejects the claims of the rational method as giving correct knowledge of reality and finds that intuition alone can give us the original, unanalysed, undissected reality. In the same manner, the many philosophers who find the ordinary rational method incompetent for reaching us to reality directly, find consolation in the idea that ecstatic trance or direct intuition can lead us to it and call their method mysticism. It is apparent, therefore, that they are methods of reaching reality or acquiring knowledge. They are all anti-intellectualistic in their attitude and do not believe in the competence of logical reason to reach reality. Even empiricism, which is opposed

to rationalism, so far as the question of origin of knowledge is concerned, is not anti-intellectualistic. It has also implicit faith in reason being the proper instrument for acquisition of knowledge. Intuitionism in the present sense also, has no antagonism with Intellectualism. In fact it is so undeveloped and so premature, that the question of opposition with intellectualism does not strike it at all. We may state again that it stands here, for undeveloped empiricism. In this stage, knowledge is limited to the perceptual type only, and all that it claims is that such knowledge is derived from immediate experience.

Ordinary common-sense rationalism also represents the first stage of harmony of this problem. We refer here to the stage where man has reached only the ordinary level of intelligence, where he is not educated enough to know of the distinctions between empiricism and rationalism. Here knowledge is based wholly on immediate experience. No attempt is made here to arrive at universal and necessary knowledge, simply because of the fact that the mind at this stage is incompetent for such work.

Ordinary common-sense rationalism represents the undeveloped form of what in a later stage, would develop into rationalism. Just as intuitionism is the embryonic stage of fully developed empiricism, common-sense rationalism is the embryonic stage of full-fledged rationalism. In an act of knowledge of the perceptual kind, there are two elements present. On the one hand, there is the object presented to the mind and on the other, there is the awareness of the object by the mind. If the mind happens to put more stress on the object side of knowledge we get intuitionism implicitly believing in the correct representation of the objects as they are perceived. Again, when the mind gives more emphasis on the receptive aspect of the act of knowledge, it comes to form the theory of ordinary common-sense rationalism, which has implicit belief in the capacity of the mind to know reality.

We have to remember that in both these cases, the mind is in pursuit only of perceptual knowledge, that is knowledge wholly based on percepts. The mind perceives and builds knowledge on perception in the most unsystematic manner possible. The mind is too undeveloped to see whether immediate experience alone contributes to knowledge or there is any other factor. It is the initial stage of harmony where the mind is not troubled by any doubts or misgivings. The absence of conflict is due to the undeveloped condition in which the problem is at the time. As the capacity for the mind increases, as it develops more universal and more necessary types of knowledge, it would be aware of the distinctions of empiricism and rationalism and that will lead us into the second stage of the development of this problem.

It has been observed above, that the problem in its first stage of harmony is concerned only with perceptual knowledge. Knowledge here consists of just being aware of what one perceives. Here knowledge does not go beyond immediate experience. Higher conceptual knowledge which is necessary and universal, is yet beyond the reach of the mind. The categories of conceptual knowledge cannot, therefore, take their rise at this stage. They are yet unborn, as the knowledge in which they are presupposed, is not what the mind is concerned with at this stage. The mind is aware here of the categories of space and time only. These two categories presuppose all perception and make perception possible. Without space, no bodily experience is possible and without time no mental experience is possible. When therefore, the mind is just so much developed as to be able to perceive only, the categories of space and time alone have taken their rise, inasmuch as they alone are the categories of perceptual knowledge.

Section 2. The Second Stage.

The mind soon discovers that it can travel beyond immediate experience and is capable of forming judgments,

which are true of things, which have not been experienced. Here the mind has risen to the conceptual stage, where out of percepts it can form concepts and by relationing percepts with concepts, forms universal judgments which are true of all cases whatever. All conceptual judgment, that is to say all knowledge properly so called, it may be seen, is a relation in which the subject is a percept or a concept and the thing predicated of it is always a concept. In perceptual judgments however, all subjects are, invariably percepts while predicates are concepts. Concepts in both cases play a very important part, and without concepts no judgment would have been possible. The question is naturally suggested to the mind : how are concepts made possible? On enquiry it finds out that concepts always take certain well marked and characteristic forms. These are indispensable for the formation of concepts. As they are thus essential and necessary forms of concepts, they are known as categories of knowledge. It is at this stage, therefore, that the mind becomes aware of the categories of conceptual knowledge such as quantity, quality, relation and modality. The categories of space and time are perceived as has already been stated at an earlier stage than this. These categories are at work as soon as sensations arise and are perceived by the mind. They are presupposed in all acts of immediate experience. As soon as man starts however, expressing his immediate experiences in forms of judgments, he has to take help of the other categories. The categories of conceptual knowledge are at work as soon as judgment making starts, be it even of the crudest kind.

The mind thus comes to know what the nature of knowledge is. It knows that in building up knowledge, it has to deal with percepts and concepts exclusively. In ordinary course, the question is suggested : how are these percepts and concepts originated? The mind is now more developed, its capacities are increased and it finds itself competent to take

up this question for answer. Two points are to be noted in this connection. All our immediate experience is based on sensation. At the very start of knowledge process, there is sensation. On this sensation is based perception and from perception, the mind builds up concepts. The idea is naturally suggested that sensations are the origin of percepts and since concepts are based on percepts, their origin is also to be traced to sensations. Sensations, therefore, are at the root of all knowledge, they are the source of our knowledge. Thinking more and more on these lines leads to the development of a spirit of partisanship and the mind comes to a stage when it says, that it is exclusively from sensations that knowledge originates. This is how the extreme form of empiricism takes shape which would make bold to say that 'there is nothing in mind which was not originally in sensations.'

The second point to be noted is that the mind observes and marks that all knowledge is spiritual or mental, because at any rate it is in all cases engendered in the mind. It would not be improper, therefore, for it to assume that knowledge is wholly derived from the mind, mind is the only source of knowledge. Thinking on this line leads to the other antagonistic view called extreme rationalism. Thus the antagonism is developed, the stage of conflict is started. The two antagonistic views, empiricism and rationalism, try their best to establish their respective claims as the sole factors of knowledge. Let us have illustrations.

Section 3. Empiricism.

We begin with views that hold that sensation is the only source of reality. They do not admit the claims of mind as an engendering factor of knowledge. They plead for the view that there are many factors which originate knowledge, and deny the contention that mind produces knowledge. We apply to them the general name of empiricism.

The Lokāyata school of Indian philosophy illustrates an extreme form of empiricism. It believes that sense perception is the only source of knowledge and would not admit of even the validity of inference. It holds that what is arrived at by means of direct perception is alone truth and that alone exists. What is not perceived does not and cannot exist, for the simple reason that it is not perceived. No inference is valid or possible, for what is passed as inference, is in reality revival of past perceptions through association and memory. Thus when we infer existence of fire from smoke we are only remembering a past perception. "We cannot have inferences, unless we have knowledge of universal connections. Perception does not give us universal relation, nor can it be due to inference, for such an inference would require another and so on. Testimony of others is of no value. Analogy cannot account for inference and so inference is invalid. It is only a subjective association, which may be justified if at all by accident."¹

In Jainism also we can trace some elements of empiricism. The Jaina philosophy is thoroughly realistic and therefore, believes in objects existing independent of and beyond consciousness. Knowledge is the faithful representation of objects and their relations. *Cetana* or consciousness which is the essence of *jivam*, manifests itself in the form of perception (*Darsana*) and intelligence (*Jnana*). *Darsana* is simple apprehension, in which the details of relationship are not brought out. Intelligence works on it and helps it in understanding reality which is extra-mental. The attributes and relations of these objects, which form the subject matter of knowledge, are not however thought out in mind, according to Jainism. They are directly given in experience and are not products of thought or imagination at all.

¹ Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 279.

If that is so, mind or reason does not play any part at all in the building up of knowledge, but it is wholly the work of experience. This is undoubtedly empiricism.

The Nyaya philosophy is also empirical in its attitude towards the problem of origin of knowledge. It holds that pure sense knowledge is an impossibility. The Nyaya philosophy believes that the universals are as real as the individuals and are necessary, even in the more elementary acts of cognition or perceptual knowledge. It further distinguishes indeterminate and determinate perception and points out that it is in the latter, that we become conscious of the universals and their relation with particulars. Nevertheless, it holds that these universals are also present in indeterminate perception. It further states that universals are not only real, but they subsist in the particular objects. The universals and their relations are not superinduced by the mind but are observed within the nature of the real objects. So all the factors of knowledge, including the particular objects and the universals and their relationships, are all perceived directly in an act of perception. Though it holds that mind (*manas*) is a condition of perception, its function is said to be nothing more than merely receiving perceptions or accepting one of many perceptions.¹ This theory thus rules out absolutely all claims of mind in contributing to knowledge, by refusing to provide any function for it, in an act of knowledge. The New School of Nyaya philosophy also supports, on the whole, this view.

Among modern philosophers, though his system is imperfectly developed, we can call Bacon an empiricist for our purpose. Though the question of origin of knowledge did not strike him directly, there are implications in his philosophy which go to show, that he did not believe that reason at all contributed to knowledge. He thought that all knowledge, except revelations, is wholly derived from sensations. Reason

¹ Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 50.

acts on these sensations and builds up knowledge, but reason has no truth of its own, it does not act as a factor in the production of knowledge.

It was in Locke's system that the question of the origin of knowledge receives serious attention for the first time in the history of modern European philosophy. His "Essay concerning Human Understanding," is "an examination of the nature, origin and validity of knowledge." Descartes had argued before him that without reason no knowledge is possible. Reason, according to him, supplied some innate ideas or principles, which alone could make knowledge possible. Locke, therefore, starts with examining critically the statement whether innate ideas exist. Locke assumes that the mind must be conscious of whatever there is in the mind. But the mind, he finds, does not feel conscious of any such innate ideas. If at all there are any principles, they must have been derived from experience. If such ideas are innate, they must be universally present, but they are not found present in children and in the uncultured. From these arguments, he comes to the conclusion that the mind has no innate ideas at all, and it is in its original form a *tabula rasa*, a completely blank tablet on which sensations give impressions, which are the groundwork of knowledge. He finds that it is exclusively from experience that knowledge is derived. Sensations furnish the mind with sensible qualities on which the mind reflects and thereby gets its ideas, which constitute knowledge. The human mind helps in the formation of knowledge only by receiving the impressions made on it either by sensation or by reflection.

Berkeley passes as a thorough-going idealist and, therefore, it would look absurd to paint him as an empiricist, that is, one who believes that sensation is the only source of knowledge. But that is the real truth about him. He does not believe in the existence of substances. He does away completely with an extra-mental world. He tried to explain the whole universe,

with the help of individual spirits and the universal spirit or God. So far it works all right. Now he thought that the whole universe consists of certain ideas, which are common to many individuals and which it is not within the power of individual spirits to control. These ideas he, thought, are impressed on our minds by God. There are again ideas which we can control in our own way, and such ideas are images of the ideas imprinted by God. God not only gives us ideas, but he also gives us connections of ideas, ready-made, for the mind to receive. Thus He has connected the idea of food with the idea of nourishment, the idea of sleep with the idea of refreshment, the idea of bodily sensation with warmth. The mind thus not only gets ideas, but their relations which constitutes knowledge. The mind, therefore, receives completely made knowledge, and its function is reduced to simply receiving them ready-made. His view, therefore, is that the mind is not at all a contributing factor to the production of knowledge. It has only a passive part to play. In this respect, his view bears a close similarity to the Jaina view of the origin of knowledge, with which we have dealt already. Is not this thoroughgoing sensationalism, which totally rejects the claims of reason as a factor of knowledge? He has more agreement with Locke than with such rationalist philosophers as Descartes or Spinoza.

Hume's conclusions are positivistic, in the sense that he believes that knowledge is limited to the world of phenomena only, and does not extend to the world of noumena. Let us examine his views on the origin of knowledge.

He finds that all materials of our knowledge are derived from outward and inward impressions. Outward impressions are direct perceptions and are, therefore, very vivid. Inward impressions are ideas which are copies of such perceptions. Every idea is copied from similar impressions. These ideas associate with one another, according to certain fixed principles, and that is how we get complex ideas. Out of these ideas, knowledge is built up "by compounding, transposing,

augmenting or diminishing the materials furnished us by the senses and experience.”¹ To the mind, therefore, falls the unimportant work of mixing and arranging up the impressions or ideas for building up knowledge. Mind or reason, therefore, does not contribute anything towards production of knowledge. The only source of knowledge is sensation or experience. In arranging up the impressions or ideas for framing knowledge relations again, the mind is influenced by habit or custom, which is the result of repeated experience. Ultimately, therefore, experience is the sole factor of knowledge.

This finishes one line of thought which takes up an extreme view with regard to the problems of the factors of knowledge. These views are extremely one-sided and would sternly refuse to admit the claims of reason as a factor of knowledge. They are all influenced by the thought and belief that knowledge is wholly derived from sensations, and that mind has no part to play with regard to this. If at all reason plays any part, it is an unimportant one and it has wholly to depend on immediate experience for building up knowledge. This concludes one set of the antagonistic views.

Section 4. Rationalism.

It has been already noted that knowledge has two principal characteristics, namely that it is universal and certain. It is found difficult to believe that sense experience can lead us very far beyond itself, to give us this kind of universal and necessary knowledge. If sensations cannot account for them properly, we have to look upon reason as the probable cause of it. When this idea is developed and elaborated, we get rationalism believing that knowledge is the work of reason. As the view develops further and further, it becomes more and more extreme, till it comes to believe that sensations play

¹ Thilly, *History of Philosophy*, p. 348.



no part in the building up of knowledge, which is exclusively the work of reason. This is extreme rationalism which is directly in opposition with the empirical views described above. Let us make a survey of the important philosophical systems which profess rationalism.

In Greek philosophy, Plato was the first philosopher to deal with epistemology seriously. In this connection he deals with the problem of origin of knowledge, with which we are at present concerned. Plato believes that knowledge is wholly constituted of concepts. It is by generalising, particularising, combining and dividing concepts that we arrive at knowledge. Judgment expresses the relation of concepts to one another and the syllogism connects judgment with judgment. He is emphatic that concepts and not sensations or images are the essential elements of knowledge. These concepts or ideas, according to him, have their source not in experience, but in the soul. They lie already implicitly within the soul and they are cleared up and brought to consciousness by help of experience. Once a notion has thus been evolved, other notions may be deduced from it by developing its implications or meanings. "Man is, therefore, indeed the measure of all things, of all truth, because there lie, imbedded in his soul, certain universal principles, notions, concepts or ideas which form the starting point of all knowledge."¹

From Plato we have to take a big jump to Descartes. After a great deal of patient searching, he arrives at the criterion of truth that what is clearly and distinctly perceived is true. Such clear and distinct perception, he affirms, cannot be possible through the senses, for they only tell us how the things affect us and not what they really are. This clear and distinct perception, therefore, is only possible by reasoning. There are certain basal principles or notions in the mind, on which reason works and, thus gives us correct knowledge.

¹ Thilly, *History of Philosophy*, p. 62.

Experience may unfold or make explicit these principles, but, all the same, the truth remains that they were somehow originally present in the mind, from before. Ideas, therefore, on which knowledge grows are innate in their nature. Knowledge, therefore, has its source, not in experiences nor in sensations, but in mind, in which they are already implicitly present. Descartes was a realist in assuming that there are substances existing outside and independent of the mind. But that did not stand in the way of his professing rationalism, so far as the question of the origin of knowledge is concerned. He believed that the true nature of the external world can only be grasped by reasoning.

The philosophy of Spinoza is the logical development of the Cartesian system. We can, therefore, expect to find him to be a supporter of rationalism. And so he is actually; only his rationalism is more systematic and consistent than that of Descartes, which was not completely developed.

Spinoza distinguishes between three kinds of knowledge. First, we get obscure and inadequate knowledge. This is, of course, derived from sense perception and has source in imagination. But this is of the nature of opinion and is not knowledge really so called. We have also adequate mediate knowledge. This is the product of reason. Reason "comprehends the universal essences of things in the particular qualities which these things have in common with all things and understands these necessary and eternal essences in their relation to God's being. Such knowledge is self-evident, its own evidence is with it." ¹ This is clear and adequate knowledge and is wholly derived from reason, and sensation does not contribute anything to it. Spinoza also distinguishes another kind of knowledge, namely, intuitive knowledge, which he calls the highest kind of knowledge from the point of view of certitude. The latter two kinds of knowledge are really

¹ Thilly, *History of Philosophy*, p. 302.

knowledge properly so called and the source of both is reason. Spinoza also shows that sensations not only do not contribute to knowledge, but also are an impediment to the acquisition of knowledge. He characterises imagination as the source of prejudice, illusion and errors, because it loses itself hopelessly in details, and does not grasp the underlying unity of all phenomena.

Leibnitz starts by criticising the view of Locke that there are no innate ideas. He shows that there are two kinds of knowledge. First, there are judgments which are derived from sensations or reached by induction. But he observes, that this kind of knowledge lacks necessity and universality, and, therefore, cannot yield certain knowledge. Sensation or experience is not qualified to give real knowledge. On the other hand, we are conscious that we possess knowledge which is necessary and universal, quite independently of experience. Logic, metaphysics, theology, jurisprudence and, above all, mathematics, according to him, are full of such propositions. These propositions are always derived from principles, which are innate in the mind. The mind may not always be conscious of them, because it is not in the nature of mind to be aware of all its ideas all at once and at a single time. Leibnitz admits that sensations also play a part, but that part simply consists of serving the mind with occasions for perceiving them. At the same time, he is very emphatic in pointing out, that sensations do not produce and create them and that they are essentially the products of the mind. To quote his own words: "The final proof of necessary truth comes from the understanding alone, and the other truths are derived from experiences, or observation of the senses. Our mind is capable of knowing both, but it is itself the source of the former. However numerous the particular experiences we have of a universal truth, may be, we can never be absolutely sure of it by induction, unless we know its necessity through reason." Elsewhere he says: "The

senses can arouse, justify and verify such truths, but do not demonstrate their eternal and inevitable certitude."

We can give one more illustration of this type of rationalism from the Yogāchāra school of Buddhist philosophy. The system is very much comparable to the philosophy of Berkeley. According to it, the existence of an outer world is a fiction. All that we are conscious of are ideas and at the same time, we cannot get beyond them to know if there is anything outside them to cause these ideas. Our knowledge of the external world, so called, consists wholly of ideas. "Does the external object apprehended by us arise from any existence or not? It does not arise from an existence, for what has not come into being has no existence."¹ "Even if objects exist, they become objects of knowledge through ideas which take the form of objects. Since the latter are all we need, there is no necessity to assume external objects."² The Yogāchāra philosophy even goes farther than this. It holds that our experiences are like what we experience in dreams. Just as in dreams we spin out a world, with the help of our previously formed ideas, even so in the waking state we spin out a world guided by instinctive tendencies working inside us, absolutely independent of any external objects. The conclusion, therefore, is drawn that all that there is, is of the nature of ideas (*sarvam buddhimayam jagat*). If that is so, it follows that knowledge has not to depend on sensations or outside objects for its origin, it is originated wholly within and by the mind.

Section 5. Third Stage.

The above illustrations, though brief are exhaustive enough for our purpose. That there have been so many important philosophers to fight for the cause of each of the

¹ Sarvadarsana Sangraha, p. 24.

² Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 625.

rival camps, makes the study all the more interesting. This only demonstrates the truth that both the antagonistic views have elements of truth in them; otherwise, they could not have thriven or could not have attracted so many adherents as they have done. As soon as this idea is realised, the ground is prepared for the transition into the third stage of this great and interesting problem of philosophy.

The importance and truth of both the opposing views being realised, the philosopher cannot now overlook the claims of one and side with the other, for that will appear now a palpably wrong thing to do. A third alternative appears possible to him now, which is not to go over to either party but rather to uphold the claims of both parties. This is not only possible, but very reasonable. Since both types of views have some elements of truth encompassed within them, the question suggests itself: Why is it, then, that they fight? It may be that they are fighting over nothing. The mind, therefore, looks deep into the question and is pleased to find that there is compromise possible between the contending lines of thought. It is this compromise, which brings us to the culminating point in the development of the problem and also gives us its most correct solution, which incorporates elements of both the views in a bond of harmony.

As a matter of fact, the intense fight that has raged on this problem is really based on no fundamental difference. It is practically fight over nothing. It is fight caused by defective partial views taken by the opposing groups. It is engendered by ignorance and absence of fuller vision. The spirit of one-sidedness is so manifest and rampant in the second stage that the philosopher seems to look at only one side of a thing as it were, and as if purposely omits to note points going in favour of the opposing view. His spirit of partisanship would obscure his view. Even if he happens by chance, to notice any point that is favourable to the other

party, he would either explain it away or interpret it in such a manner that it would not contradict his own point of view.

It is thus that we find that there are two types of views in each camp, from the point of degree of onesidedness manifest in them. There is first of all, the most extreme type, which does not observe any fact that supports the cause of the contending school. Then there is the less extreme type that would not refuse to observe points going in favour of the opposing theory, but their loyalty to their own party would make them utilise all the skill and ingenuity they can command, in twisting its interpretations, so as to serve the purpose of their own view. The Lokāyata theory, for example, is an extreme type of empiricism. It believes in sense perception alone and would not admit even the validity of inferences. This type of philosophers is inclined to reject the possibility of knowledge even, so that the claims of mind may not arise at all. Bacon may be placed in the same class, as he thought that all knowledge, except revelations, is wholly derived from sensations. The less extreme form of empiricism seems to have realised the importance of mind, but it is reluctant to admit its claim as a factor of knowledge, by relegating it to an unimportant position and wrongly holding that elements which are really the contributions of mind, are received from sensations. To this class belongs Jainism, which holds that attributes and relationships are perceived directly in the object and the mind has the unimportant function of simply receiving them. Locke seems to hold a similar view and give to the mind a somewhat analogous function to perform, as he derives all innate ideas from sensations. Berkeley may also be put under the same class as he thinks that ideas and relations are received ready-made by the mind. Hume is also a sober type of empiricist. He thinks that ideas and impressions are all received from sensations, but also thinks that the mind does the work of connecting them

in order to build up knowledge, which he however considers an unimportant work.

In the same manner, we can trace two types of views in the rationalist group of thinkers also. Plato, for example, seems to belong to the extreme type of rationalism. He would not admit of any perceptual elements in knowledge. He believes that knowledge is made exclusively of concepts which alone are real and are mental in character. Descartes belongs to the same class, as he rejects altogether the claims of sense-experience in producing knowledge. He thinks that knowledge is the product of mind, working on certain basal principles inherent in the mind, to which he gives the special name of innate ideas. To this same class must also be put the Yogāchāra branch of Buddhist philosophy, though from different considerations. The school considers all reality to be the product of the mind and, therefore, knowledge which is based on reality is also bound to be mental. If there is nothing that is non-mental in character, knowledge is also mental. This reminds one of the empirical theory of Vātsyāyana, which is just the antithesis of this. Vātsyāyana evades the question of the relative contributions of sense experience and mind, as factors of knowledge, by simply describing mind as one of the many senses. He calls the mind the sixth sense, by which we apprehend the inner states of feelings, desires and cognitions. "The relation of knowledge is exactly the same whether the object is an external one like the paper, or an internal one like desire. The object is as directly known in the one case as in the other."¹ Since mind is also a sense organ, all knowledge is derived from sensations or rather knowledge is also of the nature of sensation.

Spinoza illustrates a less extreme form of rationalism. He does admit that sense perception gives us a kind of knowledge, which, however, he considers vague and inadequate.

¹ Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 51.

He holds that knowledge properly so-called is exclusively the work of the mind. Leibnitz in the same manner admits that there may be knowledge based on experience, but says that such knowledge lacks universality and necessity. And, therefore, he concludes that real knowledge is always the product of the mind.

This analysis makes it clear that the claims of each of these opposing lines of thought are irresistible, at least in some points. If we admit the claims of both views on such points as it is proper to admit, we would find that a compromise has been effected and the harmony has been re-established. On the one hand, the claim of empiricism that knowledge is primarily based on sensations seems to be justified. On the other hand again, the claim of the mind that universal ideas and relations are the work of mind, is also equally justifiable. A constructive thinker would, therefore, take the clues from these hints and proceed to effect a compromise by keeping in view these two fundamental facts. There have been such attempts at reconciliation at different ages in the history of philosophy, as we shall before long see.

Section 6. Rational Empiricism.

The Vaishesika system in Indian philosophy seems to make a plausible attempt at reconciliation between the contending schools, and the result it arrives at is very much comparable to the Kantian philosophy. The Vaishesika philosophy applies the term "*Padārtha*" to all objects which can be thought and named. It not only includes all objects experienced outside, but also thinking subjects. These *Padārthas* it classifies into a sixfold system, according to the category applicable to each class. These categories are—substances (*dravya*), quality (*guna*), activity (*karma*), generality (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*). To these a seventh category, non-existence (*abhāva*) is added, but we have little

concern with that at present. In order to exist, a substance must have qualities. Qualities are divisible into two broad classes, according as they exist in a plurality of objects or individuals. The qualities that inhere in a plurality of objects are called generality (*sāmānya*). Again, those that reside in the individual are either permanent, in which case they are called quality (*guna*), or transitory in which case they are called activity (*karma*). Of these categories enumerated above, the Vaisesika philosophy thinks that substance, quality and action have objective existence. But generality, particularity and inherence have no objective existence, but are products of the intellect. Prasastapāda says : " They have their sole being within themselves (*svātmasattam*), have the intellect as their indicator (*buddhilakshanam*), they are not effects (*akāryyatvam*), not causes (*akāranatvam*), have no generality or particularity." These last three categories are again described in Vaisesika philosophy as *Svātmasatta* or existence independent of all beings, as opposed to the other three categories, which are described as *Sattā-sambandha* or subsistence by relation of inherence. Upaskāra further characterises them as having self-sufficient existence, independently of space and time. All these facts go to show that this system has tried to emphasise the fact that these three categories of generality, particularity and inherence are at least wholly the product of the mind and they have no existence in the world of time and space. We should make a note of the change in spirit. The philosopher here is not a blind devotee of either of the two contending lines of thought. As factors of knowledge, it admits of the claims of both. Some categories, according to this system, are derived from perceptual experience, while others are inherent in the mind itself.

In Nyaya philosophy, one of its exponents, Dharmakīrti, seems to have made a more successful endeavour. In his *Nyayabindu*, he gives his views of the origin of knowledge. He distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge, namely indeter-

minate (*Nirvikalpa*) and determinate (*Savikalpa*). Indeterminate knowledge is comparable to what we call perceptual knowledge, vague and indefinite, which has not the characteristic of universality and necessity. This is derived from sensation. But *Savikalpa* knowledge involves conceptual activity and, therefore, the mind has here a function to perform in originating such knowledge. Dharmakīrti thinks that the senses give us objects directly, while names and relations are imposed on them by the mind, in order to lead to determinate knowledge or universal and necessary truths. To mind, therefore, he ascribes the important function of casting certain forms on the material of knowledge which, in this case, is the objects themselves. Dharmakīrti thus seems to have made a very close approach to the Kantian view.

A similar line of thought is also traceable in Sāṅkhya philosophy. Vācaspati in his Sāṅkhya-Tattvakaumudī develops a theory, in which he admits both mind and sense-data as factors in the production of perceptual knowledge. Though this view is opposed by another great exponent of the Sāṅkhya philosophy in the person of Vijnānabhikṣu, it is of special importance to us on account of its bearing on the present subject-matter. In Sāṅkhya philosophy, perception is described as knowledge produced through sense activity. The perception may be either determinate (*Savikalpa*) or indeterminate (*Nirvikalpa*). According to Vācaspati, *buddhi* comes into touch with external objects through the senses. At the first moment of contact, there is an indeterminate consciousness in which the particular features of objects are not noticed and that is how we get indeterminate perception. After that, through the exercise of mental analysis (*vikalpa*) and synthesis (*samkalpa*) the object is perceived as possessing a definite nature and we have determinate perception. We, therefore, find that Vācaspati admits the function of the mind in making determinate perception possible. He is of opinion that pure

sense-data give us only a vague apprehension ; it is after the *manas* (mind) has worked on it that, we get determinate perception. To the mind, therefore, falls the function of arranging up and ordering sense-data, in the form of perception. Here, again, there is the awareness of the broad fact that both mind and sensation are equally necessary in the making of knowledge.

The fact that mind and sensations both are factors of knowledge, did not miss the searching eyes of the great master philosopher, Aristotle, to whom we are indebted for his valuable contributions to the store of our knowledge. It is a marvel to think that he could, in this matter, anticipate Kant, long long before even the German nation had seen the light of the day. It only bespeaks of the greatness of his intellect and the depth of his penetrating insight.

In his *Logic*, Aristotle emphasises the importance of demonstration in proving the truth of judgments. This demonstration is possible by deductive reasoning, by showing that the universal is true of a particular being. It is the objective of science to derive such particular truths from universals. But in order to make that possible, universal judgments have to be discovered and that is done by the inductive method. Induction is thus a necessary preparation for deduction. Our knowledge, thus, always starts with sense perception and rises from particular facts to universal concepts. Truths derived from experience by induction, give us universal judgments and, in that sense, knowledge is impossible without experience. But such truths derived by induction only give us probable knowledge. In order to be universal and necessary, therefore, they must be implicit in the mind. The universal concepts lie dormant in the mind. Experience is necessary to make them actual, to make the mind aware of them. Without experience truth would never be known, without being implicit in reason they would not be certain. Both sensation and mind are, therefore, equally necessary for the

production of knowledge. It is thus that Aristotle reconciles empiricism with rationalism.

We have now come across several views which advocate a reconciliation between these two warring groups. They are all permeated with the central thought that both mind and sense-data contribute to the production of knowledge, both are essential factors of it. Their opinions differ only with regard to the question as to the specific function of these two factors or, in other words, what are the contributions of mind and what are the contributions of sense-data in the production of knowledge. Some say that perceptual knowledge is wholly the work of sense experience, while the help of the mind is necessary only with regard to conceptual knowledge. Others hold other views. They all seem to be vague and to be suffering from an attitude of hesitation, born of absence of clearness of thought. There cannot be two opinions on the problem just stated above, namely, the specific contribution of mind and sensation in the formation of knowledge. It required a great intellect, endowed with a superior order of keenness and intelligence, to analyse this question and give the proper answer to it. For such a man philosophy had to wait for a long long time, till the appearance of Immanuel Kant.

In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant starts by distinguishing between three kinds of judgments, namely, (1) Synthetic Judgments *a-priori*, (2) Analytic judgments *a-priori* and (3) Synthetic judgments *a-posteriori*. He holds that the last class adds to our knowledge, but gives us only problematic truth. Analytic judgments are always *a-priori*, but by their very nature they cannot add to our knowledge. It is only synthetic judgments *a-priori* that add to our knowledge and are also necessary and universal. That such knowledge there is, Kant never doubted. He only prepared himself to answer the question: How are these synthetic judgments *a-priori* possible?

In order to answer this question, we must first of all ascertain what presupposes knowledge. In order to make knowledge possible, there should be a mind, for we cannot think without the mind. Again, unless there is sensibility, we can have no object of knowledge. To make knowledge possible therefore, two factors are necessary, namely sensation or perception on one side and thinking or understanding on the other. "Percepts and concepts constitute the elements of all our knowledge." The original question may thus be divided further into two parts, namely: How is sense perception possible? and how is understanding possible? Kant deals with the first question in the *Transcendental Aesthetic* and the second in the *Transcendental Logic*.

In answering both questions, Kant adopts a special method which is peculiar to himself. From the thing given, he goes to deduce the logical preconditions of it, which make it possible. Thus in answering the question, How is sense perception possible, Kant goes back into it and tries to find out what conditions are presupposed behind it. As he thus follows a regressive method, which goes from a thing conditioned to the factors that condition it, he gives his method the special name of the transcendental method.

Kant applies the transcendental method to the first question. In order to have perception, we must have sensation. Sensation has always to be perceived as coming after certain things or as situated by the side of some other things; in other words, it is to be referred as being in space and time, in order to be a percept. A perception, therefore, presupposes first, sensations and then their arrangement in temporal and spatial order. Sensations are as it were the raw materials, on which the mind, by virtue of the faculty of intuition, imposes the forms of space and time. Space and time are, therefore, the categories which the mind imposes on sensations to make perception possible. They are the categories of perceptual knowledge. We need not describe in detail the proofs Kant

gives in support of his theory, that space and time are *a-priori* forms of the mind and have no real existence apart from the mind.

But mere unrelated isolated perception is not qualified to give us knowledge. Knowledge is a statement of relation and it is only by connecting perceptions in thought, that we can have knowledge. In order to make knowledge possible, therefore, we should have understanding. Understanding thinks in concepts. "We must make our percepts intelligible or bring them under concepts, as well as make our concepts sensible, or give them an object in perception. The understanding by itself, cannot intuit or perceive anything; the senses by themselves cannot think anything. Knowledge is possible only in the union of the two."¹ Knowledge, therefore, is built up by the understanding working on the percepts, as given to it by sense experience. The special function of understanding is, to relate or connect percepts.

Kant finds that the understanding can relate concepts in different forms. And these latter he calls pure concepts or categories of the understanding, as they are not derived from experience. These forms of connecting percept or categories are also forms of judgments, as the various ways of conceiving percepts are also ways of judging. On analysis, Kant finds that there are twelve kinds of such judgments, which may again be divided into groups of three each under the four comprehensive categories of quantity, quality, relation and modality. Under the category of quantity, we get universal, particular and singular judgments. Under the category of quality we get, the affirmative, the negative and the unlimited judgments. Under the category of relation we get the categorical, the hypothetical and the disjunctive judgments. Lastly, under the category of modality we get the problematic, the apodictic and the assertory judgments.

¹ Thilly, History of Philosophy, p. 402.

These categories, Kant holds, are wholly mental in nature; they are not derived from sensations, but are products of the mind. For proof, he shows that without them knowledge would be absolutely impossible. "Without a rational mind that perceives in certain ways (space and time) and judges or thinks in certain ways (categories), that is so organised by nature (*a priori*) that it must perceive and judge as it does, there could be no universal and necessary knowledge of objects of experience." Knowledge is, therefore, produced by the application of those various categories on percepts.

But the question necessarily arises at this stage, how can the categories which are mental in nature be applied to percepts which are sensual? This is possible, says Kant, by another faculty of the mind, which is a sort of mediating idea and helps in bringing about the connection between percepts and categories. This is what he calls the transcendental schema. Since the transcendental schema has to mediate between both sensibility and mind, it has to be of the nature of both; it should be both purely mental and at the same time sensuous. The time-form is both sensuous and pure and is thus the same as the transcendental schema.

To sum up, therefore, knowledge is the outcome of several factors. First of all, there must be a sensation perceived in the temporal and spatial order which gives us percepts. These percepts again are worked on by the mind, by casting certain forms of categories on them, in order to have judgments. Thirdly, this work of imposition of forms on the raw material supplied by percepts, is done by a special faculty of the mind, to which Kant gives the special name of transcendental schema. The mind is, therefore, not a passive agency in the production of knowledge. It has to take upon itself several important functions, such as application of the categories of knowledge to percepts, and also application of the categories of space and time to sensations. The former may be called the categories of conceptual knowledge, as they are the

necessary forms of it, and the latter may in turn be called the categories of perceptual knowledge, as they make such knowledge possible. It is not that sensation has no part to play. It has the important function of supplying materials to the mind, for it to work upon in form of sensations. Sensations, therefore, give us the material of knowledge and mind gives the form. Both are indispensable factors of knowledge, both are equally necessary. "The contents of our knowledge are derived from experience (Empiricism), but the mind thinks its experiences, conceives them according to its *a-priori*, that is, rational, ways (Rationalism)." It is thus a reconciliation of both rationalism and empiricism effected by admitting the rightful claims of both.

Each act of judgment is thus a reconciliation between the universal and the particular, between the one and the many. The mind as one principle has to work on the multiplicity of sensations, to produce the act of knowledge in form of a correct judgment. It is not the mind alone that gives us judgments by spinning them out from within, nor do the sensations alone produce knowledge, for by themselves they would always continue to remain an unwieldy, unorganised mass. In the same manner, all judgments on ultimate analysis are either statements of relations between concepts as in case of universal generalisations, or they are statement of relations between a percept and a concept as in case of judgments about individuals. In short we cannot form judgments without the help of concepts. Concepts, however, are formed from particulars of perceptions. There is need of both particulars and universals in all acts of judgments.

CHAPTER IX

THE SECOND PROBLEM OF THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY : SUBJECT *vs.* OBJECT.

IN THEORY OF REALITY.

The subject and the object. First stage of harmony—Natural Realism : the Vedas, the Physicist philosophers of Greece, the Pythagoreans. Second stage of conflict—Idealism *vs.* Realism. Realistic views—the Lokāyata school, Stoicism, Democritus, Epicurus, Atomism; Idealistic views—Plato, Berkeley, Leibnitz, Lotze, Green, the Upanishads, Saṅkara, early Buddhism the Yogāchāra school of Buddhism. Third stage of re-established harmony—Ideal Realism : Jainism, Nyaya-vaiśeṣika, Purva-mimāṃsa, Descartes, Spinoza, Panpsychism, Aristotle, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel.

Section 1. The Subject and the Object.

We must go back to a former chapter to remember that the second great problem of philosophy, turns on the anti-thesis of the subject and object, both in theory of knowledge and in theory of reality. The treatment of the problem as it appears, in theory of knowledge, we reserve for a later chapter, taking up for the present the problem as it appears in theory of reality.

Subject and object are the two broad forms in which reality presents itself before our eyes. Everybody is aware of the existence of his own mind, an entity that feels, wills and thinks. Again one is equally aware of the existence of objects, hard tangible material things, all round us. Mind finds itself opposed to matter. The one is ephemeral, fleeting, changing, evanescent ; the other is substantial, tangible, static

and enduring. Even within the compass of each individual's experience, this dualism is capable of being felt most intensely. Each individual is constituted of a living organism, which is after all matter, though appearing in an organised and living form. Engrafted to this material body is the wonderful phenomenon of the mind going on, thinking, feeling and willing processes taking place, continuously and unceasingly. So everybody has got to face this dualism of matter and mind, of subject and object. Nobody can shake it off; it is so apparent, it is so manifest. So one has to accept the fact that there are two types of being, namely, the spiritual being and the material being. Matter is not of the nature of spirit and spirit is not what matter is.

The germ of conflict between matter and mind is thus rooted in the very nature of the two realities. It only remains for the mind to develop views in support of the claims of supremacy of mind over body or of body over mind. The conflict is further accentuated by another factor. There is an innate preference in the mind of man for monistic principles, rather than dualistic or pluralistic ones. A natural desire arises, therefore, in the mind of the philosopher to abolish this dualism, in favour of a monistic theory. The easiest way to accomplish this is, to deny the claims of the supremacy of either mind or body and then to support exclusively the claims of only one of them. Resolved into a simple form, the present problem stands like this : Is reality of the nature of mind or is it of the nature of matter ? Philosophers would feel tempted to secure a cheap monism by holding either of these views, that is, by saying that reality is through and through of the nature of mind or that reality is absolutely of the nature of matter. It is thus that the conflict is brought about. But more of this hereafter. Let us first trace the problem from its origin and study its growth.

It may be noted in this connection that the present problem of the nature of being, is the most important problem

in theory of reality. In fact, it is the only problem in the whole field of philosophy which arouses universal interest in the minds of all. The problems of knowledge are too complex and abstract to strike the mind of the ordinary man. Naturally, therefore, the problem of knowledge cannot be expected to interest common people. Even the problem of one or many is not suggested as readily to the mind of the laymen as this present problem of the nature of reality. Everybody feels interested to know the answer of the broad general and universal question : What is the nature of reality, is it material or is it spiritual ? This is also the reason why we find that the earliest philosophers have almost invariably interested themselves in this problem most.

Section 2. The Stage of Harmony : Natural Realism.

What we have said before, principally relates to the problem as it stands in the second stage of its development, which is the stage of conflict. The first stage being a stage of harmony, the mind should not be aware of this conflict. To find out this stage of harmony, we shall have to go back to a stage where the mind is not quite developed, where it has power only just to apprehend objects around it and not to perceive the antagonism between the two conflicting types of reality, already described above. The mind at this stage should not be aware definitely of the existence of mind, as a spiritual being. It may perceive life within itself or life around it,—for hylozoism is a very primitive achievement of mankind, but it cannot be definitely aware of a distinct spiritual being as contrasted with matter. The activities of the mind at this stage are looked upon merely as bodily manifestations of the life within it, they are at most taken as throbs of the inner life. It is only in such a stage that the mind is incapable of understanding mind as a spiritual being as opposed to matter. The child's mind, for example, is in such an

undeveloped state that it cannot understand the contrast between mind and matter, subject and object, self and not-self. It is with the awareness of this distinction that the second stage is brought forth. The first stage of harmony is caused by the absence of such awareness.

If the mind is so undeveloped here, as to be unaware of the contrast between mind and body as different types of being, the conflict completely escapes its notice. That is how the reign of harmony is made possible. The mind at this stage looks upon things and takes them as they appear to be. It goes about and sees objects about, which to it appear as throbbing with life on account of the play of natural forces in them. It has not even the capacity, at this stage, of distinguishing between what is dead and what is living. It cannot differentiate between objects and objects clearly enough. It mixes up promiscuously living matter with dead, thus making it impossible for itself to properly distinguish between living and dead things. Man looks upon himself as an object endowed with life, moving about in the midst of other objects. On the analogy of his own body he reads life in anything that shows activity, be it a living animal or a running stream. Thus, at most, it can discover life in the objects around it. But it is not developed enough to read mind either in itself or in any other living object. Mind is too subtle and too ephemeral to attract its notice. The universe, to the eyes of a man of this type, would thus appear to be composed of objects all round him, objects living and dead, moving and inactive. That is all that he can discern; he cannot differentiate himself as a subject.

To such an attitude of mind we can give the name of natural realism. This is to be distinguished from the realism which we generally oppose to idealism. This realism holds that reality is of the nature of objects or rather matter and the so-called spiritual things are but the modifications of matter. In this case, therefore, there is a distinct awareness of the conflict ;

but in the case of natural realism there is no such awareness. It is a remarkably simple theory, marked by the absence of all complexities and made possible by the undeveloped state of the mind. Just as a stretch of land looks flat and level from a height on an aeroplane and as the aeroplane gets nearer to land, the unevenness of the surface is recognised, in the same manner, in the first stage, the mind remains ignorant of the conflict which manifests itself only when the mind has undergone a certain degree of development.

The Vedas which record the earliest efforts at philosophising by mankind, supply us with a very good illustration of this view. The Vedic philosophy does not seem to be aware of the existence of any spiritual being as opposed to material beings. To the Vedic philosopher the universe is a manifestation of various natural forces, which he designates as various gods and he gives a particular name to each of them. He calls the force that works behind rains and clouds, Indra; he calls the force that manifests itself in winds, Varuna; he calls the force that manifests itself in the Sun, Sabita, and so on and so forth. There is no end of this god-making activity. But nowhere does he take care to point out that these gods are spiritual in nature and not material. In fact, it is the manifestation of force and activity through gross matter, that is perceived by him and impresses his mind. All material bodies appear to him to be the medium of the expression of activity of the gods. He is not yet in a position to differentiate between living and dead matter, not to speak of being able to differentiate between mind and matter, body and spirit. He finds no special reason for looking down upon matter or calling it gross and singing the praises of spirit exclusively. To him the two antagonistic terms mind and matter, do not exist at all.

This natural realism should not be taken as "conceiving things not as the appearance of a subjective or objective mind, but as wholly independent of the mind, and mind as something that has arisen in the evolution of the things

themselves.”¹ What is described in the foregoing quotation as natural realism, is the same as what we may call scientific realism and what we intend to call realism, as opposed to idealism in the second stage of the problem. This presupposes the awareness of the distinction between mind and body, but this is absent in the natural realism we have described above. This realism also speaks of explaining mind and its activities in terms of matter, but in the present case the philosopher does not feel any necessity for making such attempts.

In order to remove all chance of possible misunderstanding, it should also be pointed out, that what we call naïve realism is also different from the theory to which we gave the name of natural realism. Naïve realism is distinctly a theory dealing with the theory of knowledge. It does not come in connection with the theory of being or ontology. It is rather concerned with the question, whether objects can exist independently of the subject. But the present theory seeks to answer the question, what is the nature of reality. It is not developed enough to be able to say that reality is of the nature of spirit or of matter, but only says that reality is constituted by so many objects and they cannot be definitely characterised as material or spiritual.

In Greek philosophy the Ionian “physicists” or nature philosophers, also provide us with good illustrations of this theory of natural realism. Their principal question is “What is the basal stuff of which the world is composed?” This is the same as asking, What is the nature of reality? They always try to get hold of a single principle, and then explain the variety of forms of objects around us, as being the modification or transformation of that primal stuff. Thus Thales declared that water is the stuff from which everything came, which amounts to saying that everything is of the nature of

¹ Thilly, *History of Philosophy*, p. 563.



water. Anaximander came to find that the essence of things is the infinite eternal imperishable substance, by which he meant a boundless space-filling animate mass. It may be noted that he does not commit himself to either pronounced materialism or spiritualism, which is the characteristic attitude of the first stage. His pupil Anaxemenes describes this first principle as air or vapour or mist. All these thinkers believed the primal stuff to be a concrete substance like water or air. But the school of Pythagoras is interesting on account of the fact that it declared number to be the primary principle of all being. The Pythagoreans find that measure, order, proportion and uniform recurrence can all be expressed in terms of numbers. "Without numbers, they reasoned, there can be no such relations and uniformities, no order, no law, hence number must lie at the basis of everything." This is enough for our present purpose and we need not develop in detail the Pythagorean view-point. It may be noted that in contrast with the theory of the "physicist" philosophers, Pythagoras points to an entity as the primal principle which is not a natural object. This only shows that all the philosophers of this group are oblivious of the possible dualism between mind and matter. Their eagerness to find out a primary principle urges them to hold any suitable entity as such principle, irrespective of the fact whether it is of the nature of matter or spirit. Thales and his followers happened to point out a typical class of natural objects as such principle, while the Pythagoreans pointed to a non-material entity as forming the primary principle of all being.

Section 3. Conflict : Idealism vs. Realism.

Let us now go back to the stage with which we began this chapter, namely, the stage of conflict. So long the mind was not aware of the dualism of mind and body. But that state of things cannot continue for long. As soon as the

mind perceives the existence of two principal types of being, its inward urge for a monistic theory impels it to reduce this dualism to a monism, by explaining the whole of reality in terms of only one of these two types of being. Philosophers thus find themselves ranged in two opposing lines of thought. Some think it proper to support the claims of body and, therefore, to maintain that all reality is but the modification of body, spiritual beings not even excepted. In the same manner other philosophers feel themselves justified in supporting the claims of the mind and explaining all reality in terms of mind. All reality, they would declare, is mental in nature, even material bodies also are in their ultimate analysis mental. These views are onesided and when they become opposed to each other we get conflict. This spirit of partisanship has a special part to play. This helps the philosopher in analysing all the good points available in support of his own view and also criticising the defects of the opposite line of thought. It is thus on opposition that each antagonistic theory gathers strength and thrives and develops. Each theory is developed to its fullest capacity of growth and the attacks of the opposing view are tried to be refuted. It is on contradiction, therefore, that the theories thrive. Ultimately, however, it is found out that each theory has its own defects, but again neither of them is absolutely refutable, both having their own sure grounds to stand upon. After the strength of each view is thus measured in the conflict, a remarkable change comes in. When it is proved that neither theory can be vanquished, a sort of change of heart takes place, so to say, in the mind of those fighting philosophers. They feel themselves in a mood to make peace, by admitting the claims of both in such a manner as to maintain harmony between both. That is how we come to the third stage of the problem, where the harmony is re-established. But that is anticipating future thoughts, which will be discussed in their proper place.

The stage of conflict shows an intense feeling of partisanship, manifest in the views of both camps. Each theory is eager to find fault with the opposing theory and to cast aside its claims. The theory that tries to explain everything in terms of matter or body we shall, for the sake of convenience, call realism. This may be justified by the fact that the most characteristic manifestation of objects is in the form of matter. In the same manner the theory that supports the claims of mind as being the one principle of reality may be named idealism, for the most characteristic manifestation of the subject is in the form of ideas. We shall find realism pulling hard at the legs of idealism with a view to taking it off its feet. Idealism in the same manner will be found dealing hard blows on realism. Let us now have illustrations. We shall deal with the views supporting the claims of realism first and then the views coming under idealism.

The Lokāyata system is probably the oldest example of the materialistic theory and, for the matter of that, realism in the present sense. It is older even than Democritus, who was born about 460 B.C., for there is evidence to show that it was existent in India even before Buddha, who flourished in India a hundred years before Democritus. Garbe supports this theory when he says: "several vestiges show that even in the pre-Buddhistic India, proclaimers of purely materialistic doctrines appeared; and there is no doubt that those doctrines had ever afterwards, as they have to-day, numerous secret followers."¹

The Lokāyata system advocates a materialism, which is as pure and simple as the present-day atomistic theory. We can lay bare its views by quotations and references given in books. It believes in the existence of only four kinds of being, which are all material, namely, earth, water, fire, and air, and beyond them it would admit of nothing else. The

¹ Garbe, *The Philosophy of Ancient India*, p. 25.

Prabodhachandrodaya says, according to Lokāyata, "the elements are earth, water, fire and air ; wealth and enjoyment are the objects of human existence. Matter can think. There is no other world. Death is the end of all."¹ From these four elements, the Lokāyata system also derives all life and also conscious phenomena. Like Huxley it holds that thought is a function of matter. The Sarvasiddhāntasārasaṅgraha says: "The *Ātman* is the body itself, which is characterised by such attributes as are implied in the expression, 'I am stout,' 'I am young,' 'I am old,' 'I am an adult,' etc."² That the mind is the same thing as the body, is further corroborated by the fact that the mind is never seen to exist without the body. "Who has seen the soul existing in a state apart from the body? Does not life result from the ultimate configuration of matter."³ Sadānanda speaks of four different schools of materialism, according as they differ with regard to their conception of the soul. According to him, "one school regards the soul as identical with the gross body, another with the senses, a third with breath, and a fourth with the organ of thought. On any view the soul is only a natural phenomenon."⁴

Before taking up materialism proper, by which we mean the atomic theory of present-day science, as founded by Democritus and developed by Dalton and his followers, we shall give one more example of realism from Greek philosophy. This we get in the Stoic system of metaphysics. In their attempt to find out a rational basis for ethics, the Stoic philosophers begin with logic and in natural course take up the question of the origin of knowledge. After enquiry they came to the conclusion that sense perception is the basis of all our knowledge, including the so-called innate ideas. After

¹ Prabodhachandrodaya, Act II.

² Sarvasiddhāntasārasaṅgraha, II, 6.

³ Prabodhachandrodaya, Act II.

⁴ Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 280.

this observation, they further came to the conclusion that there are two principles which cause the existence of things, namely, a principle that acts, moves and forms and a principle that is acted on and moved and formed, that is to say, an active and a passive principle. They further hold that these two principles are not separate entities but are united. Bodies alone answer to this, for they are both force and matter and, therefore, it follows that all existence is corporeal. But this corporeality may have degrees, as for example, gross matter is coarse, while force is made of a finer stuff. "Everything in the world is corporeal, the human soul and God included. Even qualities are corporeal, consisting of a pneumatic substance, which is a mixture of fire and air and making each particular object what it is. Fire and air are active elements, the principles of life and mind, water and earth are passive elements, as such inert and lifeless, clay in the hands of the potter."¹

The above realism does away with the dualism of mind and matter in a rather ingenious manner. It reduces all being ultimately to bodies, and bodies may be coarse or finer. It recognises the difference between mental activities and gross matter but reduces it to a difference in degree only. Thus it says that while matter, pure and simple, is coarse, force is of a finer stuff. In the same strain, it would argue that mind is after all a finer kind of matter.

At this stage it has become necessary to remove an ambiguity, which is the result of using the term "realism" in various senses in philosophy. For obviating any grounds for future misunderstanding, the ambiguity should be cleared up here.

The term "realism" has been definitely used in three different senses in philosophy. In early Greek Philosophy "realism" stood for the view that ideas or universals alone are

¹ Thilly, *History of Philosophy*, p. 108.

true, as held by Plato. This view is opposed to the theories of conceptualism and nominalism and has no antagonism with idealism. The philosophers of the mediæval age also used the term in this sense.

The term may again be used, as a particular view-point in theory of knowledge. As such, it tries simply to answer the question, whether objects can exist without and independently of the subject. Its reply to this question is, that objects can and do exist independent of and without the help of the mind. It does not, however, concern itself with the further question whether minds can exist without objects or they have to depend on objects for their existence. At most, it makes the object independent and free of the subject, but does not plead for the absolute supremacy of the object. This is the usual sense in which the term is ordinarily used in philosophy. All the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy, namely, the Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Purva Mīmāṃsā, with the solitary exception of the Vedānta are realists in this sense. Jainism also preaches realism of this kind. They all admit the possibility of separate and independent existence of both subject and object, matter and mind, independently of each other. Descartes may in this sense be called a realist and so also Spinoza, because both of them admit of the separate and independent existence of the mind-substance and the matter-substance. It is in this sense also that the group of American and English philosophers who style themselves new realists including Bertrand Russel, Marvin, Ladd and others, may be called realists.

Realism may also be used in a third sense, according to which it pleads for the absolute supremacy of the object, in its antagonism with the subject. Here, it goes a step further than the realistic view described immediately above. It does not remain satisfied with only saying that objects

can exist independently of the subject ; but also attempts to explain the subject in terms of the object, thus making the subject dependent on the object. It is realism carried to the extreme. This thoroughgoing consistent realism is the same as materialism, as preached by present-day scientists. In the present discussion we mean to use the term realism in this third sense when it is identical with materialism. We would, therefore, give here examples of such theories only, as would try to establish the complete supremacy of matter or objects over mind or the subject. We have already noted above, that Realism in the second sense is more concerned with theory of knowledge, than with theory of reality. Thilly, in his *History of Philosophy*, defines Natural Realism as, "conceiving things not as the appearances of subjective and objective mind, but as wholly independent of mind, and mind as something that has arisen in the process of the evolution of the things themselves." This definition does not clearly state whether, according to this theory, mind is to be looked upon as a product of matter or dependent on matter. But the implication means probably to say that. If that is so, we need only to add that this is the same sense in which we want to use the term realism, in our discussions.

• Section 4. *Atomism.*

The theory of atomism or materialism appears to be the strongest rival of idealism, inasmuch as it has the support of the present-day empirical sciences. The history of atomism goes back to early Greek philosophy. Even such early philosophers as Empedocles and Anaxagoras may be said to have paved the way for atomism, by propounding materialistic theories. Let us trace the history.

Atomism proper really starts from the school of Abdera of which Leucippus and Democritus are said to be the



founders. These early atomists held that non-being is as much real as being. This non-being they identified with empty space which they said, is not corporeal but still exists. The conception of empty space is a necessary element in their philosophy as, otherwise, their theory of a plurality of beings separated from one another by empty spaces cannot be possible. Each of these separate beings is an atom which is indivisible, impenetrable and simple. These atoms are not different in quality, but differ only in shape, size and weight. They are eternal and have always been what they are at present. This atomic theory differs from the present theory in several points. They are not geometrical points, as at present assumed, but are believed to have extension. Moreover, since they are said to be indivisible, we have to suppose that there cannot be empty spaces inside them, contrary to the theory of the present-day atomists, who suppose that an atom is made up of separate electrons moving about in space.

The atomists then build up the entire universe, in all its multitudinous details, with the help of these atoms and empty spaces. All bodies are combinations of atoms and spaces. Bodies differ, because atoms constituting them differ not in quality, but in extension, weight, etc. Interaction between atom and atom is possible by direct contact or by emanations moving from one body and striking another. The evolution of the astral bodies is explained as due to the difference in the weight of atoms, lighter ones flying up and forming the heavens and stars and heavier ones forming the earth. The soul is also explained as a combination of these atoms. "The soul is composed of the finest, roundest, most nimble and fiery atoms which are scattered over the entire body—there being always one soul atom between two other atoms—and which produce movements of the body."¹ So everything is explained in terms of

¹ Thilly, History of Philosophy, p. 31.

the atom, mental or spiritual beings included. This is characteristic of materialistic atomism.

In the philosophy of Epicurus we find an echo of all these thoughts and we may, therefore, justifiably call Epicureanism a continuation of materialistic atomism, in so far as the metaphysical portion goes. The main interest of Epicurus is morality; nevertheless, he thought it necessary to cover the grounds of logic and metaphysics as preliminary studies. In logic he comes to the conclusion that all knowledge, to be true, must be based on sense perception, even knowledge of universals included. It, therefore, follows that sense perception is the only source of knowledge. Sensations give us only material bodies and, therefore, material bodies alone are real. Material bodies cannot exist by themselves, they must have a container, which is empty space or non-being. These material bodies are composed of elements which are small particles of matter called atoms and are physically indivisible, indestructible and unchangeable. Like Democritus the whole world is then explained in terms of these atoms, differences of bodies being accounted for as due to differences in the size, shape, weight and relation of atoms. The soul is explained as material in nature; if it were not so, it could not have participated in any act in the material world. We thus find that Epicurus accepts the atomistic metaphysics *in toto*, without almost adding anything new to it.

The atomic theory received its present completed form and shape in the hands of the nineteenth century physicists, beginning from Dalton. The history of the development of this theory is too well known to be repeated here. As it stands at present, it accepts the principles of the old Greek atomism with some modifications necessary to give it a scientific form. It finds that all reality is divisible into certain units of matter, which are not further divisible. These material particles as we get them in the last analysis

of matter, are called atoms. These atoms are of various kinds and each kind accounts for one of the elements in chemistry, and is the basic principle on which the theory of elements is based. This is so, because of the peculiar structure of atoms. Each atom is like a solar system in miniature, in which there is a central part called the ion and one or more peripheral parts called electrons. The electrons move round the ion at a great speed, even as the planets move round the sun and, thus, give the atom the shape of an integral unit. Now, the difference between atom and atom is, with regard to the number of electrons that each class of atom is provided with. The atom of the element of Hydrogen has just one electron and no more, and that is why Hydrogen is the lightest of all atoms. In contrast with this there are other atoms which are provided with as many as 80 to 90 electrons in them, as for example, Helium or Radium. This is how the division of matter into elements is sought to be explained. Elements, again, can combine with one another and, from such combinations, we get such chemical compounds as water or salt. Water is believed to be a compound of the elements of Hydrogen and Oxygen, and salt a compound of Sodium and Chlorine. These facts are too commonplace to be explained in detail. Suffice it to say, that the whole physical universe is explained by the atomists with the help of elements and their compounds. So far it is all right, but scientific atomism advances still further. It makes bold to say that even psychical and mental processes also are either the product of matter or are the same as matter. These phenomena are accounted for wholly by and through matter, leaving no room whatsoever for idealistic philosophy. The special arguments advanced in favour of this theory that mind is also explicable by matter are as follows.

All mental phenomena presuppose a corresponding disturbance in the material particles of the nervous system.

Thus, when we hear a bell ring, the air wave proceeding from the sounding bell strikes the drum in the ear and this vibration of the drum is carried to the brain, in form of nerve impulses, by means of an intricate arrangement. Every bodily movement in a living body can thus be accounted for by physical causes or, rather, by physical antecedent events and one need not depend on the mind for that. All physical effect must have a physical cause. Comparative anatomy seems to support this view. There is a correspondence between the complexity of the nervous system of an organism, with the possession of higher mental powers. Man is the most intelligent of all animals, and we also find that he has the biggest of brains on comparative basis. This is also confirmed by pathological experiments. For example, an injury to the brain produces a corresponding lessening of capacities of the mind. A serious attack of typhoid often permanently impairs the mental capacities of a man. In old age, diminution of mental activities is accompanied by degeneration and waste of the brain matter. Cosmological reflections also favour this view. Life was rather late in making its appearance in the world. Before life there was a time when matter used to exist alone and there may come a time, when life will cease to be, and yet matter will continue to exist. "As a loaf of bread is covered with a coating of mildew, with a world of living plants, so our earth is at any given moment of its long development, covered with a world of living organisms; and among them man appears as a variation of these forms. After a brief bloom, this world sinks back again into the nothingness from which it came. One thing alone remains: eternal matter and the laws of its motion."¹

We need not stop here to inquire into the validity of the claims of materialism. We reserve it for treatment later, after we shall have enumerated the theories supporting

the claims of idealism. As we shall have to ascertain the relative merits of these opposing lines of thought, this arrangement will be more convenient. .

Section 5. Idealism.

Let us now deal with the views of idealistic philosophers. Let us see how they put their case, as against realism. The central theme of idealism is that all reality is explicable in terms of mind ; in other words, reality is wholly of the nature of spirit or mind, according to it. It will be also found to be equally obstinate, in refusing the claims of matter as being any part of reality.

There is a long line of philosophers, in the history of both Indian and European philosophy, who have supported the theory of idealism. This speaks of the intense popularity and attractiveness of idealism, as a philosophical theory. It is still a moving force in the current of philosophical thought. This is so because of the surer basis it supplies to the philosopher, for construction of a system. It is marked that all that is material is constantly subject to change and decay. This subjection to destruction made an unfavourable impression against the material world of fleeting phenomena, in the mind of the thinker. He was naturally drawn away from it, thinking it to be an unsuitable ground for the construction of a philosophical system. The philosopher looked for a static something which would abide in all changes, something that is not touched by the rough hand of death, but is eternally existing. It is the time-old search for the noumenon in philosophy, the philosophical mirage that has waylaid many a bewildered thinker. It is on these grounds that Plato considered the particulars unreal and unsubstantial and finding universals to be eternally existing, proclaimed that they alone are real. It is this love for a

statical abiding reality, again, that made Sankara interpret the world of phenomena as a degeneration of reality, as a false mask of the true real Absolute. We shall thus find that most idealistic philosophers start with a prejudice against the material world.

In Greek Philosophy, Plato was the first philosopher to definitely plead for the cause of idealism. After being drawn away from sense perception, on the belief that it gives us fleeting changing appearance only, Plato comes to find that genuine knowledge consists of relationships between concepts or universal ideas. These universal ideas, according to him, are not derived from particular objects given by sensation, but they lie dormant within the mind. Since knowledge is correspondence of thought with reality, there must be some reality with which it is to correspond. This cannot be the objective phenomenal world, as concepts have no resemblance with them. Plato, therefore, posits a third world, constituted by universals, as the world of reality. This world of universal ideas is something permanent, unchangeable and eternal. This world of ideas is not a rule of chaos, but is a well-ordered system, where ideas are inter-related and connected in organic unity. They are also arranged in logical order and are subsumed under the highest idea of all, which is the idea of the good.

In order to account for the changing phenomenal world, Plato brings in a third principle, which was later designated as matter. It is the raw material upon which the real ideas are somehow impressed and that accounts for whatever semblance of reality the fleeting phenomenal world may possess. "Nature owes its existence to the influence of the ideal world on non-being or matter. As a ray of light passed through a prism is broken into many rays, so the idea is broken into many objects by matter." The admission of matter as a third principle, for explaining the world of phenomena, does not necessarily change the character of Plato, as

an idealistic thinker. He always puts his emphasis on the mind side and explains that ideas, which alone constitute reality proper, are of the nature of mind. The world of matter he degrades to an unimportant and secondary position. His philosophy is very well comparable to the philosophy of Sankara. Both of them look upon the world of phenomena as a mere appearance, which distorts reality proper. The factor which brings about this distortion, according to Plato, is non-being or matter and according to Sankara, *Avidyā* or absence of true knowledge. There is a remarkable parallelism between these two systems. If the Vedānta of Sankara is idealistic—and nobody doubts that it is—we may then call with equal force Platonic realism idealistic. "It is idealistic or spiritualistic, in so far as it makes mind the parallel principle of things and matter a secondary principle. In any case, it is thoroughly anti-materialistic and anti-mechanistic."¹

From Plato we have to take a long jump covering about two millenniums, before we come across another case of thoroughgoing idealism, in European philosophy. This second great champion of idealism is George Berkeley.

Berkeley accepts the Lockian view of the origin of knowledge and utilises it to his own purpose. Unlike other cases, he starts as an empiricist and ends as an idealist. Since sense perception is the only source of our knowledge, all that we can get is only ideas and their mental images. This idea of Berkeley occupies the same position as what we call sense data in philosophy. Even the reality of universal ideas he would not admit. Universal ideas according to him exist only in names. "An idea which considered in itself is particular, becomes general, by being made to present or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort." In order to be known, these ideas must have a perceiving subject.

¹ Thilly, History of Philosophy, p. 66.

This perceiving active agency is mind or spirit and it is thus the principle, which makes the existence of ideas possible. To exist, therefore, is to be perceived. To say that things exist when there is no perceiving mind, is to take up an absurd position. Bodies, therefore, depend on mind for their existence. This fact will be evident when we analyse the essence of bodies. Bodies are said to be substances having qualities. Of these qualities some are secondary, as they are said to be caused by the agency of the mind and others, which inhere wholly in the substance, are called primary, such as weight, size, etc. But Berkeley holds that these primary qualities are as much secondary, as secondary qualities. These primary qualities as well are brought to the mind through sensations. The material substances, he therefore concludes, are an abstraction. Sense data or ideas are inactive and, therefore, they cannot be the cause of sensations. It appears that we can make or unmake certain ideas at our will. But there are other ideas which are forced upon us, as when we perceive an object. These ideas, therefore, cannot exist in me, but exist in an external mind which is God's mind. The world of objects is thus nothing but a well ordered system of ideas existing in the mind of God, which God arouses in our mind, in proper pre-arranged order. Those ideas which are imprinted on us by God, are called real things and those contained in our own minds only, are called images or ideas of things. Minds and their ideas, therefore, give us a complete explanation of the whole of the universe. The material world is also a system of ideas existing in the mind of God. Matter need not be called for help in accounting for this universe. This is a very extreme form of idealism indeed !

Leibnitz supplies us with an equally pure form of idealism, making a wholesale denial of the claims of materialism. In common with the materialists, he believes in the existence of a multiplicity of beings. He is equally pluralistic like them. But, unlike them, he believes that these units are not

of the nature of matter, as the materialist would have us believe, but are spiritual in nature.

Leibnitz puts emphasis on the dynamic character of all substance. He, therefore, comes to find that force and not extension is the essential attribute of a body. This force precedes all extension. Space is, therefore, conceived by him as the harmonious co-existence of force; space is, therefore, not absolute. If we analyse a body, we shall find that it is composed of a plurality of simple forces. This force is called by him monad. He points out that it is not a physical point, as it is a more primary thing than space, nor is it a mathematical point, for it has actual reality. These monads are eternal. They are spiritual points. An organic body has a "queen monad" in it, which serves as the guiding principle for the monads surrounding it. Inorganic bodies consist of a mere mass of monads. Monads cannot communicate with one another. They are described as "windowless," shutting off all chances of connection with the outside. Knowledge is made possible by the fact that every monad has the power of perception. Every monad perceives or expresses the entire universe, though without actually coming in contact with the universe. All monads are thus, a microcosm, "a living mirror of the universe." "Everybody feels everything that occurs in the entire universe, so that anyone who sees all, could read in each particular thing that which happens everywhere else, and, besides, all that has happened and will happen, perceiving in the present that which is remote in time and space." It is in this manner that Leibnitz accounts for the whole universe, with the help of a multiplicity of spiritual units, which he calls monads. Analogically, these monads occupy the same position in his system as atoms in materialistic philosophy. For a materialistic atomism he thus substitutes a spiritual atomism so to say.

Lotze also, in his own way, builds up an extreme idealistic view. He wants to demonstrate that the phenomenal world,

as it is presented to us, is wholly a product of the subject. The thing in itself supplies the stimulus, and on that the subject builds up sensations and perceptions, which account for the whole of the phenomenal world. It remains for us to ascertain, therefore, what is the nature of this thing in itself, which supplies the mind with the necessary stimulus, as the basis for the construction of the phenomenal world. He argues that this thing in itself possesses the capacity for remaining the same in all changes ; it has the capacity to maintain unity in multiplicity. In the soul also we find such unity in variety, persistence in change and development. Since mind is the only reality which we are directly aware of, and since it possesses the same characteristic as the thing in itself, it may, on this ground, be safely concluded that the thing in itself is also of the nature of mind. The stimulus or sense data, which is the basis of all objective existence, being also spiritual in nature, the objective world is wholly mental or spiritual. This is confirmed by the fact that there is unity and organisation in gross matter also.

The degree in which such unity and organisation is perceptible in nature, shows the degree of its reality as well. Thus the human mind representing the highest stage of self-consciousness in the scale of mental life, shows the greatest amount of unity and organisation and is thus the highest representation of reality. But mental life is equally discernible in less clearly conscious modes of existence and even in gross forms of matter.

Green also evolves a kind of idealism which is somewhat analogous to that of Lotze. He wants to prove that the world of nature also is mental or spiritual in composition. He finds that nature is manifold and yet there is some sort of unity in it. This unity in plurality, this organisation in the midst of seeming chaos, is possible only because there is a consciousness working behind it, for it is in consciousness alone that we get order and system. By

analogy with human consciousness, therefore, we will have to interpret nature as a spiritual organisation, as a system of related facts worked out by an eternal intelligence. The very existence of a well-organised system in nature, points to the fact that there is such an all-unifying consciousness. Nature is thus, shown to be the expression of an all-embracing intelligence. What we call nature, therefore, is also spiritual in composition. In man also we find that there is a spiritual principle, which renders knowledge possible for him. This is to be taken as but a reproduction of the universal intelligence. Mere succession of sensations does not give us knowledge. Unless there is a self to organise these sensations into percepts and concepts, knowledge is not possible. The unifying principle, therefore, is wholly spiritual.

We have enumerated so many examples of idealism. We may have noticed in this connection that idealism usually takes two forms. The opposition of realism against idealism may be removed in two possible ways. We may, firstly, deny altogether the existence of what the realist would call the object or matter, which is the stronghold of realism. In that case, one has to account for the universe wholly and exclusively with the help of the subject. This is subjective idealism. We get an example of this in the philosophy of Berkeley. Arguing on the lines of Locke that sensations alone give us knowledge of things outside the mind, he comes to the conclusion that the essence of existence is perception. From that he argued that since we come in contact with ideas and images alone, they alone exist and we need not concern ourselves about the existence of any outside objects. He thus shuts himself within the narrow limits of subjectivism and would not grant even the existence of an object. Again one may admit the existence of objects and then interpret them as composed, not of matter, but mind and thus defend oneself against the attacks of realism. It is after all very difficult to account for the totality of reality, without the help of

objects altogether. The need is, therefore, felt for bringing it in. In order to keep intact the position of idealism however, it is dogmatically maintained that objects exist, but they are not different from mind. They are also mental. This is less extreme than the Berkeleian point of view in its attitude towards realism. Because these philosophers admit the reality of objects, but read mind in them, they are called objective idealists. Philosophers like Leibnitz and Lotze are thus objective idealists. The position of subjective idealism in short is this: Objects do not exist, all that exists is the subject and its ideas. Objective idealism as contrasted to this, will say: Subjects exist as well as objects; subjects are spiritual in nature and so are objects also.

The enumeration of the various schools of idealism will remain incomplete, unless we refer to some of the important idealistic views of Indian philosophy also. We shall start with the idealism as preached in the Upanishads.

In the Upanishads, we find two strong currents of thought, which distinctly lean towards idealism. First of all, there is a tendency always to demonstrate the superiority and dominance of the subject over the object, suggesting thereby that objects are dependent on the subjects for their existence. Thus, in the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad we find Jāṇnavalkya saying about the *ātman*, "When then he sees not yet is he seeing, although he sees not, since for the seer there is not interruption of seeing because he is imperishable; but there is no second beside him, no other distinct from him, for him to see."¹ In the same book it is mentioned elsewhere that "when the sun has set, when the moon has set and when the fire is put out, the self alone is his light."² In the Māndukya Upanishad also we find a confirmation of the above views. It proposes to analyse the whole of reality into four distinct stages of being. First, there is the stage of ordinary con-

¹ Brihadāranyaka, IV. 3. 23.

² Brihadāranyaka, IV. 3. 6.

sciousness, when the mind is awake. Second, there is the stage of sleep undisturbed by dreams, when the soul does not perceive any object. Last of all, there is the fourth stage of the soul, which is a pure intuitional consciousness, when there is no knowledge of objects, external or internal. The subject in the last stage exists alone without any object. The subject does not thereby lose its characteristic as a subject for, "for the seer there is no interruption of seeing as the subject is imperishable" as taught by Jāṇnavalkya.

The second great point of emphasis for the Upanishads, is the fact that the soul is the basis of all reality. This fact is repeated again and again in the preachings of the Upanishads. Thus, "he who sees all objects inside the *ātman* and sees the *ātman* in all objects, from him reality cannot remain hidden."¹

This *ātman* is an active universal consciousness on which the whole reality is based. "The moon and the sun are its eyes, the four quarters of the sky its ears, the wind its breath."² This *ātman* contains all consciousness of objects, implicitly within itself. This infinite *ātman* in us, is all-embracing and includes everything that is in the universe. "This self, which embraces all, is the sole reality, containing within itself, all the facts of nature and all the histories of experience. Our small selves are included in it and transcended by it."³ There may be a stage when the absolute self alone exists. This is possible, when the objective world would become submerged in the universal subject. Only when there is a sense of dualism can objects exist. But when this duality is removed—for, after all, this duality is a seeming one and not real,—and the self is grasped in its true being, the whole of the objective world vanishes. To quote the words of Yāṇnavalkya: "When there seems to be a duality, then one sees another,

¹ Isa, 5.

² Mundaka, I, 1.

³ Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 158.

one smells another, one tastes another.....but when the whole of it becomes subject alone, then who will see whom, who will smell whom, who will taste whom.....who will know the great knower? ”¹ The soul is thus propounded to be the only reality in the universe.

Sankara's philosophy being mainly based on the Upanishads, is also thoroughly idealistic. Sankara does not deny the relatively enduring framework of the external world. He is no believer in subjective idealism and denies the correctness of the theory, which says that perceptible objects are merely ideas in the mind of somebody. “We are compelled to admit objects outside our knowledge (*upalabdhi*). For, no one knows the column or the wall as a mere form of knowledge, but everyone knows the column and the wall as objects of knowledge.” An object cannot be explained away, as being due to the mental activity of perception for, really speaking, it is the object that causes the mental activity. Mere presence to an individual consciousness is not the essence of existence of an object. “Even metaphysically, as we shall see, Sankara is obliged to posit an object, for consciousness is mere knowing or awareness.”² The need for a substratum for objects independent of the mind is thus strongly felt by Sankara. Having conceded this much, he does not, however, concede the further point that these objects are of the nature of matter or something non-mental. He would interpret them as being mental in nature. Objects do not exist for themselves. It is the universal spirit, which creates them and is a continuous percipient of them. All that there is, is contained and sustained in the universal consciousness. If we would look deeply into what appears as object, we will find it mental through and through. “When the individual awakes to life, breaks down the contracting

¹ Brihadāranyaka, IV, 5, 15.

² Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 497.

upādhis, which limit his vision, he will realise that the whole world is filled with *ātman* inside and out, even as the water of the sea is filled with salt."¹ This *ātman*, which encompasses within its folds, both subjects and objects and all that is in this universe, is characterised by Sankara as being of the nature, '*Nirvishesa-chinmōtram*' or undifferentiated consciousness alone. This consciousness is self-luminous, is pure awareness which is also, "the supreme principle in which there is no differentiation of knower, knowledge and known, infinite, transcendent, the essence of absolute knowledge."² In his *Bhāṣya* to the *Brahma Sutra*, Sankara again observes that "the *ātman* is throughout nothing but intelligence; intelligence is its exclusive nature, as the salt taste is of the lump of the salt."³ As the sun shines even when there is nothing for it to shine on, so the *ātman* has consciousness even when there is no object.⁴ These statements have a striking similarity with the passages of the *Upanisads* quoted immediately before. Sankara seems to subscribe to the same view as that of *Jajnavalkya*, which holds that *ātman* is out and out a perceiving consciousness, a subject,—which characteristic does not cease to exist, even when there are no objects to be perceived at all (*na hi drastur drister biparilopo vidyate abināshitvāt*).⁵ Sankara's views are, thus, a continuation of the views of the *Upanishads* and he is thus a thoroughgoing idealist.

The philosophy of Buddha, as it was preached by the great seer himself, is as we have already seen a philosophy of becoming. It substitutes a series of becomings to represent a being. It does not, therefore, directly tackle the question, whether this becoming of the world is of the nature of matter

¹ Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 498.

² *Vivekachūḍāmaṇi*, p. 239.

³ *Sankara-Bhāṣya*, III, 2.16.

⁴ *Sankara-Bhāṣya*, II, 3.18.

⁵ *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, IV, 3.23.

or mind. It of course, paints this world of becoming as a continuous flow simply, which is non-entity (*nisattā*) and soullessness (*nijjiva*). It is all the working of *dhamma* or grouping of conditions. There are, however, statements in the teachings of Buddha, which indirectly point to the fact that he wanted to paint this phenomenal world of becoming, as being the product of the subject alone. There are references, which seem to give an idealistic interpretation of the objective world.

It is said that the world of objects is the product of the individual subjects. It is the individual subject that causes the world of objects. Thus the question is put: "Where no more is there earth or water or fire or wind? Where are dissolved both long and short, large and small, good and bad? Where are subject and object wholly remainderless melted away?" Buddha's answer to this is: "By the undoing of consciousness wholly remainderless, all is melted away."¹ Again, Buddha says, "Verily, I declare unto you, that with this very body, mortal as it is, and only a fathom high, but conscious and endowed with mind, is the world, and the waxing thereof and the waning thereof and the way that leads to the passing away thereof."² The individual consciousness is thus the sole factor of the production of this world of experience.

This same view is reiterated in the exposition of the doctrine of *Pratītyasamutpāda* or the Doctrine of Dependent Origination. It explains the factors by which man becomes bound to the wheel of life, which is suffering and, again, how it is possible for man to free himself from the bonds of life and thus attain *nirvāna*. It gives us the series of factors, which first bring man into this life of suffering and then gives the course of conduct to be adopted for his escape from this life of

¹ Dahlke, *Buddhist Essays*, p. 310.

² *Udāna*, VIII, 3.

suffering. We would not give a detailed exposition of the view and, as our purpose demands, we shall limit ourselves to a reference only to those factors, which entail suffering on man.

The Mahāvagga says : “ Then the Blessed One during the first watch of the night, fixed his mind upon the chain of causation, in direct and in reverse order : “ From ignorance, spring *samskāras*, from the *samskāras* springs consciousness, from consciousness spring name and form, from name and form spring the six provinces meaning the six senses of eye, ear, nose, tongue, touch and mind, from the six provinces springs contact, from contact springs sensation, from sensation springs thirst, from thirst springs attachment, from attachment springs becoming, from becoming springs birth, from birth springs old age and death, grief, lamentation, suffering, dejection and despair.”¹ Of all these factors of the misery of suffering man, we may take notice of the first three factors. The first factor is *avidyā* or ignorance, which is the cause of the ego sense of man, making him think himself as apart from the rest of existence. The second factor, called *samskāra*, probably means a strong over-powering desire, which causes a man to be born. It is synonymous to the will to live, as described by Schopenhauer. The subject-matter of this will may change and *samskāra* may be for the abolition of all desires, that is for the attainment of *nirvāna*. The Majjhima Nikāya explains *samskāra* thus :—“ It happens, my disciples, that a monk.....communes thus within himself. Now then could I, when my body is dissolved in death, obtain rebirth in a powerful, princely family. He thinks this thought, dwells on this thought, cherishes this thought. These *samskāras* and internal conditions which he has thus cherished within him and fastened, lead to his rebirth in such existence. This, disciples, is the avenue, the path which leads to rebirth in such an existence.” Now, the third factor

¹ Mahāvagga, 1. 1. 1.

in this wheel of causation, namely, consciousness, is the most important thing for our consideration. Great emphasis has been laid on this third factor. It is held to be the progenitor of the world of phenomenon, appearing in a plurality of beings having name and form. The Mahānidāna Sutta tries to impress the above idea in the following manner: "If consciousness, Ananda, did not enter into the womb, would name and form arise into the womb?" "No, Sir." "And if consciousness, Ananda, after it has entered into the womb, were again to leave the place, would name and form be born into this life?" "No, Sir." "And if consciousness, Ananda, were again lost to the boy or to the girl, while they were yet small, would name and form attain growth, increase and progress?" "No, Sir." The idea is, that this consciousness persists from one life to another and is the cause of the budding forth of multiplicity, constituting the world. It is the subject, therefore; that is the cause of the objects also; the supremacy of the subject is thus established beyond all shadows of doubt.

This idealistic phase in the thoughts of early Buddhism, was accepted and elaborated in the Yogāchāra school of later Buddhism. The idealism that it preaches is of a more thoroughgoing type and stands comparison with that of the Berkeleyan system.

The Yogāchāra Philosophy propounds the theory that there is only one homogeneous reality, which is consciousness or *vijnana*. The whole world is of the nature of consciousness, it says (*sarvam buddhimayam jagat*). The whole reality is founded on our thoughts, it is made up of our thoughts. This consciousness does not depend on external objects, but is self-subsistent. The Yogāchāra view is, on account of this, called the *Nirālambanavāda*. The whole system of facts constituting the objective world is stored up within each individual consciousness. This vast storehouse of facts is *ālaya*. It is something comparable to the world of reals, as

imagined by Plato, and the world of ideas in God's mind, as contemplated by Berkeley. Every individual has within him this great tank of knowledge, of which, he can be aware only a fragment. This *ālayavijnāna* or sum total of all possible conscious states is the permanent background of all ideas and feelings common to all individual minds. This is the only reality existing. Individual experiences are only phases of this *ālaya*. It thus accepts thought as the sole basis of all reality. The appearance of the objective world is explained as due to the positing of another thought, as its object. Thought itself appears as object due to modification of consciousness. "What is of the nature of consciousness is indeed indivisible, but by those whose vision is confused, it seems to be, as it were, differentiated into the perceived object, the perceiving subject and the perception itself."¹ Thought, thus, contains everything within itself. It sees an object only when it thinks itself to be its own object.

The Yogāchāra philosophy adopts the same arguments as those of Berkeley, in demolishing the position that extra-mental objects can exist. For perceiving an object, we need not necessarily have an object. All that we come in contact with are only ideas. So, even if objects exist, we can become aware of them only through ideas. All the qualities of objects we know, are subjective. Since all that we know is thus reducible to mere ideas, we are not in need of assuming the existence of objects, outside of mind. We can explain the objective world around, as caused by mental operations within. Outer objects are non-existent; they are merely mental ideas or experiences arising in an established order. This clearly manifests the Berkeleyan spirit. Thus the *Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha* says: "Is the external object a simple atom or a complex body? It cannot be the latter, for we do not know whether it is part or whole that is apprehended. It cannot be an atom, since

¹ *Sarva-Siddhānta-Sāra-Sangraha*, III, 2'4.



it is supersensible." It is almost like saying that the essence of existence is in perceptibility, and since objects are never apprehended directly by us, and all that we come in contact with is only ideas, we need not grant the existence of extra-mental objects.

Section 6. The Third Stage of Reconciliation.

We have given examples, above, of extreme forms of realism and idealism. We have noticed that in this stage of conflict, the spirit of partisanship is very intense. The two opposing groups have tried their best to fight against each other, with utmost zeal and persistency. Each group is equally serious in proving the wholesale superiority of its own views. Materialism has tried to explain the whole of reality in terms of matter and idealism has, in the same manner, tried to explain reality in terms of mind only. In these attempts, it may have been noticed that, to a certain extent, the position of each view is unassailable. That there are material and extended bodies existing outside and independently of mind, seems to be correct. Idealism found it a hard task to explain it in terms of the unit and, after all the attempts so far made, does not seem to have met with very much success. In the same manner, materialism has also been extreme and narrow. It would explain reality exclusively in terms of matter. So far as the physical aspect of reality is concerned, its endeavour on the whole appears to be successful. It is in explaining mind also in terms of matter, that it comes in contact with hard ground. If we take up this view, it would appear that both views are correct in some respects, but one-sided and incorrect in some other respects. Before we draw up this conclusion finally, let us examine the views of idealism and materialism a little closely.

It has been already noted that idealism usually takes up two positions. When it refuses to recognise the existence of

extra-mental objects altogether and affirms that minds and their ideas alone constitute the whole of reality, it is then called subjective idealism. This subjective idealism ends in solipsism and takes up, on the face of it, an absurd position. The dualism of subject and object is a fact and is the basis of all cognitive experience. It would be absolutely futile, therefore, to deny existence to objects altogether. This is the reason why even extreme idealists like Berkeley, could not altogether set aside the claims of objects, as existing things. He of course, argued that we never come in contact with objects directly but with sensations and ideas and, therefore, it is justifiable to say that objects do not exist, since to him the essence of existence is perceptibility. But to account for the universal experience of the same kind of sensations, in all individual minds, he had to invent the mind of God, which was to be the repository of ideas, which are roused in our minds in spite of us. These ideas took up the same position in his system, as objects in ordinary systems of philosophy. Ultimately, therefore, he could not deny existence to objects, but had to accept that fact, though under the guise of a new name. It is not disproving the existence of a certain thing by only giving it a new name. In fact, Berkeley's intense love for idealistic views made him take up such a childish position.

The less extreme type of idealism is apparently aware of the absurdity of the above position. It, therefore, accepts the contention of realism that objects have got extra-mental existence. But these idealistic philosophers maintain their idealistic position by holding that these objects, however, are caused as well by the mind or are nothing but the mind itself. When Lotze, for example, says that the thing in itself, which is the basis of sensations is of the nature of mind, he takes up the latter position. The Yogāchāra school of Buddhist philosophy, and the philosophy of Berkeley, are examples of the former class, for, both of them say that objects are also of the nature of mind. These views betray a prejudice in favour of the idealistic

view. Whether objects be of the nature of mind or not, they seem to be aware of the basic fact that subject and object are in a way different and opposed to each other. In their attempt to make out a good case for idealism, they try to obliterate, so to say, this difference between subject and object. Their explanation of the identity of subject and object is rather far-fetched, and the identity is sought to be established with violence.

Materialism in the same manner takes up a very extreme and unreasonable position, when it says that not only physical facts but mental states are also explicable in terms of matter. Materialism may take two fundamental forms. First, it may hold that states of consciousness are effects of physical states and, secondly, that states of consciousness are nothing but physical states of the brain. Both the views are, however, untenable. We know that scientific explanations never explain the 'how' and the 'why' of a thing.

When physics explains many physical phenomena by the law of gravitation, all that it does is to show that they are included in the general formula of the law of gravitation. That is only a statement in a compendious form of the manner of behaviour of things. Again, when the scientist explains the cause of a thing, he simply gives us the immediate antecedent circumstances of it. This only explains the 'how' of a thing and not the 'what' or the 'why.'

When, therefore, the materialistic philosopher wants to say that mental phenomena are caused by physical matter, he would only point to some physical antecedent circumstances of any such phenomenon. The experience of hearing would, thus, be said to be caused by molecular movements in the brain matter preceding it. But, to connect them as cause and effect, it is further necessary to prove that there has been transformation of energy, from one into the other. We would in such circumstances expect that the physical process would be interrupted at a certain point, where the psychical process

would start. If a nervous disturbance is the cause of sensation, it must vanish as such at a certain stage and in its place sensation must appear. But that is not what happens. As a matter of fact, instead of one movement ceasing and the other starting, there is a continuous parallelism traceable between physical and psychical processes. Every physical phenomenon in an organism, has its own succeeding physical state, while there is also independently a sequence of psychical states going on along with them. Under the circumstances, the law of causation cannot be applied to them. Since they are thus intrinsically different, it cannot be said either that they are homogeneous and both are of the nature of matter. The theory of interaction between body and mind cannot stand on account of its unworkability, and the inevitable consequence is the acceptance of the theory of parallelism, which presupposes the intrinsic difference between matter and mind.

Besides epistemological reflections also make clear the absolute futility of the attempt at interpreting mind to be of the nature of matter. The object, after all, exists for the subject. The entire essence of the object is a content of perception. The qualities belonging to an object exist only in relation to a subject having sensibility and intelligence. The dualism has to be faced and accepted. Neither can matter or object be explained in terms of the subject, nor the subject or mind, in terms of matter.

If philosophers would, therefore, choose to side with one of these opposing schools, they would be guilty of one-sided narrowness. If they take up such a position, they cannot get a complete and correct view at all. If reality is in nature mental in some respects, it is also physical in other respects. The fact that both these opposing groups of views got admirers in all ages of the history of philosophy, is a proof that they both stand on solid grounds, to a certain extent at least, that they both have elements of truth in them, which served

as the fountain of inspiration of their respective adherents. The sober and impartial philosopher, therefore, who cares more for truth and knowledge than for the interests of any party, will not feel satisfied with either of these views. As soon as he realises that there are elements of truth in both views, he would try to measure the importance of each view impartially. He would feel inclined to hold that reality is both matter and mind, part of it is mind and part matter. It is by organising the two views in a harmonious combination that we get the whole truth.

In trying to bring about a conciliation, the philosopher finds himself irresistibly drawn towards a dualistic conception. If mind and matter are to be given equal importance, we have to accept this dualism. This dualism is to be looked upon as rather an advancement in the progress of thought. It contains greater truth than the one-sided monistic views of idealism and realism enumerated in the second stage. The monism we get in extreme idealism is born of false abstraction and is the result of prejudice and narrowness. This charge is also equally applicable to the narrow and cheap monism preached by materialism. Here on the other hand, the mind rises to a superior plane from where it can make an impartial investigation into the rights of each of the contending schools. The dualism is, therefore, due to the richness of the content, due to the fact that it effects a complete survey of reality. We need not be sorry, therefore, for this dualism. In Jainism, in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and in the Purva Mimamsa, we get examples of this kind of dualism. In European philosophy, the systems of Descartes and Spinoza will serve us with parallel examples.

The mind, however, does not, on account of its innate urge for a monistic theory, feel satisfied with a dualistic conception of reality, and rightly so. For, though reality may be partly of the nature of the mind and partly of the nature of body, there still remains the fact that reality is welded

together into one single consistent systematised whole, that reality is a unity and not a duality. Reality is at its very root monistic, though it has the dual aspect of both mind and matter. Philosophers, therefore, try to reduce this dualism of mind and matter by deducing them from a third principle altogether, which is interpreted as the common origin of both mind and matter, subject and object. Spinoza and Hegel follow this line of thought. Monism may also be arrived at by maintaining that reality is but one though it has two aspects, the mind aspect and the body aspect, like the two sides of the same shield. This leads to panpsychism as developed by Fechner and Paulsen.

Section 7. Idealistic-Realistic Views.

We shall now take some concrete examples, illustrating views of the third stage, which try to effect a reconciliation between idealism and realism. We begin with examples from Indian philosophy.

The Jaina philosophy admits the claims of both mind and matter, as being constituent parts of reality. It gives them equal importance and equal status, like a good and impartial judge.

Jaina philosophy traces the whole of the universe to two everlasting, uncreated, co-existing, independent categories, namely *jiva* and *ajiva*. The *jiva* is active, while the *ajiva* is inactive (*jada*). The *jiva* is the type of all-conscious mental beings, while the *ajiva* is the type of all that is felt or touched, that is to say, that constitutes the passive object of experience. "What knows and perceives the various objects, desires pleasure and dreads pain, acts beneficially or harmfully, and experiences the fruit thereof, that is *jiva*."¹ The *ajiva* is not exactly the same as matter, but stands for all entities that have not the quality of consciousness. This will

¹ Panchāstikāya-samayasāra, p. 129.

be evident from the fact that Jaina philosophy divides the *ajiva* further into two classes, namely those without form, such as *dharma*, *adharma*, space and time and those with form to which they give the special name of *pudgala*. This *pudgala* is the same thing as matter. This *pudgala* is defined thus : "Whatever is perceived by the senses, the sense organs, the various kinds of the *sariras*, the physical mind, the *karmas*, etc., are *murta* or figured objects. These are all *pudgala*." ¹ This *pudgala* is further analysed and found to consist of *paramānus* or atoms. Jainism also finds it necessary to admit ontological existence of space and time and such principles, as *dharma* and *adharma*. We need not however concern ourselves with detailed descriptions of them, as the *jiva* and the *pudgala* form the most important constituents of the universe. "The others are the principle of their action or the results of their interaction. *Samsāra* or the world is nothing but the entanglement of *jiva* in matter." Matter and mind are thus both equally important and separate constituents of reality according to Jaina philosophy.

The Nyāya and the Vaisesika systems hold the same views with regard to the questions of soul and body. We can, therefore, conveniently treat them together. In dealing with the Nyāya-Vaisesika theory of reality we shall note two important facts. It explains the physical aspect of reality purely with the help of an atomic theory, not unlike that of Democritus. On the other hand, it is not obsessed with the idea of the importance of matter to an unjustifiable extent, and is very anxious to show that mind constitutes reality of a different order and is inexplicable by matter. This is the great point of difference between Nyāya-Vaisesika atomism and present-day atomism.

Kanāda, the formulator of the Vaisesika system, explains the world of nature with the help of atoms. These atoms

¹ Panchatīkāya-samayāsāra, p. 89.

are incapable of division into parts, as they mark the limit of divisibility. The whole of the material world is constituted by these atoms. Atoms are divided into four classes, answering to the four great classes of material objects, namely, earth, water, light, and air. It is by the combination of these various classes of atoms in different manners, that we get the variety of objects around us. These atoms again are eternal for they are permanent constituents of all objects. "Fabric after fabric, in the visible world up to the terrestrial mass itself, may be dissolved, but the atoms will abide ever new and fresh ready to form other structures, in the ages yet to come."

The Nyāya-Vaisesika theory does not, however, take upon itself the impossible task of explaining mind also in terms of matter. It finds that there are elements in the universe, which are not of the nature of matter and cannot be explained by it. They are cognitions, desires, aversions and feelings of pleasures and pain, that is to say, all kinds of mental phenomena constituted by thinking, feeling and willing. They are viewed as qualities of the permanent substance of soul. The Nyāya-Vaisesika philosophy proves the existence of soul by inference. It also rejects with a strong feeling of repulsion the materialistic view that consciousness is a product of matter. It argues that if consciousness is a product of the body, it would exist in all parts of the body. Again, if body is the same as consciousness, all matter must also be conscious. Again consciousness cannot surely be the property of that of which one is conscious, but of that which is consciousness. It denounces extreme materialism on moral grounds also, holding that such an explanation of the soul is inconsistent with morality. The body is relegated to an inferior position, in reference to its relation with mind. It is looked upon as the "vehicle of actions, sense organs and objects." ¹ The soul is the master,

¹ Nyaya Sutra II, 1. 1.

the body is its instrument of action. This soul is believed to be a substance, which is eternal. At times, it becomes connected with a body according to its merits and thus we get an individual person. We need not enter into further details about the nature of the soul. In the Nyāya-Vaisesika philosophy, we can thus discern two independent kinds of being. On the one hand, there are the innumerable atoms, constituting the world of matter and, on the other, there are the souls, which become connected with bodies and assume the form of living beings. The importance of both idealism and materialism is maintained at the cost of neither.

The Purva Mimāmsā Philosophy of Kapila also shows deep insight, by accepting the dualism of mind and body, in the same spirit, as that of the Nyāya-Vaisesika system. On the one hand, the extra-mental reality of objects is admitted. "When we perceive, we perceive objects and not our cognitions."¹ In order that knowledge may be possible the reality of the objects is to be admitted. The Mimāmsā philosophy has a strong contempt for any theory which tries to explain away the objective world as merely phenomenal. "If it be the conclusion of those who know Brahman, that all that is known is false and that what is not known is true, I beg to part from them with a bow."² The whole universe is believed to be made up of substances of different classes. In all nine classes are enumerated. They are earth, water, air, fire, *akāśa*, space, time, self and mind. Along with other substances, the self or the soul is also accepted as an independent and separate entity. This self is regarded as distinct from the body, the senses and the understanding. Thus while the self is present in sleep, the *buddhi* is not. The self again persists when the sense organs are injured. The body is made of

¹ Sabara on 1. 1. 4.

² Brihati, p. 30.

matter, which is not an intelligent principle, and so a combination of natural particles cannot give us consciousness, which is absolutely non-material. The Mimāmsā philosophy refutes the Buddhist conception that the soul is only a flux, a series of ideas. Such a theory cannot explain phenomena like self-consciousness and memory. Unless the soul were a permanent substance, transmigration is not possible and, along with it, the doctrine of *karma* also fails. This is enough to show that the Mimāmsā was both idealistic and materialistic and accepted partially the views of both, in a spirit of reconciliation.

Descartes found it preferable to accept a similar kind of dualism, than side with any of the one-sided views of the second stage. He was very much impressed with the absolute distinction of body and mind. He said that mind is diametrically opposed to body. The attribute of mind is thought. Body is diametrically opposed to matter. Mind is what body is not and body is what mind is not. Having realised this distinction, he thought it absurd that only one of the elements may be made to explain away the other completely. Since they are both distinct, neither can possibly be the cause of the other. He, therefore, found it more reasonable to accept the dualism of mind and body. Descartes defines substance as a thing, which has not to depend on any other thing for its existence. He finds that God alone, strictly speaking, answers to such a definition. Nevertheless, mind and body also are relatively independent and may, therefore, be called relative substances. All substances have attributes and modes. The substance of body, in its various attributes and modes, explains for the whole of the objective world. Thus, all the processes of the external world are modes of extension, which is an attribute of body. All variation of matter or diversity of form depends on motion. The substance of soul, in the like manner, manifests itself in various modes of thought. These two substances are believed to interact on each other, for, without interaction,

many psychological facts cannot be properly explained. Mind, body and their interaction, therefore, are calculated to account for the whole of reality. Descartes' bias for a monistic system felt itself satisfied only by pointing out that these two relative substances are ultimately dependent on God for their existence. Monism is thus maintained, but the relationship of God to these two substances is rather loose and not clearly thought out.

This work of giving the dualism of body and mind a more definitely monistic shape fell on the philosopher Spinoza. Descartes held that both body and mind, as well as God, are substances and yet maintained that God was, somehow, the most important of substances. Spinoza tried to reconcile this apparent inconsistency. If substance is really to be conceived as existing, in and by itself, then there can be no two substances existing together. If mind and body depend on God, for their existence, they cannot be substances really speaking. God alone then can be the substance and the inconsistency can be removed by holding that thought and extension are the two attributes of the same substance, God. The two attributes are infinite and parallel. There cannot be interaction between the two attributes, between mental processes and physical processes. Their correspondence is due to the fact that they are parallel to each other, in every respect. That is why wherever there are mental processes, there are to be physical processes. With the help of these two attributes of the one substance, God, Spinoza explains the whole of reality. Since thought and being are distinctly different, inasmuch as they are different attributes of God, the one cannot be explained with the help of the other. Materialism, therefore, made a mistake in trying to explain the mental by the physical and idealism took a wrong step in attempting to explain physical substances as mental. Spinoza is thus forced to take up parallelism. The importance of both body and mind in this system is equally emphasized.

They are placed on the same footing and are traced to one common origin. It is indeed a laudable attempt at effecting a harmonious compromise between idealism and realism. Spinoza's system will ever remain a landmark in the history of philosophy, as marking the beginning of a new attitude in philosophy, with regard to the problem of the antithesis of body and mind.

As soon as the mind realises the mutual independence of mind and body, and the impossibility of explaining the one by the other, it is inevitably drawn towards a theory of psychophysical parallelism, as a solution of the problem of the nature of reality. In the illustrations given from Indian philosophy, we may note that there is only the consciousness that mind and body are independent and the existence of both as independent entities is to be admitted. In Descartes, we mark an advance on this position, because he not only accepts the equality of the position of each, but also makes an attempt at reaching monism, by making both dependent on God. Spinoza further systematized this theory and thought that interaction between body and mind is impossible. Thus, he formulated the theory of parallelism, which may be accepted as one of the satisfactory solutions of the problem of dualism between mind and body. Though there were germs in his philosophy which can be developed into a consistent parallelistic theory of the universe, the urge for a monistic theory was stronger in Spinoza, and that led him to choose another path of reconciliation. It is necessary to remember here that we have talked of a monistic solution of the problem of mind and body being possible in two different ways. It is first possible by deducing both mind and body, from a third common origin, and thus reconciling them with monism. It is also possible, to arrive at monism, by holding that though reality is one, it manifests itself in the twofold aspect of body and mind. Spinoza took up the first line of reconciliation by interpreting mind and body as the two parallel attributes of the one substance,

God. We should remember, in this connection, that Spinoza did not limit the attributes of God to these two alone. He rather held that God has an infinite number of attributes, of which we human beings can but discover two only, namely body and mind. This clearly decides that the parallelism that Spinoza struck upon in his system, came to him only incidentally and was not contemplated to be a very important element of his philosophy. Be that as it may, the position remains, that Spinoza took up the first method of reconciliation, which is deducing the two antagonistic principles from a third common source. His philosophy also showed the possibility of effecting the compromise in the second method. The working out of this possibility was left to be done by a group of idealistic thinkers. They developed and brought out the full implication of this parallelistic theory and gave it the name of panpsychism and put it forward as the solution of the problem of nature of being. Fechner, the founder of psychophysics, developed this view and Wundt also accepted it. Paulsen also elaborated it at length, and gave it logical shape and consistency. We shall give below a sketch of the theory, as it stands.

As already stated, the parallelistic thinker starts with the idea of the impossibility of explaining bodily phenomena by mind and mental phenomena by matter. It, therefore, starts with the two propositions that physical processes are never effects of psychical processes and psychical process are never effects of physical processes. The acceptance of the first proposition gives the great advantage that the whole corporeal world is unreservedly placed at the disposal of natural science. Since mind and body are two distinctly separate entities, interaction between them is out of question. Yet, it is realised that there is correspondence between mental activity and bodily activity, mental phenomena and bodily phenomena. For explaining this correspondence, the hypothesis of universal parallelism has to be accepted. It is tried to prove, that every psychical

process is accompanied by a physical process and *vice versa*. Body and mind run parallel, in every manner, to the extent of minute details. They are but two sides of the same reality co-extensive with each other. It is possible to read psychical life in all forms of matter. Living beings we may leave out of the question. Thanks to the researches of Jagadischandra Bose, we may take it as proved that psychical life is present in plant life also. The existence of the nervous system in plants, which is the invariable accompaniment of psychical life, has been demonstrated by him. The question remains: Does the theory hold good with regard to inorganic matter also? It may be observed that organic bodies are composed of the same ingredients as inorganic bodies. Protoplasmic matter according to modern biology rose out of inorganic matter. There is, thus, no sharp line of demarcation between organic and inorganic matter. "A molecule is a relatively complete system of corporeal phenomena, a plurality of parts most intimately correlated and interacting in manifold ways and at the same time a whole related to its surroundings."¹ This is true also of an atom. There is the same organisation and system both in organic and inorganic matter. This order and system is the mental counterpart of the inorganic material bodies. "Thus the same mental thread runs through all material phenomena. The human mind is nothing but the highest development, on our earth, of the mental processes which universally animate and move nature." While the human mind manifests the most complex thought processes, its physical counterpart also,—we mean the brain,—shows an equal complexity of structure, which in this case is much greater than found in ordinary animal brains. They are found in an ascending order. The more the complexity of mental processes, the greater the complexity of the physical structure. In the reverse manner, the less the complexity

¹ Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 106.

of the structure, the more simple is the mental phenomenon manifested. Thus, in inorganic material bodies, the presence of the mental aspect is almost imperceptible. Again, each psychophysical unit can be embraced in a higher unit, and if we continue the process for long, we shall ultimately come to the highest unit of all, which is the totality of the universe and identical with the Absolute. "Our body embraces the cells as elementary organisms. We assume that, in the same way, our physical life embraces the inner life of the elementary forms, embracing in it their conscious and unconscious elements. Our body again is itself part of a higher unity, a member of the total life of our planet, and together with the latter, articulated with a more comprehensive cosmical system and ultimately articulated with the All."¹ According to this theory the totality of all material objects together, forms the body-part of the Absolute universal self.

This is the conception of the universe according to panpsychism. It supplements materialism by adding that it is but one side of reality. The Absolute is one, but it has two sides. The inner side of it is the soul or mind and the outer side is matter or object. Body is the form side of reality and mind is the content side. Both are component parts of reality, both are true and both are equally important. Bold and imaginative, the theory of panpsychism creates naturally a deep impression in the mind of every philosophical thinker. The conception that even heavenly bodies have soul makes the theory at once poetic and fascinating. In depth of vision also, panpsychism rises to a great height by realising the fundamental unity of mind and body and emphasizing their equal importance.

Panpsychism effected reconciliation of realism and idealism by making them the two aspects of one and the same thing. This is one manner in which a solution is possible. As

¹ Pauleen, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 106.

has been already pointed out, philosophers have attempted the solution in another manner also. The other possible way is, by interpreting them as being the later development of what was originally one and the same thing. In the very first chapter of this book we have given a picture of the conception of reality according to the genetic philosopher. We would profit here to recall it. Then, we had talked of three stages in the life-history of the Absolute. First of all, there is the pre-empirical stage, where we get the laws of reason alone, which are the common structure of all thought as well as of the world of nature. This is the realm of logical necessity and as it forms the common basis of both thought and being, mind and nature, it has been called the pre-empirical stage in the life of the Absolute. This realm of logical necessity is not manifest in the ordinary everyday life, where dualism of mind and body is manifest, but is implied in it. In the everyday life of this dualism of mind and body, of matter and spirits, where reality presents itself in the form of two antagonistic principles, in and through nature, we get the second empirical stage of the life of the Absolute. This is governed entirely by the laws of nature and has been referred to as the world of natural necessity or the realm of nature. This is the stage of conflict in the life of the Absolute. We arrive at the third stage of re-established harmony, when cognitive thought in the mind of the human being rethinks this process of development of the Absolute, first through the laws of reason and then through the laws of nature, and thus realises the unity of mind and matter, as being the forms, in which the one Absolute manifests itself, in the empirical stage of its being, so that it can study itself. In this empirical stage, the Absolute divides itself, in the form of matter and mind, subject and object, so that it can study the object after assuming the rôle of the subject. That both subject and object are the self-differentiation of one and the same Absolute, is realised when this same subject rises to a higher

plane of vision and, with the help of concepts, pictures the history of growth of the Absolute and finds that what was one undifferentiated thing at one stage becomes, through the workings of the self-imposed laws of reason and laws of nature, subject and object, matter and mind, at a later stage. We had delineated nature as the self-introspection of the Absolute. Let us bring out the details of the analogy and see how far it holds good. It is a psychological fact that the subject can study its own thoughts and that phenomenon has been described as introspection in books of psychology. The special feature of this introspection is that one thought, as subject, cognises the other thought, as object. The thought that is cognised holds, analogically, the same position as an outside object, and the antithesis of subject and object is as much present in such an act of cognition, of one thought by another, as in an act of cognition of a material body, outside of subject, by mind. But here, this antithesis of subject and object does not have the effect of shutting out our vision, to a very great extent, so as to make it difficult for us to realise the oneness of the thought cognised and the thought cognising. That they are both thoughts is so clear to us, being a matter of direct knowledge, that the antithesis cannot get any chance of misleading us at all. In the case of the world of nature, however, we are so much used to taking the antithesis of mind and matter to be fundamental, that we can never think of viewing them as probably the bifurcation of one and the same Absolute self, imposed for the purpose of its own understanding of itself. The idea of difference, between mind and matter, is so very familiar to us that we find it very difficult to shake it off.

A group of philosophers attempted reconciliation of mind and body on similar lines. The discovery that the same reason is the guiding principle or common structure of both subjects as well as physical objects, of thought processes as well as processes of nature, gave them the clue. Arguing that the laws of thought are

also laws of things, they came to the conclusion that thought and thing, subject and object, are ultimately one and the same thing. Even as early a philosopher as Aristotle, was conscious of such a possibility. But the theory received serious attention a long time after, in the nineteenth century, in the hands of a group of well-known German philosophers, namely Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. We give below, in brief outline, the course of development of this theory.

In talking about the forms of things, Aristotle pointed out that they constitute the essence of things. Again, these forms are not only principles or essences of things, but also principles of reason. They are both forms of thought as well as forms of reality. The idea of oneness of the subject and object was re-affirmed in the philosophy of Fichte, who deduced them both from reason.

The real reality according to Fichte is active Reason, Pure Will, which is also the Good. What the common mind regards as real, is a phenomenon, a manifestation, a translation. Being as such has no value. It is all movement, tendency and will. The universe is the manifestation of Pure Will, the symbol of the Moral Idea, which is the Absolute. Knowledge is neither in whole nor in part the product of sensation; it is the exclusive work, the creation of the ego. There is no philosophy, but idealism. Philosophy does not discover ready-made truths. To know is to produce such facts, to create such truths.

According to Fichte, philosophic thought starts with a spontaneous act of its creative energy. Its theses result from a regular succession of intellectual acts. The original act of the understanding and every intellectual act is three-fold: (1) The ego posits itself. (2) A non-ego is opposed to the ego, or the ego is negated. (3) The ego and the non-ego reciprocally limit each other. As the essential elements of one and the same reality, these form but a single act. By affirming itself as subject, the ego posits its opposite,—

the objective world. The objective world exists, but it owes its existence to the objectivity of the subject. Suppress the ego and you suppress the world. Creation is the will or pure thought, limiting, determining or making a person, of itself.

Thus, according to him, what we call an object is nothing but the subjective modification of the consciousness of an ego. It lies within the nature of a self-active principle like the ego, to limit itself. The object is but the limitation, posited by the subject itself, against it. It is essential for the ego that it should limit itself like this, otherwise it will find no material for it to work upon. Behind the individual ego, Fichte thinks that there is the Absolute Ego as the precondition or logical ground of the individual ego. It prescribes the same universal processes of thought, to all individual egos. He identifies it with the universal active reason, which acts in us all and directs the process of our thinking in universal terms and places universal purposes, or ideas, as goal of our moral activity. This Absolute Ego is described as a "living flowing, self-determining, spiritual process, that expresses or manifests itself, in individual selves, that is the law of their nature, the common ground of their sensational or phenomenal life, as well as the necessary laws of thought. It is the universal life and reason that lives and thinks and acts in us."

According to Fichte, non-ego is the product of the unconscious ego. But Schelling holds that what is unconscious, is not ego and is neither non-ego. There is no object without subject, as propounded by Berkeley and afterwards confirmed by Fichte. Neither can there be a subject without the object. So the subject cannot produce the object, nor can the object produce the subject. Subject and object, being thus limited by each other cannot be the Absolute. The Absolute must be beyond the ego and the non-ego, beyond all conditions of existence. The ego and the non-ego are both derived from a third higher principle. This

third principle is reason or universal will. The dynamic aspect of all being around us also made a deep impression on his mind and so he conceived reality as a process of continuous growth or evolution. He also found that reason need not necessarily identify itself with conscious reason alone. Reason includes the unconscious instinctive purposive forces of nature also. He, therefore, conceived reality as a dynamic process in which universal will works out its own purpose, which is the production of self-consciousness. Nature is but an earlier stage of growth in the life-history of the Absolute spirit, in which it works as an unconscious will. In animal life, it reaches the stage of consciousness and in man it attains the highest stage of growth, by producing self-consciousness. Nature and mind are, therefore, fundamentally of the same nature ; they are but different stages in the life process of the Absolute spirit. The dead and unconscious objects, in nature, are but unsuccessful attempts of the Absolute to reflect upon itself. Since nature and mind are but linked together like this, they have but one and the same law to guide them. The laws of mind or thought are also the laws of reality. If we, therefore, trace the different stages in the history of self-consciousness, we shall at the same time, be tracing the development of the Absolute principle, as it manifests itself in nature. "All qualities are sensations, all bodies are percepts of nature ; nature itself with all its sensations and percepts is a congealed intelligence."

Hegel built on the foundation laid by Schelling. He agrees with Schelling in identifying logic with ontology. The universe itself is to him a logical system. Whatever is real in this world is rational and whatever is rational is real. The universe is, to him, logic crystallised, so to speak. Subject and object, matter and mind, both are intrinsically the same thing ; both are reason at bottom. The Absolute is nothing but reason, which lies and evolves both in nature and in mind.

In the beginning, according to him, was God or the Idea, which is the potential universe, the timeless totality of all the possibilities of evolution. This idea is called Creative Logos also. It develops by itself according to its own laws of development, which are logical laws. It is thus that we get the whole of the objective world which is the concrete development of the Creative Logos. God, as Idea or Pure Thought, never existed before the creation of the world. It is His nature to develop eternally, according to forms or categories, which are eternal. The Idea brings out all that lies within itself, by a logical process of development, and this unfolding takes the form of nature. Here, the Idea remains unconscious. The idea also feels the need of studying itself and, therefore, it strives to be conscious. In animals, it appears in the conscious stage and feels and knows itself in the form of the objective world. Its ultimate goal is however to be self-conscious, which it realises in the human mind. Here the Idea studies itself and brings out the laws of its own development to consciousness. It is in this way that the universal mind realises its destiny by thinking itself in its objects. It, thus, becomes for itself what it was in itself, in form of the idea or the potential universe. Ultimately, therefore, there is but one and the same reality, which is Thought. This Thought, first of all, develops itself logically and that is how we get the objective world. Having realised itself in an actualised form, it studies itself and thus assumes the form of the subject or mind. The universe is thus an eternal process of self-introspection of the Absolute. Thought and being, subject and object, are thus at bottom one. They are the manifestations of one and the same thing, and so there is no intrinsic opposition between them. Both idealism and realism, materialism and spiritualism, thus get themselves reconciled to each other, in such a system of philosophy.

CHAPTER X

THE SECOND PROBLEM OF THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY: SUBJECT *vs.* OBJECT.

In Theory of Knowledge.

The problem stated—whether object is presented directly to the subject. The first stage—Naive Presentationism. The second stage—Presentationism *vs.* Representationism. Presentationistic views: Berkeley, common-sense school, Hamilton, Bradley, Bergson, *Anubhava* of Sankara, Purva-mimāṃsā, Early Buddhism, Vaibhāsika school of Buddhism, Sāṅkhya. Representationistic views:—Democritus, Epicurus, Locke, Hume, Kant, Mill, Spencer. Third stage of Absolute Knowledge—reconciliation of intuition with the mediational process of Knowledge.

Section 1. The First Stage: Naive Presentation.

Perception is the basis knowledge. If we analyse an act of perception, we shall find that it is a relationship between object and subject. In every act of perception, there is the perceiving subject on one side and, on the other, there is the perceived object. Perception may thus be defined as subject-object contact. The question naturally arises: Is the contact direct or indirect? In other words, is the object presented directly to the subject or is it presented indirectly to the subject, through the medium of some other agency? The antithesis of subject and object, with regard to this epistemological question of perception, gives rise to the second problem of the theory of knowledge. Let us now trace the history of this problem genetically.

In the first stage of this problem, the consciousness of the distinction between subject and object need not arise. For, as soon as this consciousness arises, the question comes,

whether the subject-object contact is direct or indirect and at once the stage of conflict is brought in. This consciousness of the distinction is to be regarded, therefore, as the stepping stone by which we are led into the second stage of conflict, where thought begins to develop in two opposing lines with regard to this question. Since this consciousness has not yet arisen, the mind cannot grasp the implications of an act of perception in a clear manner. There is only a vague awareness of the presentation of certain objects to the mind. Whether these objects are presented direct to the mind or not, such questions do not strike the mind at all, as the mind is not yet sufficiently developed to think of such questions. This attitude of the mind cannot be called naive realism, if by naive realism we mean the theory which believes that extramental objects are presented to the senses, just as they appear. If, however, naive realism only means to say that objects exist as they are and does not give any definite opinion as to whether objects are presented directly to the mind or not, it is not hostile to a theory illustrating this first stage.

It may best be expressed by the term naive presentationism. This is the view with which a man of the ordinary level of intelligence looks upon an object presented to his senses. When the ordinary man perceives a cat, except the likeness of the cat presented to his senses he is not conscious of any elements constituting such perception. Whether the cat he sees is directly presented to his senses or not, such a question does not suggest itself to his mind at all. Nor is he conscious of the fact that to make perception possible, a subject is, on one side, necessary and, on the other side, an object. Such is also the stage in which, the mind of the undeveloped child works, or the mind of the savage works. The main characteristic is that in an act of perception there is no awareness of a subject-object relation. The stage is present only in the most undeveloped states of the human mind, as illustrated

by the view-point of a child, a savage or an adult of a low level of intelligence. The amount of intellectual development, that philosophical knowledge presupposes, makes it impossible, therefore, for such a theory to exist, in the domain of philosophical speculation. It speaks of a lower stage of mind, when it is still unripe for philosophical speculation. There is no philosophical view, therefore, to illustrate this stage.

Section 2. The Second Stage : Presentationism vs. Representationism.

As has been said before, the mind soon attains a higher level of intelligence, when it can analyse and bring out the implications of an act of perception. It finds that an act of perception involves a relationship between the subject and the object and that without such relationship perception is impossible. When this is realised, the further question arises : how is this relationship effected ? If perception is nothing but subject-object contact, how does this contact take place ?

Two answers are possible with regard to this question. It may be a contact which takes place directly in which the object is brought face to face to the subject, which perceives the object in itself and not any substitute of it. The philosopher who puts forward this answer, is said to hold the view of presentationism, because he thinks that objects are presented directly to the subject and what we perceive as the object is really the object and nothing but the object. Others may choose to answer this question in another fashion, saying that the object is never brought directly in contact with the subject, but that some representative of it goes to the subject and through that the subject knows the object. These philosophers hold that the object and the subject remain for ever apart and are never in contact. The object sends out sensations or its images to the subject, and with

the help of them the subject reconstructs the object in its own mind, and thus comes to know about the object. According to them, when we perceive a man, we do not see the real man at all. The real man sends a photograph of himself to the mind or gives a description of himself through sensations. With the help of this third party mind gets to know what an object is. Some philosophers go a step further and say that the object is not only kept out of contact with the subject, but it remains forever so remote and distant from the subject that it remains forever unknown and unknowable. All that we can know of the object, through the sensations roused by them, is only their appearance, while their real form remains outside our grasp. This is agnosticism of the type preached by Kant. Since these thinkers hold that the object is never presented directly to the subject but is represented through the agency of a third party, namely, their images and sensations produced by them, this theory may be called representationism. While presentationism holds that objects are brought directly in contact with the subject, representationism contends that it is wrong to hold such a view, and that the correct view is that the object is presented indirectly to the subject.

The manner in which thought bifurcates in its attempt to answer the nature of contact between subject and object, in an act of perception, has been already indicated. This brings us into the second stage of the development of the problem, and we already seem to hear the battle cries of the contending lines of thinkers. Presentationism finds itself opposed to representationism and a fierce conflict takes place. Each group is bent on justifying its own views, in opposition to the other. We are bound to be impressed with the zeal and loyalty of the thinkers, for supporting the cause of the school of thought to which each belongs. The history of such a conflict is no doubt an interesting matter to study.

Section 3. Presentationistic Views.

Presentationism is a theory which made a very late appearance in the history of European philosophy. The first great champion of this view is Berkeley. It may be a little difficult to follow how a thinker like Berkeley, who is not ready to admit the existence of objects even, could happen to be the upholder of presentationism and so it needs a little clearing up.

We had occasion to talk of Berkeley on several times. We already know that he accepted from Locke the view that we perceive only sensations and not objects. From this he draws the conclusion that all our knowledge is confined to facts of experience and we have direct knowledge only of our ideas. He further drew the conclusion that, since ideas are all that we perceive, they are all that exists. Objects do not exist because we do not perceive them, for, the essence of existence is capacity to be perceived. He comes thus to abolish the objects altogether and in their place substitutes ideas. There are again ideas which arise in our own mind, according to the dictates of our will; that is to say, we can control origination of such ideas. These latter ideas are, therefore, the products of our own mind. There is another set of ideas, however, which arise in our mind in a definite and regular order, whether we wish them to be or not. These ideas are thrust on our mind in spite of ourselves and we have absolutely no control over them. This is so because, according to Berkeley, they are placed in our mind through God Himself. These are, on that account, more vivid ideas and are, for that reason, perceived in common with other minds, while our own ideas are perceived by us alone. Berkeley says that it is this latter class of ideas which we mistake for objects.

It will be easy for us now to realise how Berkeley subscribes to the view of presentationism. Since objects have no place in his system and their place is taken up by the ideas, put in our mind by God, we can look upon them as occupying

the position of objects. These ideas, according to Berkeley, are placed directly in the mind and not their copies. What occupies the place of objects, therefore, in Berkeley's system, is placed in direct contact with the subject, for the purpose of producing knowledge. Berkeley is thus a presentationist.

The common sense school of Thomas Reid, is a very suitable illustration of the presentationistic view. It is but a re-affirmation of the ordinary commonsense standpoint of mankind and, therefore, his view is aptly called the common-sense school. It came as a direct reaction against the scepticism of Hume and was meant to save philosophy from the undermining influence of scepticism. It accepted as true the fundamental belief of the ordinary man, that there is an extramental world of objects outside of mind and that there is also a soul. In an act of perception, the object is presented directly to the subject and thus carries with it the immediate proof of its existence. That objects exist, cannot be doubted at all, for, they are as much within the scope of immediate knowledge, as our own ideas.

This line of thought is further continued in the writings of Hamilton. With regard to subject-object relation, he holds the same realistic view as the common sense school and gives it the special name of natural realism. He believes that we have a direct consciousness of the world as really existing. He believes that it is really so, because we know it, we feel and perceive it, as existing. So far, he follows the line of thought accepted by common sense. But after this, he makes a sudden turn for a representationistic view of the act of perception. The influence of Kantian rationalism proves too strong for him to shake off. He, therefore, thinks that a law of thought compels us to think something absolute and unknown, as the basis and condition of the relative and the known. To make this dogma consistent with the first part of his thought, he interprets that we perceive directly the phenomena only and not the substance of which they are

appearances. This substance is cognizable only through phenomenal existence.

The Nyāya view of perception is an exact parallel of the commonsense view. The Nyāya philosophy has firm faith in the naturalistic view, that the object is brought in direct contact with the subject. "The outward object is conceived as stamping its image on the self, even as the seal impresses itself on the wax."¹ It is realistic and believes that objects exist outside the mind, for without them perception could not be explained. It is by direct contact of the object with the sense that an act of perception takes place and in such perception the object is presented directly to the mind. That direct contact of subject and object is an essential factor of perception, according to the Nyāya view, is very well illustrated in the definition it gives, of perception as "sense-object contact."² A commentator on Nyāya philosophy adds this comment: "If the sense organs were operative without actually getting at the objects, then they could perceive things behind the walls also."³ The direct contact of the subject with object is thus emphasised in all acts of perception.

In Sāṅkhya philosophy there is dispute as to the exact nature of perception. Both the views of presentationism and representationism seem to have been preached at one and the same time by different commentators. While admitting the fundamental fact, that a perception takes place, when an object is presented to the sense, they differ with regard to the exact manner in which they are presented. The Sāṅkhya philosophy, like other Indian systems, distinguishes between indeterminate (*savikalpa*) perception and determinate perception (*nirvikalpa*). For our purposes, we shall take notice of

¹ Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 52.

² Nyāya Sutra, II. 1., 29.

³ Nyāya Kandali, p. 23,

determinate perception, which is perception proper. Vācaspati seems to believe in the theory of representationism, for, according to him, the object gives the mind sense data on which the mind works to produce percepts. So, the mind or *manas* has to arrange and order the sense data, before it can have perception. The object is not, therefore, presented directly to the mind. But Vijnānabhikṣu opposes Vācaspati by holding that the objects come directly in touch with the mind and produce perception. In perception the object is directly presented to and apprehended by the mind. Thus, while Vācaspati is a representationist, Vijnānabhikṣu is a presentationist.

In Purva Mimāṃsā philosophy, there is a good deal of controversy over the fact, whether class characters are apprehended in perception. Kumārila and Prabhākara fall out on this point and raise interesting points for discussion, which we need not touch on. They both admit of two kinds of perception—determinate and indeterminate. We need not take notice of that fact either. They are, however, in agreement with regard to the main point in issue, and with regard to that they join hands in saying, that in an act of perception the object is brought in direct touch with the mind. Purva Mimāṃsā defines perception as '*sāksāt pratiti*' or direct apprehension, by which it is suggested that, in perception, there is contact of the object and the sense organ. So we can safely form the opinion that the Purva Mimāṃsā belongs to the presentationistic school.

The theory of sense perception of early Buddhist philosophy seems to be completely in favour of the theory of presentationism. Buddhaghosa holds that, for perception to arise, consciousness should come into touch with the object. Sensation is caused by contact of the subject with the object. The stream of consciousness is only, "the sequence of the states of the mind caused by the causal impact of the sense and object. The *phassa* or the contact

takes place 'as when two rams are butting together.' The eye is one and the object is another and the contact is the union of the two."¹ Dhammasangani gives a detailed analysis of the process by which a sense perception takes place. But we need not talk of those details here. It will suffice to observe, that he also upholds the view that sense perception takes place when an object is brought into contact with the subject.²

This line of thought seems to have been continued in the Vaibhāsika branch of later Buddhism. They are realists in the sense that they believe in the existence of objects, quite independently of subjects. They are dualists and believe in the independent existence of mind, on the one hand, and matter, on the other. They believe that our knowledge of the outside world of objects, is not a creation of the mind, as idealistic thinkers would make us believe, but is only a discovery. Things are not created by the mind, but they are given to us by the objective world outside, and the function of mind is only to receive them. They are empiricists and believe that without experience no knowledge is possible. For, all knowledge is ultimately based on inference. An inference cannot be absolutely independent of perception, for, such an idea is absurd and impossible. By experience or perception they mean, like early Buddhism, contact of object with sense. When an object is brought directly in contact with the mind, we have perception.

The illustrations given above may be placed under a definite group, apart from other varieties of presentationism. This is possible, because of the fact that they talk of perception or try to explain perception, in one and the same manner. According to them, objects not only exist independently of the body, as all realists hold, but they are presented directly to the mind in the very form in which we happen to perceive

¹ Milinda, II. 3, 9.

² Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, pp. li-liv.

them. The mind seems to discover objects when it comes in contact with them. They are all empirical, for they would not ascribe any important function to the mind, in making possible an act of perception, except mere passive reception of the object presented to it.

We shall now deal with a group of thinkers about whom it is very difficult to say whether they definitely belong either to the presentationistic school or the representationistic school. Though belonging to different ages and different countries, their thoughts, curiously enough, proceed along the same course of development. In appearance, they are strong supporters of rationalism and, as such, cannot but believe in representationism. In ordinary perceptual knowledge, they find mind at work, arranging and shaping sense data in the form of percepts. Reason, thus, is the source of knowledge and, in the field of mediate inferential knowledge, the supremacy of reason is beyond question. In this respect, the competence of reason goes unquestioned. But suspicion is raised about the competence of reason to give to the mind the true character of reality. By investigation, they came to find that, by virtue of its very nature, reason is incompetent to give us direct contact with reality. To reason, the object is only indirectly presented, it is represented and, therefore, what knowledge we get of the object, through reason, is at best an appearance ; it is second-hand and, therefore, not genuine knowledge. This leads to a strong anti-intellectualistic movement. It is found out that rational knowledge is limited to the study and description of experience which, at best, gives us a mere approximation to the truth. Intellect is, by its very nature, discursive and, therefore, can give us only a symbolic view of reality. These philosophers, therefore, tried to find out a new source of knowledge, which is free from the defects of rational knowledge. This source they find out to be a specialised kind of perception, which would present reality to us direct, as it is in itself. Having found out that intellect gives

us a representation of reality, they call intellectual perception representative, and incompetent to give the true view of reality. The specialised form of perception, they think, would give them reality itself and, in this respect, they may be called supporters of the view of presentationism. They thus support both presentationism and representationism at one and the same time. In Indian philosophy, Sankara developed his ideas along these lines and in Western philosophy, Bradley and Bergson have, strange to say, followed his footsteps.

Sankara is silent about the psychology of perception. What little we get about his views on this point, in the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, is hopelessly unsatisfactory. But from the general implications of his writings it appears clear, that with regard to the question of subject-object contact in perception, he held the view of representationism. The real, according to Sankara, is free from all distinctions. The real, which is pure consciousness, cannot be an object of knowledge. For, in order to be an object of knowledge, the mind has to qualify itself, by ascribing relations to itself. In perception the functioning of an inner activity or *vritti* is accepted. The object itself is indetermined. It is the *vritti* that dresses it in the definite form in which we see it. When we see a jar, the *vritti* is supposed to go towards it and assume its shape, as a jar, and then cognise it. What we perceive, depends on the form the *vritti* takes. If it takes the form of weight, we perceive weight in the object, if colour, we perceive colour and so on.¹ This same reality seems to be identified, later in his system, by implication, with what he calls *adhyāsa*. *Adhyāsa* is defined, as attributing to the real something which is different from it. The Absolute is conceived by Sankara as pure self-consciousness, undifferentiated and whole, in which the consciousness of subject-object relation is absent. This subject-object relation starts, as soon as the mind attributes

¹ *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*.

name and form, etc., to the undifferentiated, by making it appear what it is not. In all acts of perception, the real as the object is conceived as having position in space and, time. The ascribing of relations to the object, is *adhyāsa* and in an act of perception, the subject, influenced by *avidyā* or ignorance, ascribes such relationships to make perception possible.

Sankara is of opinion, that the rational method of acquiring knowledge, based on percepts, is by its very nature incompetent to know reality in itself. Empirical knowledge distinguishes between the knower, knowledge and the known. But the real is, according to his conception, free from all distinctions. Discursive thought is analytic. It tries to know an object, by relating it to something else. "We have either to say that reality is reality or say that reality is X, Y, or Z. The former is useless for thought, but the latter is, what thought actually does. It equates the real with something else, i.e., the non-real."¹ All such knowledge is, therefore, strictly non-knowledge or *avidyā*.

It is not however that ordinary discursive knowledge, based on experience, is to be rejected altogether. It has its values in the practical sphere of life. It holds good of the ordinary life, where the distinction of the subject and the object has to be taken as an accepted fact. Discursive knowledge holds good in this world of empirical existence. There is, however, no denying the fact that this gives us mere appearance or *avidyā*. It is after all a delusion and unreal.² "Thinking and logic belong to the level of finite life, while ultimate reality transcends thought. The real is present to itself and has, therefore, no need to think itself."³

¹ Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 505.

² "Without the delusion that 'I' and 'mine' consist in the body, sense organs and the like, no knower can exist; and consequently no use of the means of knowledge is possible.....consequently the means of knowledge, perception and the rest, belong to the province of *avidyā*." (Sankara-Bhasya, Introduction.)

³ Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 509.

Since the ordinary rational method gives us only illusions and lands us in a hopeless maze of contradictions, we have to find out if there is a better method to supplement the intellect. There is such a source of knowledge, Sankara assures us, in intuition or *anubhava*. This *anubhava* is an intuitional consciousness of reality, in which the distinction of subject and object does not exist. Where thought becomes one with reality and the individual shakes off its individuality, the apparent duality is gone and the mind finds itself steeped into the very heart of reality, where it can hear its heart-throbs, in an act of direct perception. It is called '*sāksātkāra*' or direct perception, as reality here is brought face to face with the knower. This knowledge by intuition (*anubhava*) is not to be confused with indeterminate sensation. It is higher even than mediate reflective knowledge. It is of the nature of artistic intuition. It is real perception and all devotion, training and study is meant for preparing the mind for this kind of intuition. "It does not come out of the blue. It is the noblest blossoming of man's reason."¹

Bradley, curiously enough, pursues a closely parallel line of thought in his philosophy. The world of phenomena, as revealed in experience, gives us a plurality. But reality, according to Bradley, is a self-consistent whole, embracing all differences, in an all-inclusive harmony. The bewildering mass of phenomenal diversity does not, therefore, give us the true character of reality. It is, therefore, appearance : but nevertheless it exists, for, it also is in reality. Phenomena, therefore, cannot give us the unity, which is the essence of the ultimate reality. It is like this wherever discursive understanding makes an effort to know reality. Thought is relational ; it dissects reality and shows it piecemeal. If it ceases to be so it commits suicide. For this very reason it fails to grasp reality as it is.

¹ Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 512.

Bradley, therefore, rejects the rational method of knowledge as incompetent to understand the world and seeks for help in other functions of the mind. He gets a hint for the solution of this problem, in ordinary human experience. In immediate presentation, we have the experience of a whole in diversity, of unity in multiplicity, of harmony in discord. It thus reveals, within itself, the essential characteristics of reality as a whole, where will and thought and feeling all become submerged into one. But mere immediate feeling will tell us nothing of the reality, even as a mere discursive thinking would fail. If we try to think out the entire reality in such a manner that thinking is absorbed in it, we can experience reality proper. It will be more like an experience of feeling than thinking, where the differences of subject and object and the diversity of the world of phenomena, all become engulfed in the all-embracing oneness of the experience of totality. This is possible if we can think out consistently.

The similarity between the views of Sankara and Bradley is indeed striking. In Bergson also, we shall notice the same impatience, manifested against the rational intellectual method of knowledge. We shall find that he also seeks for help in functions other than the intellect, for the solution of the problem of reaching reality directly. We should not lose sight of the central fact that, with Bradley as with Sankara, he holds that ultimate reality is better approached in perception or experience, than through the mediation of discursive reasoning. Reality presents itself directly to the mind in the proper type of experience.

Reality, according to Bergson, is the manifestation of a certain moving force, an '*elan vital*,' which expands its creative energy by traversing matter. Life or consciousness is a more direct manifestation of the creative force than matter. Matter is a kind of immense machine, without memory, and mind is a force, essentially free and essentially memory. It is the nature of mind to add past to past, like a rolling snowball or a winding ball of thread and, at every moment, to create and

add something new to it. Life is consciousness, using matter for its purpose. Matter plays both the rôles of an obstacle and a stimulus. Matter is inert and has little elasticity in it and, therefore, in trying to organise matter and put it to its use, consciousness becomes itself ensnared, its liberty is often hampered and, in the long run, stifled. Consciousness avails itself of a certain elasticity in matter and turns it to its own use. "The animal performs voluntary movement by simply producing the infinitesimal spark, which sets off the potential energy stored up in the food-stuffs." Reality thus puts on a dualistic shape.

Now comes the question of knowing this reality. To the ordinary rational method of thinking in concepts, Bergson gives a special function. Since it is discursive and treats reality piecemeal, it is best suited for the purpose of knowing the static dead world, the world of inert matter, where there is no life, no freedom and where absolute mechanism reigns. That is why it has been very successful in the field of the positive sciences. But this world of matter is not reality proper. It is crystallised in death, it is the waste product of creation. The world of reality, as manifested in living matter and consciousness, remains however out of its reaches and the intellectual method is incapable, by its very nature, of penetrating its husk. The rational method analyses reality and cuts it up, it translates the flowing time into space relations, it mechanises evolution, which is purely creative and free. The rational method based on intelligence is, therefore, relegated by him to an unimportant and lower function. It is fit for the mechanical world of sciences. It is incompetent to know living flowing reality.

Philosophy is expected to give us a direct vision of the real living, flowing, creative reality. It can, therefore, not make use of the inferior method of the intellect. Philosophy should be the art of comprehending the universe in its process, in its vital impetus. This can be done only by a kind of

divining sympathy, a feeling which goes nearer to the heart of reality than reason. "Our intuitions are something like instinct, a conscious refined spiritualised instinct, and instinct is still nearer life than intellect and science. The real, the becoming, the inward '*durée*,' life and consciousness, we can apprehend only through the faculty of intuition." There is, therefore, intelligence on the one hand with a specialised function for it, namely, the study of dead matter. And there is intuition for the sake of experiencing reality as it is, living flowing reality. Philosophy should do justice to both intellect and intuition, for thus only can it come nearer to truth which is its goal.

Thus, the philosophy of Sankara, Bradley and Bergson develop along the same line. For all the three of them, ordinary discursive rational method cannot take us to reality. Reality can be reached only by some special method, which is not intellectual. They all indicate that this method should be some sort of an intuition. This special method, they all give us assurance, is specially equipped to lead us direct to reality. Reality, therefore, is not represented to our mind in our highest act of understanding, but is presented direct to the mind in an act of intuition. In this sense, these philosophers may be said to belong to the school of presentationism.

Section 4. Representationistic Views.

As opposed to presentationism, representationism, as has already been indicated, sticks to the idea that reality is not presented to the mind directly. It sends out some stimuli or materials for the mind to work upon and through their medium the mind makes a reconstruction of the objects and thus knows reality. It lays down the formula that reality is known only indirectly, our knowledge of reality is absolutely second-hand.

The theory of representationism took shape very early in the history of philosophy. We find that Democritus gave us a

well-developed, though crude, form of representationism. The atomists explained sense perception as a change produced in the soul, by the action of emanations, or images or idols. These emanations resemble the perceived body and after flying off from the body itself give their shape to the intervening air. On the other hand, emanations from the sense organs also pass out in the intervening air. In the midway, the emanations of the perceived objects meet with the emanations of the sense organs. If the emanations coming from the two sources are alike then only there is perception. The like perceives the like. Perception is only possible when the images coming from the body and the images coming from the sense organ are alike and meet one another. Perception is thus mediate and not immediate.

This Democritean theory of perception is carried to the philosophy of the Epicureans, who accept it *in toto*. Like Democritus they held that objects are never perceived but their images. Their conclusions were also based on the same grounds and so we need not repeat them over again.

John Locke gives us, for the first time, a really scientifically developed form of representationism. Locke indicates that there are two sources of our knowledge, namely, sensation and reflection. Both of these sources supply the mind with ideas of the simple type. The mind works on them and produces complex ideas and thus the structure of knowledge is raised. The sensations, he believes, are produced by certain objects existing outside of the mind. The objects have certain powers of producing sensations or ideas in us. These may be called qualities. Locke further distinguishes between two kinds of qualities. There are certain qualities which are utterly inseparable from the objects themselves. These are called by him primary qualities, such as solidity, extension, figure, motion, etc. There are again qualities which do not exist in the objects themselves, but which are only powers to produce sensations through the primary qualities, such as

colours, sounds, tastes. It is these qualities, then, that are presented before the subjects, instead of the objects themselves. The mind reconstructs a picture of the objects outside it with the help of these qualities and has to remain satisfied with that, for, it is not within the mind's power to see objects immediately presented to the senses. Objects are, therefore, perceived mediately and not immediately; they are represented to the mind and never presented.

This same line of thought runs through the system of Hume as well. To what Locke calls idea in his system, he gives the name of impression. He distinguishes between two kinds of impressions, the inner and the outer. Impressions given by the senses are outer impressions, which are the same as perceptions. All thought and, for the matter of that, all knowledge is ultimately based on those impressions and, therefore, the structure of knowledge is built on them ultimately. The outward impressions arise, he says, from unknown causes, because he holds that all we get is impression and never the object in itself. We, of course, by customary habit of the intellect, arrange these impressions, in the form of substances causally related to one another. But there is no proof that objects in actuality are organised or related like this, because we do not get at them at all. His sceptic mentality made him come to the conclusion that objects themselves are unknowable. After analysing the law of causation, he came to the conclusion that it is at best a customary habit of the intellect. The notion of substance also he breaks up, holding that we have no idea whatever of a substance. The objects may not be connected at all, it is only the ideas in our mind that are connected by association, which is the result of repetition of custom or habit. He, therefore, draws the conclusion that we have no absolute, certain and self-evident knowledge of matters of fact, for, our knowledge never reaches absolute certainty. So, then, Hume starts with the idea that objects are not presented

immediately to the mind, but are presented through sensations and from this observation the conclusion is drawn by him, that objects are not knowable exactly as they are. The impressions that we get are not adequate enough to give us a correct and certain knowledge of objects.

So far as the present problem is concerned, Kant's theory of knowledge differs little from that of Hume. Hume had made a sweeping remark that absolute and certain knowledge is impossible. This sceptic attitude roused Kant from his dogmatic slumber, as he himself says. Kant took upon himself, therefore, the work of demonstrating that synthetic judgments *à priori* are possible. How he answered this problem is not relevant here and, moreover, this problem has been already elaborated in another part of the book. We have only to observe that Kant showed the possibility of universal judgments with the help of categories, in the field of phenomena only. Theoretical knowledge of ultimate objects, or things in themselves, as he call them, is not possible, he affirmed. That is why he forbade the transcendental use of the categories. Knowledge of the world of phenomena alone is possible. But the real world of things in themselves is unknown and unknowable to us. So Kant's position, with regard to the knowability of ultimate reality, is the same as that of Hume. With Hume he holds that things in themselves are never presented to the mind directly. He only adds that the phenomenal world of perception is the joint product of the thing in itself and the mind, the former contributing the material and the latter the forms. But this phenomenal world is only a world of appearance and what knowledge we have of this world is not applicable to the world of things in themselves. He, therefore, concludes like Hume that we cannot have real and genuine metaphysics, which should be metaphysics of the things in themselves. So far as the theory of representationism and its implications are concerned, Kant's position is not altered from that of Hume.

There is a common standpoint between both these philosophers, which is also common to the later agnostic philosophers of Kant's type. They all start with the belief that sensations do not reveal the things in themselves to us, but that they are like the effects of objects lying outside of minds. All that the mind comes in contact with is sensation, of which the sense datum is only one of the contributing factors. Since the mind can travel thus far only, it cannot reach reality proper and, therefore, ultimate reality is unknown and unknowable. There may be difference with regard to the detailed working out of this idea in each of the systems, but this fundamental characteristic is common to them all.

In the philosophy of Mill also we find, that the same agnostic attitude has been maintained. Like Kant and others he holds that we can know phenomena only and not things in themselves. With regard to the real nature of the thinking mind on one hand and the nature of material objects on the other, we are and must always remain in the dark. Bodies are the causes of sensations and the mind is the cause of feelings. But we know only the effect and not the causes themselves. Since the causes are thus never brought in contact directly with us, we cannot know them as they are. The commonsense belief in the knowledge of the external world and mind is, however, explained by him as based on memory, expectation and the laws of association. When I see an object and then cease to see it, I carry a memory of it and hope to see it again. I thus form a notion of something permanent, which is however my own creation absolutely. Thus, there is always the possibility of my past sensations reappearing and the external world is thus a permanent possibility of sensations. We look upon these permanent possibilities as true realities, being made to believe like that by experience and association of ideas. While denying the possibility of knowledge of external objects, Mill cannot

consistently hold that therefore they do not exist at all. The influence of Kant is too great on him and he also feels himself bound to posit a thing-in-itself, an unknown something as the cause of our sensations. He finds that the world of knowledge based on sensations, is only a world of phenomena. Besides that there is a noumenal world of things in themselves which is unknown and unknowable. The result is that he comes to hold the same position as that of Kant.

This same view is re-emphasised in the philosophy of Herbert Spencer. Arguing that knowledge is by its nature mediate and second-hand, he comes to the conclusion that ultimate reality is unknown and unknowable. It is a restatement of the agnostic views of Kant, and Spencer seems to accept them in general. As to the question whether reality is presented directly in experience or not, he is a representationist, as he is bound to be, on account of his agnostic viewpoint. After establishing the claims of realism as the universal postulate of reason, he gives us his views of perception. According to him, the things presented to our consciousness, are neither images, nor copies, nor pictures of the objective world, but they are symbols, which have little in common with the realities they represent. They hold the same place with regard to reality as letters hold with regard to the psychic processes. But that does not preclude us from thinking that there is something beyond them, of which they are representations. "There is some ontological order whence arises this phenomenal order we know as space; there is some ontological order whence arises this phenomenal order we know as time, and there is some ontological nexus whence arises this phenomenal relation we know as difference." This gives us only a bare knowledge of the existence of the noumenal world but does not say anything beyond that.

Section 5. Absolute Knowledge.

Philosophers have thus followed two opposite lines of thought with regard to the problem of subject-object relation in an act of perception. One group affirmed that object is mediately presented to the subject, while the other said that it is immediately presented to the subject. Presentationism thus found itself opposed to representationism. The antagonism started as soon as the consciousness of the opposition between subject and object in an act of perception arose. It was realised that two fundamentally different kinds of things are brought into contact with each other in a case of perception. It is this idea of the fundamental difference between subject and object that paved the way for conflict by suggesting two possible views of contact, namely, direct and indirect contact. In order to effect a compromise between these two views, therefore, we have to come back to the original position. We have to examine whether subject and object are intrinsically different from each other or not.

In the immediately previous chapter, we have tried to show that according to the genetic view, the conflict of subject and object is only true of a stage in the life-history of the Absolute, which is the stage of conflict. In the first stage, which has been called the pre-empirical stage, the Absolute should be regarded as an undifferentiated entity in which the distinction of subject and object is not yet manifest. This stage may, by analogy, be identified with what Kant probably meant by his thing in itself. Kant was quite correct in holding that the Absolute in the pre-empirical stage of harmony was at the back of the phenomenal world of appearance. But he made a mistake in supposing that it was unknowable. It would be wrong to suppose that the Absolute would, in any stage of time, remain in the stage of harmony,

for, it is in its nature to manifest itself eternally in the form of nature and minds. We should not only say that it is presupposed in the world of experience, but should also hold that it is manifest in and through it, it has no separate existence apart from the world of experience. When, however, as a result of false abstraction, we try to think it as existing apart from the world of phenomena, we find it difficult to identify it with the world of experience and delude ourselves in thinking that this reality is unknown and unknowable. In fact the human mind has all along been a prey to this habit of false abstraction. Both in the East and in the West, even great philosophers have been obsessed with the idea that the world of experience is only an appearance and not reality proper. This obsession made Kant believe that the noumenon is behind and apart from the phenomenon and as the phenomenon is all that we come in contact with the noumenon is unknown and unknowable. This obsession also made Sankara believe that this world of experience is after all an appearance and does not give the true picture of reality as it is. Kant was quite correct in concluding that phenomena are all that we know of, but he was wrong in arbitrarily holding that the thing in itself exists apart from the phenomena. As a matter of fact, the Absolute, the ultimate reality, the thing in itself, call it by whatever name you like, exists and manifests itself in and through phenomena. Just as thought cannot exist without concept or universal ideas cannot exist except in particular beings, the Absolute can manifest itself to the mind only in the form of phenomena, in the form of the world of experience. It is the quest of the noumenon, as existing apart from the phenomena, that has acted as the ever deceptive mirage waylaying and misleading many a philosopher in the desert of philosophical speculation.

We grew conscious of a universal idea only by studying the particulars. We can recognise or communicate a thought

only by means of concepts or ideas. It is true that the concept or idea is after all the outward form of the thought contained in. It is in the same manner true that the universal can appear only in the form of particulars for our apprehension. This does not, however, necessarily mean that the thought is not contained within the concept or the universal is not manifest within the particular. It is by this outward form that we grasp it, that we cognise it. In the same manner, the Absolute is manifest in the form of the phenomenal world of experience. It is cognizable in this form alone and it would be a fallacy of abstraction to hold that in this world of experience we get only phenomena and not the Absolute. That this despised world of phenomena is as real as any reality that is ever possible to conceive, will be borne out by the fact that Sankara even could not shake it off completely by saying that it is absolutely unreal. He characterised it as semi-real (*sadasat*); because he believed that it was based on the real but it gave a false picture of reality.

Once we can free our mind of this obsession, we shall find that there is no need for positing a thing in itself, as the noumenon, existing apart from the world of phenomena, unknown and unknowable. Though holding that the world of phenomena is appearance, even Sankara could not deny reality to this, as he thought that that would amount to denying reality to the Absolute also. Once we can convince ourselves of the correctness of this position, we can easily conclude that reality is presented directly to the mind. It is not represented, but presented. In the previous chapter, we had talked of the intrinsic oneness of the subject and the object which are but the two solid manifestation of one and the same Absolute, in its stage of conflict. If this is realised there will be less difficulty to think of the possibility of direct contact between subject and object in an act of perception. Subject-object contact is thus direct and in all acts of

perception we may say that we intuit objects directly. The mind intuits objects, even as it intuits its own ideas.

While it is true to say that we have direct knowledge of objects in acts of perception, it would not be correct to hold that we can have direct knowledge of reality as a whole. Direct apprehension can lead us to particular aspects of reality only, but the whole of reality can never be presented, in an act of perception, to the cognizing mind, simply because of the vastness of its contents. It is so rich in contents, so complex in its structure, that it can never be brought within the compass of a single act of perception. This is where Bradley, Sankara and Bergson err. They are all impatient of the analytic character of knowledge, which presents reality indirectly to the mind. In preference to the intellectual method, therefore, they count upon intuition for helping the mind in coming in direct contact with reality. They never, however, consider the question whether the whole of reality can ever be grasped in a single act of perception. They claim for their methods supernatural powers, which actually they do not possess. First of all, there is a great deal of vagueness in what they acclaim to be their methods. Sankara calls his *anubhava* to be of the nature of artistic intuition. Bradley talks of combining the conceptual knowledge of the intellectualist philosophy with the character of immediacy of an act of presentation, a difficult thing to accomplish. Bergson's sixth sense is equally a rare philosopher's gift, and one knows not, what exactly it would be like. These are difficult things to achieve and are not at all marked by spontaneousness or immediacy. It is the old story of oriental mysticism, which seems to seek consolation more in ignorance than in knowledge. Supposing even that this intuition will give us direct knowledge of the inner life lying behind our empirical consciousness, there is no guarantee that what we experience thereby, is also the inner life of other individuals and nature.

Sankara holds that his *anubhava*, which is of the nature of aesthetic intuition, is higher even than conceptual mediate knowledge. But philosophic comprehension is richer than aesthetic intuition, inasmuch as it makes it its object and contains it as its element. It comprises within itself not only the voluntaristic and the affectivistic factors of reality, but also knowledge, the cognitive factor, having for its object the true. The aesthetic experience falls far short of conceptual knowledge, inasmuch as it excludes the ugly and the aesthetically neutral, which are all embraced in the true.

Bradley finds that the world of phenomena presents us with a bewildering mass of diversity while, according to him, the characteristic of reality is unity in diversity. Hence he rejects the world of phenomena as mere appearance. In the same manner he finds that conceptual knowledge is analytic and therefore gives us reality piecemeal. Hence, he asks us to try to get the whole range of human knowledge, cast into the form of an act of intuition, which, as we have already seen, is a difficult thing to achieve. Before siding with him we should seriously ask the question, Is it true that knowledge gives us reality piecemeal only? Let us stop and consider.

We are absolutely in agreement with Bradley's view, where he says that reality embraces all differences in an all-pervading unity. We are also in complete agreement with him when he says that the world of phenomena gives us only diversity and not unity. We hold that all immediate acts of experience give us diversity and conflict, as they show us reality in the second stage of its history. This conflict and diversity is smoothed up in all-pervading harmony and unity, when we rise to the third stage of the Absolute's life-history. This is possible not by intuition, for intuition or direct perception gives us reality piecemeal only, but in absolute knowledge, that is knowledge of the totality of experience systematised into an organised whole by the help of conceptual processes. The mind builds concepts out of its

experiences, and knits them together in the form of branches of knowledge, and then finally organises them into a unified system of the totality of knowledge, which is after all a reproduction of the totality of experience, which is identical with the whole life-history of the Absolute.

The mind can, by direct apprehension, get a knowledge of very small parts of reality. As it is psychologically impossible to get the totality of all experience in a single act of perception, the mind has no other way but to take recourse to mediational processes of knowledge to give us knowledge of the whole universe or absolute knowledge. Where intuition is the same as direct apprehension, it gives us direct contact with a part of reality only. Where, however, intuition is identical with mystic trance, it gives us probably still less, perhaps a void, a negation of all experience. This is like shutting out all inlets of light and living in artificial darkness, actuated by a perverse feeling so to say. Immediate experience and mediate knowledge through concepts built on experience are the only means of reaching reality. If we reject them we sever our connections with reality. Even if mystic trance gives us any experience at all it is, after all, one of the many experiences, it is just coming in contact with one of the many thousands and thousands of aspects of reality.

No single act of perception or intuition can, thus, bring us in contact with the whole of reality. So, direct perception gives us parts of reality. To counteract this difficulty, the mind has the wonderful power of exercising memory, through which it preserves all particular experiences in it. It takes photos of the aspects of reality presented to it, in acts of perception so to say, with the help of memory, which we call memory objects. From these memory objects, it builds up universals or concepts or class types and, connecting them, arrives at mediate knowledge. It forms series of knowledge relations, and ultimately unifying, them in a harmonised system, arrives at

absolute knowledge. It is like taking photographs of particular parts of a very big object because the whole of it cannot be placed within the focus of the camera, and then fitting up those partial views into a whole picture, each view taking up its proper place, and thus ultimately succeeding in picturing up the whole big thing. If one would try to have a full picture of the Himalayas, with all its peaks and ranges depicted in it, one would adopt a similar course. We have to take recourse to mediational processes of knowledge simply because the totality of reality, the Absolute, is too vast an object to come within a simple act of perception.

The main complaint of Bergson against the intellectual or mediational method of knowledge is, that it is analytic and as such always tries to reduce reality to a static dead thing, whereas reality is a flowing dynamic process. Granted that the intellectual method has the bad habit of reducing dynamic objects to a static position. But nobody would come forward and declare that it is an absolutely incurable habit of the intellectual method. It is not that the mediational method is incapable of painting dynamic reality. If it is in the habit of giving reality a static form, one can be on one's guard and see that the intellectual method does not commit such mistake. This habit can be cured and the mediational method perfected, so that it does not in future commit the mistake of painting reality as static and immobile. Since this vicious habit is after all curable, there is no justification for banishing the intellectual method from the field of philosophy altogether and falling back upon intuition, to give us a first-hand direct knowledge of totality of reality. This is expecting too much of intuition. By the very nature of reality and the limitations of the powers of direct perception we are bound to take help of the mediate process of knowledge for grasping of the totality of reality. It is true that mediate knowledge gives us a translation of reality and never reality direct. But it is in its power to make the translation

as closely similar to reality as possible. If we are not satisfied with that, there is no way out of it, for the totality of reality can never be grasped in a single act of direct intuition or perception. The intellectual method is like a window bringing outside light into the room. It may be that the window pane is not quite clear and, therefore, does not admit light properly. That is no reason why the window should be shut up altogether and, out of dissatisfaction, we should try to dig out an underground channel and bring light through it. The underground channel cannot be expected to bring more light to us than the window, when kept properly clear. To the reasonable man, it would appear a ridiculous thing to attempt. He would rather cleanse the window pane and use it. Bergson's recommendations are similar to this. Since intuition cannot give us the whole of reality, why not reform and perfect the intellectual method, which is by nature more qualified to give us knowledge of the whole of reality, and then use it? When there is nothing better, why not make the best use of a bad bargain?

In absolute knowledge we thus find that intellect and intuition, both immediate and mediate processes of knowledge, have to work together hand in hand, like friends. While the immediate method can give us partial direct views of reality, we have to depend wholly on the mediational method for the reconstruction of the whole of reality in knowledge. Absolute knowledge is a magnificent structure, made possible by the joint efforts of immediate and mediate processes of knowledge. Each act of perception has been preserved in mind as a memory image and, working on them, the mind has connected them together in the unity of a system of knowledge. The memory images are like bricks, while the knowledge relations are like mortar and lime, joining them together into a unified system. Both methods have their own contributions to make and both play an equally important part in the building up of absolute knowledge. In another sense, absolute knowledge

effects a reconciliation between presentationistic and representationistic views of reality. It holds that only parts of reality are presented directly to the mind, but the whole of reality is incapable of being presented directly to the mind. The whole of reality can only be grasped by the mind through the help of mediate knowledge ; it can only be represented to the mind.

APPENDIX I.

THE GENETIC METHOD OF TEACHING THE BENGALI ALPHABET.*

* * * * *

The Bengali Alphabet is usually taught, on basis of the classification of letters made in grammar, according to difference in sound. This method is indeed helpful to learning the sound of letters, but it does not help learning their shape and is rather an obstacle to it. The object of a primer is not teaching the dialect, but teaching, reading and writing of a language. The principal ingredient of a spoken dialect is sound, carrying some meaning with it. The ingredient of a written language is letters, standing for these significant sounds. Each letter is meant to represent a particular sound. These visible representations are to be seen by the eye for learning to read and write a language. Children get acquainted with the various vowel and consonant sounds forming the materials of a spoken language, long before they learn its written form, by hearing others speak that language. When a child is to be taught the letters of a language, it is unnecessary to teach it anew the sounds they represent. Only the letters standing for these significant sounds have to be taught. The classification of letters on basis of phonetic differences, is not the least helpful in teaching the beginner the visible representations of these sounds, called letters. On the other hand, they make things difficult for him. If the letters are

* Translation of relevant portions of the Introduction to the *Bāṅglā-Akshar-Parichaya* (Bengali Primer) written by the author.

arranged according to their general similarities of shape, the letters can be taught more quickly and easily. On this consideration, the usual classification of letters on basis of sound has been avoided in this book and classification on basis of difference in shape has been substituted.

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Another characteristic of this primer is that instead of the conventional method of teaching sounds by combining letter with letter, an attempt has been made to teach letters with the help of easy sound combinations or words. The letter that has been sought to be taught with the help of a group of words, is to be found, either in the beginning or in the end of such words and again, these words are sought to be represented with the help of pictures. This new method of teaching letters of the Alphabet is absolutely different from the accepted method of teaching letters separately from the very beginning. In this new method one advances from the concrete to the abstract. In the accepted method, an attempt is made to move from the abstract to the concrete. It is now to be ascertained what method of advancement of knowledge is approved of by psychology. For understanding this, we will have to find out the manner in which knowledge develops in the mind. The law of development of knowledge is that it advances from concrete to the abstract, from the totality to the particular, from the whole to the parts. For this reason, a child can more easily recognise, and keep in memory, the shape of a whole word or group of sounds as represented in a group of letters. But it takes time to recognise and learn the different constituent letters standing for the group.

We find that in the history of man the evolution of the Alphabet has taken place according to the same manner in which a child learns the letters of the Alphabet. We can trace four stages in the history of the evolution of the Alphabet. They are given, in brief outline, below :—

1. The first stage—Hieroglyphics.

In the old Egyptian Hieroglyphics we find that words have been sought to be represented by pictures instead of letters. This is the first stage in the evolution of the Alphabet.

2. The second stage—Ideograph.

In Chinese Ideography we find that a certain written symbol has been made to stand for either a thing or a mental concept or a name. It is the outcome of a combination of the principles of the Hieroglyphics with the principles of the Phonetic Alphabet. It is the second stage of the evolution of the Alphabet.

3. The third stage—Syllabic Alphabet.

The Japanese letters have evolved from the Ideographic Alphabet of the Chinese. Here, a letter represents a whole syllable constituted by vowels and consonants. Unlike the Hieroglyphic, it does not represent things and unlike the Ideographic Alphabet, it does not stand for concepts. This represents the third stage in the evolution of the Alphabet and it can be called Syllabic Alphabet. Bengali Alphabet, like Sanskrit, belongs to this class; for the so-called consonants 'Ka,' 'Kha,' etc., each represent a syllable formed by the combination of a vowel and a consonant.

4. The fourth stage—Phonetic Alphabet.

The next stage is to be traced in the cuneiform characters. The letters here have the shape of the blades of an arrow. These letters slowly evolved from the Hieroglyphic stage and ultimately reached the stage of Phonetic Alphabet. The letters here came to represent not whole syllables, but each constituent vowel or consonant representing such syllable separately. This is the final stage of Alphabetic evolution. The Phoenician letters belong to this class and from them have originated the Greek, the Hebrew, the Roman and other modern European Scripts. Here, each letter represents a particular vowel or consonant sound.

The Phoenician Alphabet has evolved from the Egyptian Hieroglyphics according to genetic laws of growth. From this, it is proved that Alphabet of all kinds evolved from Heiroglyphics under the genetic law. Here (1) the use of a picture or symbol for a thing or idea, (2) becomes substituted by the sign for such thing or idea and (3) that symbol for the name in its turn, is substituted by signs for syllables forming such name and from such syllabic signs (4) are evolved signs representing separately the constituent sounds of a syllable. It is thus that the four kinds of Alphabet are originated.

The fundamental principle of the science of teaching is that teaching should follow the law of growth of the mind. The mental development of each individual man takes place in exactly the same order in which the mental development of the race took place. If one is to admit this law of mental growth, it becomes evident that the child should be taught the Alphabet according to the same law. . . .

In this book, an arrangement has been made for teaching the Alphabet according to this genetic method.

In the first stage it is natural for the child to learn letters with the help of pictures. Accordingly, in this book, by the side of each word, a picture signifying the word has been placed by the side of it. The child here should only be asked to see the picture and name it. If it succeeds in doing that, the learning of Hieroglyphics will be completed.

In the second stage, the shape of the letter group representing the name of the picture should be grasped by the child all at once. The picture should be kept covered with the palm of the hand and the child should be asked what the letter group represents. If he can successfully name it he learns Ideography all right.

In the third stage the first or the last portion of the names which are common and similar to one another, should be taught separately impressing the fact that these common portions represent the same sound group. If they are in a

position to recognise these sound groups forming parts of a word, they master the syllabic Alphabet.

After that comes the fourth stage where the child should be taught that letters like 'ka,' 'kha,' etc., are constituted by two different sounds such as 'K' and 'A' together forming 'ka.' They should separately learn the sound and shape of *hasanta* letters (pure consonants). When the child masters this, the learning of the Phonetic Alphabet will be completed.

If there were no system of changed forms of letters under different combinations in the Bengali script the learning of the Alphabet would have been completed here and pages 24 to 40 of this book devoted to the teaching of these changed forms of letter combinations would have been found superfluous. For the sake of removing the illiteracy of the masses and popularising the use of Bengali typewriters, we should give up the use of these unnecessary letter forms and introduce pure vowel and consonant forms of unchanging shapes instead.

APPENDIX II.

THE GENETIC LAW TRACED IN THE GROWTH OF LOVE.*

The speciality of these poems is that they record a realistic story of the growth of conjugal love which easily beats both in point of imagery and beauty, the imaginary creation of poets and the mystic realisation of meditators. I cannot make out whether I should call them lyrics recording feelings rising from separation or the story of a heavenly love. It is both. In these poems history is wedded with poetry, the real has proved to be more wonderful than the imaginary. That is the special feature of this book of poems.

We can trace three stages in the growth of the universe and of all things appertaining to it.

From the point of view of the universe we find—(1) first, there is one undifferentiated whole, next (2) that is growing into complexity and diversity and lastly (3) all the differentiated diverse parts get reconciled to one another as parts of the one complex whole without losing their intrinsic differences.

This first stage in the development of the universe where there is unity without diversity, we may indicate as the stage of harmony, as undeveloped *Prakriti* or *Brahman* without name or forms. The second stage in the life-history of the Absolute, we may call the stage of conflict or the stage of duality. In this stage, the world and its beings are separated from *Brahman*, the one is here manifested as many. The third stage in the history of the universe we may call the

* Translation of the relevant portions of the Introduction written by the author to the *Vyāthā o Vedanā*, a book of love poems by Hiranmay Banerjee.

stage of re-established harmony, where there is plurality in unity and unity in plurality. In this stage, through a process of meditation, knowledge or devotion to an art, it is realised that the world and its many beings, though separate from the central principle, do not come in conflict with the unity of the whole, but rather help the realisation of a complex unity. Just as the part cannot exist without the whole, the whole cannot exist without its parts. What is one and limitless as a unity, is the world and the many as a plurality. If the limitless would not enclose within its embrace the limited thing, it would become limited in its own turn. For this reason, the world and its beings cannot be placed outside *Brahman*, nor can they be explained away as illusions. The diversity and conflict in the universe have to be explained as the natural development or creation of the Creative Principle for the sake of infusing variety and interest in the Drama of the Universe. The realisation of this truth, through meditation, through knowledge and through love, leads to the third stage of the development of the universe, which is the stage of re-establishment of harmony.

Just as we can trace three stages in the development of the universe, in the same manner, we can trace these very three stages in every part of the universe. There is the same law for the growth of the whole as well as the part. In every being, in every living cell, in every molecule, in every atom and in every electron we can discern three stages of growth. Thus even the minutest part of the universe is in itself a universe, which follows the same law of growth.

The realisation of love that is recorded in this book of poems also subjected itself to the rule of that same law of growth in three stages. These stages are indicated below.

The first stage is represented by the first to the sixteenth poem.

Here we come across the picture of first love. Love here is simple, unalloyed, without suspicion and full of mutual

confidence. Here there is no quarrel, no conflict, no wounding of feelings, no suspicions. It is a stage of quietude, placidity and steadfastness. Such is the condition on the eve of separation.

In the first poem we find that the first meeting of the lover with his beloved has filled his heart with a new inspiration. Immediately after, follows the pitiful picture of leave-taking of the lover for going away to far-off countries. In the following poems we find that the sweet memories of the first union are one by one reviving in the mind. How the first meeting took place is very beautifully painted in the following lines :—

I was going alone along the road,
When I met with you.

* * * *

Methought, I could recognise you
O unknown stranger ;

Some night long long ago

I must have seen you.

This meeting of ours to-day

Is not the first one.

In the past, by some enduring knot

You had tied me.

That is why I feel, I know you,

O, stranger mine.

It is in the nature of such love to accept as known for ages, a partner who was previously absolutely unknown.

The " gifts showered by this stranger " are described as follows in another poem :—

The forest of my mind

Lay dead and without feeling ;—

There, with great shivering,

By your enlivening touch,

What a great revival

You called forth !

This reminds one of a poem by the poet Chandidas :—

Without a beloved, the mind withers
And writhes with apprehensions.
It writhes and writhes
And dies though living.
Who recognises such deaths?
What sort of death is that?
The person who recognises it, lives
And shares death.
When thus, death is shared, both live
And people cannot know that.
It is the nature of love, to be restless,
Says Chandidas the Brahmin.

Persons who have been roaming alone in the wilderness of life suddenly discovered each other as their beloved and realised what a tragic death their heart had died for want of a lover and as soon as the partner came and took share of this death, the hearts of both became revived and they started a new life.

In the despair rising from the depressing effects of an alien atmosphere, what great comfort it was to receive a letter from the beloved, like a flash of lightning in darkness! That is described in such language as it makes difficult for one to restrain tears :—

Just a few lines, written in a known hand
Come to my door with their bosom filled, with honey!
They wiped away all the gloom of separation,
And brought to me the sweet touch of my beloved!
Tears flow down my eyes, I do not know why,
O joy, what was far away came so near me!

The second stage is represented by the sixteenth to the thirty-ninth poem.

Here we find that suspicion has eaten into the core of the simple trustful love following the first union. In the darkness of the overpowering despondency of a lonely life, the

little lightning flashes of hopes of reunion are gradually becoming few and far between. The separated lover thinks, my beloved does not respond to my love; may be the person "for whom I weep has forgotten me altogether; she does not weep for me in her turn." This misgiving causes irritation, he feels outraged. "Forget me please" (Poem No. 17) represents such a feeling. But this is too much to endure and so the mind has to be consoled that the beloved cannot desert the lover, though not spoken actually in words, she loves him in her heart. With this thought the heart weeps for the beloved over again. The lonely lover dreams that in the small hours of the night his beloved came and wept:—

Did you come last night,
 In the quiet of the small hours
 And did you look at me
 With a sorrowful face ?
 * * * * *
 Your eyes, they appeared
 So full of pain !
 What tears you shed
 Depressing my heart !
 That must be why I discovered in the morning breeze
 A mournful tune flowing
 And found the leaves of the trees by my door
 Drooping with the burden of dew.
 You will weep and go back like this
 And can I endure that ?
 You will feel gloomy for me
 And shall I sit idle ? .

When, one by one, all the hopes of reunion broke down, love found out a new and higher order of life for itself from out of this despondency. It welcomed separation and decided to treasure up the pain of separation in its heart and thus pass its days:—

I do not want you in my life ;
 I want that you should remain away always,

You should remain in the world that is never to be,
 You should remain only in the mind,
 You should remain in my dreams, you should remain always
 Out of my sight. Let your separation
 Burn my heart like this all the time,
 Let not its yearning for getting you back
 Ever cease, but always continue.

Afterwards, when such an attitude became unbearable, the lover felt the burden of life too great for himself. The lover then sought for the help of death for his relief from all suffering :—

Death, do come
 And take me,
 Spread your dark hair
 About me—
 My burden of pains
 I cannot bear
 To the other side of life
 Take me.

The third stage is comprised by the fortieth to the fiftieth poem.

Here we meet with the third stage of love. It is the stage of re-established harmony in love. Love is now beyond the reach of doubt and suspicion. In such love, separation does not hamper its growth, nor cut its roots, but on the other hand, makes it more deep and more pure. That is why Kālidāsa has said: "It is a wrong thing to say that love withers in separation ; on the other hand for absence of enjoyment love concentrates more on the object of desire." In this stage, it does not matter for the lover whether there is response from the beloved or not ; that he loves his beloved is a satisfaction by itself. The neglect on the part of the beloved does not any more make him feel dejected ; he does not any more find fault with the conduct of his beloved ; whatever she does, appears faultless to him. The beginning

of such a stage in the development of love is indicated in the following poem :—

Whether you love me or you love me not,
 I love you all the same.
 I do not care to think, whether you love me
 Or whether your heart aches for me.
 I only pray that I for ever may
 Love you alone.

When, thus, love became selfless and desireless, the lover earned again his right to reunion. Unless the fire of separation burns out all the dross in the lover, love cannot be genuine. It is for this reason that in the Kumārasambhaba, Pārbati had to endure the sight of the burning of Madana and practise severe penances counting her beauty useless for winning the love of Mahādeva. It is for this reason again that Kālidāsa subjected Dushmanta to the curse of Durbāsā and burnt out the sensuous character of his first love in the fire of his sorrow for separation from Sakuntalā and then qualified him for reunion with Sakuntalā in heaven.

I end my introduction by quoting the poem describing the reunion of the lover with his dear ones after passing the difficult test of separation :—

I come back again to you all.
 Have I anything to be sorry for, to-day?
 Nothing, there is nothing, absolutely nothing.
 Those for whom I wept a long long time,
 Those who were like dreams in my mind,
 I got them all back, in this moment;—
 All my dear ones, my fatherland,
 My cloudless sky, clad in deep blue.
 Why do you look at me so timidly?
 Why do you look at my face? What do you find there?
 Tears flowing from the eyes? That is nothing.
 It is certain that I have no sorrows to-day.
 It is the overflow of boundless happiness
 That seeks freedom through the outlet of my eyes!

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